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MUTUAL FUND SCANDALS- A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN THE REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE
INVESTMENTS
Jerry W. Markham*

I. INTRODUCTION

The mutual fund market timing and late trading scandals initiated by
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in 2003 led to settlements from
industry participants that totaled over $4.25 billion.1 However, Spitzer's
actions were controversial and undercut the role of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which had been given pervasive
regulatory authority over mutual funds by the Investment Company Act of
1940.2 The SEC had been embarrassed by earlier Spitzer prosecutions of
financial analyst conflicts on Wall Street and by a spate of accounting
scandals at Enron and elsewhere. The individuals and companies involved
in those scandals had all been under the SEC's purview, but that agency did
nothing to prevent or uncover those problems. Spitzer's actions against the
mutual funds made the SEC look even more ineffective. In order to restore
its tarnished image, the SEC imposed additional regulations on mutual
funds, including a requirement that they increase the number of outside
directors on their boards and split the role of chairman and chief executive

' Professor of Law, Florida International University School of Law at Miami. I want to thank Sean
Markham, a third year law student at the Charleston Law School, for his research assistance in the
writing of this article.
1. Susanne Craig & Tom Lauricella, How Merrill, Defying Warnings, Let 3 Brokers Ignite a
Scandal, WALL ST. J., March 27, 2006, at Al. See generally Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a
Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and the SEC's Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42
Hous. L. REV. 1271 (2006) (describing these scandals); Mercer E. Bullard, Insider Trading in Mutual
Funds, 84 OR. L. REv. 821 (2005) (same); Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of Mutual Fund
Reform, 26 PACE L. REv. 133 (2005) (same).
2. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000)).
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officer.3
The actions taken by the SEC were highly politicized, and critics
noted that there was no empirical evidence that such a requirement would
have prevented the mutual fund scandals or assured better performance
results.4 Adding further embarrassment to the agency, those corporate
governance rules were struck down twice by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals.5 An effort by the SEC to regulate hedge funds because of their
role in the late trading and market timing scandals met the same fate.6 The
SEC's proposals were, in all events, nothing more than face-saving
gestures. There already existed a pervasive regulatory scheme for mutual
funds under the Investment Company Act of 1940, including requirements
for outside directors.' However, those restrictions provided little or no
protection to mutual fund shareholders, and adding more bells and whistles
will not produce a better result. The corporate governance model for
mutual funds simply failed. This raises the issue of whether other
governance structures would be more effective in providing shareholder
protection or would at least serve equally as well.8 Are mutual fund
investors really shareholders in a traditional sense who need the protection
of a board of directors and attending fiduciary duties? Alternatively, are
they simply consumers who base their investment decisions on product
price in the form of investment returns after expenses?9
This article will examine the SEC's response to the late trading
scandals and provide a comparative analysis of alternate mechanisms for
regulating collective investments. The article first traces the growth and
development of mutual funds and their regulation. This includes a
description of the early history of investment companies, the development
of the open-end mutual fund in the 1920s, the problems encountered by
investment companies in that era and the regulation that followed under the
Investment Company Act of 1940. The article next describes the late

3. This saga is described in JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S.
CORPORATE SCANDALS, FROM ENRON TO REFORM, 400-34 (2006).
4. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 438-39.
5. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005) and
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
6. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
7. See infra Part lI.C and accompanying text,
8. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy ("AEl") and the Brookings Institute have
conducted a joint policy initiative on this issue. See Ronald A. Cass & Henry G. Mann, SEC d la
Donaldson,
WALL ST. J.,
July 1, 2005,
at A8, available at http://www.aeibrookings.org/policy/page.php?id=220. AEI has also conducted a number of conferences on alternative
regulations of mutual funds that are co-moderated by Peter Wallison, AEI Resident Fellow, and Robert
E. Litan, a Brookings Institute fellow. This paper is based in part on a presentation at one of those
conferences, and I want to especially thank Peter Wallison for inspiring and commenting on this article.
9. See Paula Tkac, Tinker, Tailor, Mutual Fund Adviser, WALL ST. J., April 12, 2006, at A14
(concluding that mutual funds are simply consumer transactions).
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trading and market timing scandals and the SEC's response, as well as the
role of hedge funds in those scandals. Alternative regulatory schemes for
collective investments are then examined, including hedge funds,
commodity pools, common trust funds, collective investment funds for
pensions, endowments and insurance company reserves. Some other
alternative regulatory and market schemes are also considered, including
unitary investment funds, unit investment trusts and trust indentures. None
of the latter mediums provide shareholder status for the persons supplying
the funds that are under management and some do not provide the
protections of fiduciary duties. The article concludes that alternative
mechanisms, even those that do not have a board of directors, would serve
equally as well as the current regulatory structure for mutual funds, which
has proved to be overly costly, complex, and ineffective.
II. INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION
A.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

"The investment company concept dates to Europe in the late 1700s,"
according to K. Geert Rouwenhorst in The Origins of Value, "when 'a
Dutch merchant and broker... invited subscriptions from investors to form
a trust... to provide an opportunity to diversify for small investors with
limited means."'' 0 This trust was created by Abraham van Ketwich and
was called the Eendraght Maakt Magt. It sold 2,000 shares to subscribers
whose funds would be collectively invested in "bonds issued by foreign
governments and banks and in plantation loans in the West Indies."" The
sponsor was paid a fee of 0.5 percent of the subscriptions plus an annual
fee of 2,000 guilders. An annual accounting12was required, and the sponsor
was monitored by two independent trustees.
The Societe Generale de Belgique, a Belgium trust originally created
in 1822 by King William of the Netherlands, was another collective
investment enterprise that initially invested in foreign government loans
and later in commercial businesses. 3 The Societe Generale de Credit
Mobilier was organized in France in 1852 to supply new enterprises with

10. WILLIAM N. GOETZMANN & K. GEERT ROUWENHORST, THE ORIGINS OF VALUE 254 (2005)

11. Id.
12. Id. at 254, 257.
13. E.C. HARWOOD & ROBERT L. BLAIR, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND FUNDS FROM THE INVESTOR'S
POINT OF VIEW 12 (1937); THEODORE J. GRAYSON, INVESTMENT TRUSTS 11 (1928). A decade or so
later, the Societe Generale Pour Favoriser l'lndustrie Nationale Des Pays-Bas, initially a Belgian firm,
converted loans to defaulting businesses into stocks of those firms and later sold the stock into the
public market. That enterprise formed another investment trust with the Rothschilds in 1836 called the
Societe Des S Capitalistes Reunis Dans un But de Mutualite Industrielle, which held shares in various
companies. RONDO CAMERON, FRANCE AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE 147-48 (2d
ed. 1961).
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banking facilities.' " It invested in railroad projects in France and in joint
stock companies. 5 The Credit Mobilier, which effectively operated as a
closed-end investment company, was not without controversy. Critics
charged that it was actually a giant stock-jobber that was manipulating the
market for the companies in which it invested. 6
The creation of investment companies became popular in London in
the 1860s. They operated as limited liability companies upon the
enactment of the English Companies Act in 1862.7 Their numbers
included the London Financial Association and the International Financial
Society.' 8 Those investment companies sought to pool small investors'
funds and provide for expert management, but both companies failed. 9
Investment trust companies were formed in London in the 1870s as a
medium for the purchase of American corporate securities. 0
The
American Trust Company in London was one such enterprise. 21 The
Submarine Cables Trust invested in the securities of telegraph companies.
Robert Fleming, the grandfather of the creator of the James Bond novels,
was said to be founder of the Scottish investment trusts that were popular in
the 1870s.2 ' Fleming's Scottish American Investment Trust was managed
by a board of advisors and invested funds for about 500 clients.24 By 1886,
there were twelve investment trusts that were trading on the London Stock

14. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 322-23 (2002).
15. GEORGE W. EDWARDS, THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 51-52 (1938).

16. Money Affairs on the Continent, N.Y. TIMES, October 3, 1837, at 2. The French Credit Mobilier
became a model for the Credit Mobilier railroad construction company that caused so much scandal in
the United States over the building of the Union Pacific Railroad. See generally MAURY KLEIN, UNION
PACIFIC, THE REBIRTH (1987) (describing the building of the Union Pacific railroad and the role of the
Credit Mobilier). The American entity was used to loot the Union Pacific and its officers bribed
numerous politicians in order to protect the company's interests. Representatives Oak Ames of
Massachusetts and James Brook of New York were censured by Congress for accepting those bribes
and the career of Vice President Schuyler Colfax was destroyed. ROBERT V. REMINI, THE HOUSE, THE
HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 219- 221 (2006).

17. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 323.

18. Id.
19. HARWOOD & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 13-15; GRAYSON, supra note 13, at 1-2. The Foreign and
Colonial Government Trust, which was formed in London in the 1860s, was a global trust that
purchased securities in several foreign countries. It promised to redeem a portion of its shares through
an annual drawing. That arrangement was held to be an illegal lottery. CHARLES RAW ET AL., DO YOU
SINCERELY WANT TO BE RICH? THE FULL STORY OF BERNARD CORNFELD AND IOS 33 (1971).
20. Typically, an English investment trust would set aside one half percent of the first £500,000 of
capital and one quarter percent above that amount for expenses. This included payments to directors.
HARWOOD & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 14.
20. DELORES GREENBERG, FINANCIERS AND RAILROADS 42 (1980).
21. Id.
22. HARWOOD & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 14.
23. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 323.
24. RAW ET AL., supra note 19, at 28; DIANA B. HENRIQUES, FIDELITY'S WORLD 51 (Simon &
Schuster, 1995).
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Exchange.25
B.

AMERICAN INVESTMENT COMPANIES

Although the model for American investment companies is the
English investment trust, there were some collective investment schemes in
America that predated those ventures.2 6 The Massachusetts Hospital Life
Insurance Company ("MHLIC") was originally chartered in 1818 as an
insurance company. It soon began to operate "somewhat similar to a trust
company, but the funds deposited were commingled rather than kept as
separate trusts, and it was, therefore, more like a modem investment
2
trust., 27 MHLIC used its trust powers to invest money for annuities. 1
MHLIC also accepted investments in excess of $500 from subscribers for a
fee.29 MHLIC agreed to repay the deposit and any gains, less any loss by
debt or investment, usually at the death of the investor.3" Other nineteenth
century investment trusts in America included the United States Mortgage
Company that was organized in New York in 187131 and the New York
Stock Trust that was formed in 1890.32 The Boston Personal Property Trust
that was formed in 1893 was a collective investment fund that was invested
in a diversified group of securities. In fact, it was a tontine scheme that
was to terminate twenty years after the death of the last survivor. The
trustees were paid five percent of the gross income of the trust plus other
fees."

25. Those investment companies experienced heavy losses during the Baring Panic in 1890.
supra note 13, at 14-17. Subsequent investigations revealed some questionable practices by
those investment trusts, including schemes in which the depreciated securities in their portfolios were
sold to new trusts and sold to the public at inflated values. LAWRENCE M. SPEAKER, THE INVESTMENT
TRUST 13 (1924).
26. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 358 (2002).
27. HERMAN E. KRoOSS & MARTIN R. BLYN, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 58
(1971).
28. Supporters of Secretary of State Daniel Webster purchased an annuity for $37,000 from MHLIC
that provided Webster with an annual income of $1,000. ROBERT V. REM1NI, DANIEL WEBSTER, THE
MAN AND HIS TIMES 601 (1997). This slush fund raised some ethical questions, and "someone
remarked that the proposition was 'indelicate' and he wondered how Mr. Webster would take it? 'How
will he take it?' snorted [Harrison Gray] Otis. 'Why, quarterly, to be sure!' SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON
& JOHN PAUL JONES, A SAILOR'S BIOGRAPHY 359 (1959).
29. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 324.
GRAYSON,

30. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES,

H.R. DOC. NO. 75-707, at 42 (1939). MHLIC managed a portion of the funds that had been placed by
Benjamin Franklin into his "Franklin Fund." Franklin wanted those funds to be invested and
accumulated for 100 years, distributed in part and the remainder accumulated again for another 100
years. MHLIC was eventually able to distribute some $800,000 from the investments made from the
$16,000 that MHLIC had been given to invest for the Franklin Fund. KROOSS & BLYN, supra note 27,
at 59.
31. LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIN & WILLIAM WREN HAY, INVESTMENT AND SPECULATION 106
(1931).
32. HARWOOD & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 24.
33. H.R. DOC. No. 75-707, at 45. Another form of investment company was the "commercial
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"Popularization of the investment company as a medium for
investment in a diversified portfolio of securities, particularly common
stocks, began only in 1921."3" Investment companies were then promoted
as a way for small investors to diversify their security holdings. It was said
that this investment medium provided investors with "the opportunity of
investing small amounts in a large number of securities, diversified
according to undertaking, geographical location, and type of security."35
The investment companies offered expertise in the management of the
investors' funds.36 "During the 1920's the type of investment company
which was almost exclusively organized was the closed-end management
investment company."3 7 Funds were raised by those entities through
common and preferred stock offerings and bond issues.3"
The American investment trusts in the 1920s differed from the British
investment trusts by the fact that the latter took long-term positions in
securities and did not actively trade their portfolios.3 9 In contrast, the
American investment trusts of the 1920s "were founded in speculative
desire and dedicated to capital appreciation rather than investment
return."4 Recognizing that the investment trusts were often speculative
enterprises, the Investment Bankers Association successfully advocated
that the term "investment company" should be substituted for "investment
trust," the latter term connoting a more conservative investment approach.4 1
Otherwise, regulatory efforts to deal with the speculative operations of
investment companies were fitful at best. New York authorities warned
that the investment trusts were being used to defraud investors.4 2
Nevertheless, an effort to adopt legislation in 1927 to regulate the
investment trusts failed in that state. Although California, Utah and other
states did adopt some regulations, they had no effect on the burgeoning
number of investment companies.43

trusts" that bought automobile and other consumer loans from the dealer originating the transaction.
See In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1929) (describing such operations). Mortgage bond
houses were also operating in the 1920s that allowed investors to participate in a portfolio of
commercial mortgage bonds. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 147.
34. H.R. Doc. No. 75-707, at 114.
35. GRAYSON, supra note 13, at 7.
36. H.R. Doc. NO. 75-707, at 108-09.
37. WAGNER, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, S.
REP. NO. 76-1775 at 3 (1940).
38. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 141-42.
39. British TrustsNote Our Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1929, at 8.
40. FLETCHER, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 339 (1934).
41. HARWOOD & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 33. The term investment trust "seems a misnomer coined

for the gullible. The so-called 'trusts' are simply holding companies for various kinds of stocks whose
selection is intrusted to the directors thereof-hardly the common interpretation of the word 'trust.'
United States v. Weinberger, 4 F. Supp. 892, 892 (D.N.J. 1933).
42. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 142-43.
43. HARWOOD & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 30.
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The investment companies sold their shares to the public as a means to
diversify their investments, but the investment trusts frequently acquired
"concentrated holdings in particular industries, thereby subjecting the
investor to the very risk he was seeking to avoid."
Many of the
investment companies gave shareholders only a general description of their
investment strategies. Preceding Eliot Spitzer by decades, a New York
deputy attorney general charged that investment companies were "merely
blind pools engaging in speculation.' 5 They were viewed as blind pools
because shareholders did not know what stocks management were selecting
for investment." There were other abuses. Sponsors of investment trusts
retained warrants that allowed them to profit from the investment trust with
no risk.47 The investment trusts were used as a place to dump securities
underwritten by their sponsors for investment banking clients. 48 The
investment trusts often raised funds through bond sales, which gave them
leverage that was magnified by buying stocks on margin. 49 Self-dealing
was common and investment companies often changed their trading
strategies without informing their shareholders."
A "veritable epidemic of investment trusts afflicted the Nation" before
the Stock Market Crash of 1929.51 By 1924, over $75 million had been
invested in investment companies, up from less than $15 million in the
prior year.52 In 1925, investment trusts holdings doubled to $150 million. 3
Some 140 investment companies were formed between 1921 and 1926."4 A
new investment company was being created every other day in 1928.55
"[B]y 1929 they were being created at the rate of almost one a day."5 6 The
assets of investments companies rose to over $1 billion in 1928. Another
$2.1 billion was added in 1929.5' Between those two years, the number of
44. S.Rep. No. 73-1455, 438 (1933).
45. Markham, supra note 26, at 143.
46. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSIONS,
COMPANIES, H.R. Doc. NO. 75-707 at 107 (1939).
47. HARWOOD & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 34.

INVESTMENT

TRUSTS

AND

INVESTMENT

49HENRIQUES, supranote 24, at 59.

49. WILLIAM K. KLINGMAN, 1929: THE YEAR OF THE GREAT CRASH 61-62 (1989).
50. WAGNER, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, S.

REP. No. 76-1755, at 7 (1940).
51. FLETCHER, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 339 (1934).

52. Id. at 334.
53. HARDWOOD & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 30.
54. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INVESTMENT
H. DOc. No. 75-707, at 64 (1939).

TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES,

55. ALEX GRONER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

286 (1972).
56. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, S.REP. No.
76-1755, at 3 (1940).
57. HENRIQUES, supra note 24, at 58. The NYSE had proclaimed in 1924 that its members should
avoid being involved with investment trust that did not protect investors. E.C. HARWOOD & ROBERT L.
BLAIR, supra note 13, at 29. Nevertheless, the NYSE began listing investment trusts in 1929. H. DOC.
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investment company shareholders increased from 55,000 to over 500,000.58
Almost all of these enterprises were "closed-end" investment
companies that invested in securities rather than producing a product or
service. Otherwise, they operated like any other corporation in the
distribution and sale of their securities. Investors bought and sold shares in
investment companies through a secondary market after the initial
distribution of the shares.59 The "open-end" mutual funds, which dominate
the market today, were not created until 1924.60 "None of them, however,
achieved great importance in the investment company field before 1927.61
"This type of company allowed shareholders to have their shares redeemed
at any time upon giving a prescribed notice. 62 The redemption was based
on the net asset value ("NAV") of the shares, less a charge, which was
usually $2.63 The open-end mutual funds continually offered and redeemed
their own shares. Instead of a secondary trading market, owners of mutual
funds purchased and sold their ownership interests from and to the mutual
fund.64 Those purchases and redemptions were based on the NAV of the
fund's shares as calculated at the end of the day on which the redemption
or purchase order is received.65

No. 75-707, at 63 n.161.
58. HENRIQUES, supra note 24, at 63.
59. As noted by the Supreme Court:
[A] mutual fund is an investment company, which, typically, is continuously engaged in the
issuance of its shares and stands ready at any time to redeem the securities as to which it is
the issuer; a closed-end investment company typically does not issue shares after its initial
organization except at infrequent intervals and does not stand ready to redeem its shares.
Because open-end investment companies will redeem their shares, they must constantly issue
securities to prevent shrinkage of assets. In contrast, the capital structure of a closed-end
company is similar to that of other corporations; if its shareholders wish to sell, they must do
so in the marketplace. Without any obligation to redeem, closed-end companies need not
continuously seek new capital.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 51 (1981) (footnotes and
citation omitted).
60. The first open-end mutual fund was the Massachusetts Investors Trust that was created by
Edward G. Leffler in Boston. George Putnam formed another open-end fund, Incorporated Investors, in
1925. The State Street Investment Corporation, which was originally formed by Paul Cabot, Richard
Saltonstall and Richard Paine in 1924, became an open-end company in 1927. H. DOc. No. 75-707, at
101-103; JOHN BROOKS, THE Go-Go YEARS 129 (1973).
61. H. Doc. No.75-707, at 101.
62. Id. at 105.
63. Id.
64. Because of this unique arrangement, "private trading in mutual fund shares is virtually
nonexistent." United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 549 (1973) (footnote omitted). "These
features-continuous and unlimited distribution and compulsory redemption-are... 'unique
characteristic[s]' of this form of investment." United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422
U.S. 694, 698 (1975) (alteration in original) (citing Cartwright,411 U.S. at 549).
65. Quoting from an SEC study, the Supreme Court has noted that:
Mutual fund shares are not traded on exchanges or generally in the over-the-counter market,
as are other securities, but are sold by the fund through a principal underwriter, and redeemed
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The investment companies were especially hard hit by the Stock
Market Crash of 1929. The United Founders Corp. and the American
66
Founders Corp. were the largest investment trusts operating in the 1920s.
The price of American Founders Corp. stock dropped from $30 to 38
cents. 67 The stock of the United Founders Corp. fell from a high of over
$75 to 25 cents a share. 6' Another very popular investment company, the
Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation, was trading at $1.75 per share in
1932, down from a high of $326.69 A spin off of that company, the Blue
Ridge Corporation, witnessed a drop in its share from a high of $100 to 63
cents.70 The assets of the Kidder, Peabody investment companies declined
in value from $85 million to $20 million.71
C.

THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940

Investment companies were regulated under a belated piece of New
Deal legislation that arose from the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the
subsequent Great Depression.72 A study by the SEC of the operations of
by the fund, at prices which are related to 'net asset value.' The net asset value per share is
normally computed twice daily by taking the market value at the time of all portfolio
securities, adding the value of other assets and subtracting liabilities, and dividing the result
by the number of shares outstanding. Shares of most funds are sold for a price equal to their
net asset value plus a sales charge or commission, commonly referred to as the 'sales load,'
and usually ranging from 7.5 to 8.5 percent of the amount paid, or 8.1 to 9.3 percent of the
amount invested. A few funds, however, known as 'no-load' funds, offer their shares for sale
at net asset value without a sales charge. Shares of most funds are redeemed or repurchased
by the funds at their net asset value, although a few funds charge a small redemption fee.
The result of this pricing system, it is apparent, is that the entire cost of selling fund shares is
generally borne exclusively by the purchaser of new shares and not by the fund itself. In this
respect the offering of mutual fund shares differs from, say, the offering of new shares by a
closed-end investment company or an additional offering 'at the market' of shares of an
exchange-listed security, where at least a portion of the selling cost is borne by the company
selling the shares.
Cartwright,411 U.S. at 548 (1973) (citing SEC REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS,

H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 4 (1963)).
66. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 155.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation stock was a "hot issue." Priced initially at $104, its
shares were soon trading at $136.50. Five days later, its price had reached $222.50. This was twice the
value of its assets. The Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation created the Shenandoah Corporation,
which sold its shares at $17.50. Those shares more than doubled in price on the first day of trading to
$36. Shenandoah Corporation in turn sponsored the Blue Ridge Corporation, which sold securities
totaling $142 million to the public. LISA J. ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS, THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS
45-46 (1999).
71. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 155.
72. In 1932, the New York Stock Exchange had unsuccessfully tried to discourage investment in
"unit" or "group" plans in which a portfolio manger bought a diversified group of stocks and then sold a
"1package" of those securities to individual investors at an excessive markup. Pimie, Simons & Co., Inc.
v. Whitney, 259 N.Y.S. 193, 213 (1932). Another entity bought shares in the Standard Oil companies
that were deposited with a trustee and then units in those trusts sold to investors. Standard Oilshares,
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investment companies was authorized by the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935. 73 The SEC investigation, which discovered a
number of abuses, resulted in the passage of the Investment Company Act
of 1940.74 That legislation has rightly been said to be "the most intrusive
financial legislation known to man or beast."75 "It places substantive
restrictions on virtually every aspect of the operations of investment
companies; their valuation of assets, their governance and structure, their
issuance of debt and other senior securities, their investments, sales and
redemptions of their shares, and, perhaps most importantly, their dealings
with service providers and other affiliates."76
The Investment Company Act throws its net over a range of
investment company formats, classifying them into three categories: "face
amount certificates," "unit investment trusts," and "management
companies."77 The first two do not actively manage or trade components in
their portfolios. Instead, they have fixed portfolios in one form or
another.78 The third group, management companies, was sub-classified into

Inc. v. Standard Oil Group, Inc., 150 A. 174, 176 (Del. Ch. 1930). One court held that outside directors
of an investment company were liable for not monitoring the company's president who looted its assets.
O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp. of Va., 177 S.E. 852, 860 (Va. 1935).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 79(a)-(z-6) (1935) (repealed 2005). The Public Utility Holding Company Act was
another rare piece of federal legislation that sought to control corporate governance of the companies
subject to its regulation. It required a simplification of highly leveraged pyramid holding company
structures. That legislation was largely the result of the failure of the giant Insull electric company
empire during the Great Depression. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 358. A part of that scandal involved
two investment trusts controlled by Insull. See In re Insull Util. Invs., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 653, 654 (N.D.
II1. 1934) (describing the abuses connected with those investment trusts). See generally FORREST
MCDONALD, INSULL: THE RISE AND FALL OF A BILLIONAIRE UTILITY TYCOON (2004) (describing the

Insull failure). The Public Utilities Holding Company Act was repealed in 2005. Energy Policy Act of
2005, sec. 1263, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 974, repealing 15 U.S.C. § 79(a)-(z-6).
74. As the Supreme Court has noted:
The Investment Company Act of 1940 originated in congressional concern that the Securities
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C.§ 78a et seq., were inadequate to protect the purchasers of investment
company securities. Thus, in § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 837,
15 U.S.C. § 79z-4, Congress directed the SEC to study the structures, practices, and problems
of investment companies with a view toward proposing further legislation. Four years of
intensive scrutiny of the industry culminated in the publication of the Investment Trust
Study and the recommendation of legislation to rectify the problems and abuses it identified.
After extensive congressional consideration, the Investment Company Act of 1940 was
adopted.
United States v. Nat'l Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 704 (1975).
75. CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 382 (1997).
76. Paul F. Roye, Remarks Before American Law Institute/American Bar Association Investment
Company Regulation and Compliance Conference (Oct. 16, 2003).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4 (1940).
78. Face amount certificates are agreements to pay investors a stated amount in the future. The
investor pays for that investment through installment payments. See generally SEC v. Mount Vernon
Mem'l Park, 664 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1982) (describing the basis for regulating these instruments). The
unit investment trust holds a fixed group of securities in its portfolio and does not trade those securities.
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closed and open-end investment companies and further sub-divided into
"diversified" and "non-diversified" companies. To obtain diversified
status, an investment company could invest no more than five percent of its
assets in the stock of any one company and could hold no more than ten
percent of the voting securities of any one company.79
Non-exempt investment companies were required to register their
offerings to the public under the Securities Act of 1933.80 They were also
required to register with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of
1940.81 The latter registration requirement then became the hook for the
substantive regulation of those companies. Not all collective investment
mediums were required to register under the Investment Company Act.
Among those exempted from registration, and hence regulation, under that
statute were insurance companies, banks, and "any common trust fund or
similar fund maintained by a bank exclusively for the collective investment
and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity
as a trustee, executor, administrator or guardian., 82 Also exempted were
any qualified "employees' stock bonus, pension, or profit sharing trust."83
Investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act
were required to provide the SEC with periodic financial reports.84 Those
requirements are similar to those imposed on other issuers of securities, but
the Investment Company Act goes far beyond that pattern with other
provisions. Among other things, that statute creates a minimum net worth
requirement, 851 a practice long abandoned in state incorporation laws.86 It
governs the capital structure of investment companies, limiting the amount
of their indebtedness acquired through "senior securities. ' 7 The act further
regulates dividend polices of investment companies, a matter normally left
to state regulation.88 The Investment Company Act seeks to dictate the
manner of investment company governance in other ways. It prohibits
securities law violators from serving as an employee or director or

See generally Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625 (1970) (describing unit investment trusts);
Thomas S. Harmon, Emerging Alternatives to Mutual Funds: Unit Investment Trusts and Other Fixed
Portfolio Investment Vehicles, 1987 DUKE L. J. 1045, 1088 (1987).
79. Id. § 80a-5(b)(1).
80. Id. § 80a-24.
81. Id. § 80a-8.
82. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, §3, 54 Stat. 789, 798 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (2000)).
83. Id.

84. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (2000). Sales literature must also be submitted to the SEC. Id. § 80a-24(b).
85. Id. § 80a-14.
86. As a court noted with respect to one such statute: "One may start business on a shoestring in
Kentucky, but if it is a corporate business the shoestring must be worth $1,000." Tri-State Developers,
Inc. v. Moore, 343 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Ky. 1961).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2000).
88. Id. § 80a-19(a).
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otherwise being affiliated with an investment company. 89 Shareholder
approval is required where an investment company changes its status from
a diversified to non-diversified investment company, where its investment
plan changes, or where it decides to deviate from previously stated
investment policies.9" The act also regulates the election of directors to the
board of investment companies. 91
Even more intrusively, the Investment Company Act requires that at
least forty percent of investment company board of directors be
independent outside directors. 92 The requirement for outside directors was
expanded to a majority requirement by the SEC in 2001.9' That majority
outside director requirement was added through the back door by the SEC
by requiring such a board before investment companies become eligible for
exemptions from SEC conflict of interest rules. Among other things, those
exemptions permit mutual funds with majority outside directors to purchase
securities in an initial public offering in which an affiliated broker-dealer is
acting as an underwriter; permit the use of fund assets to pay distribution
expenses; allow securities transactions between a fund and another client of
the fund's adviser; and permit funds to issue multiple classes of voting
stock.94 The SEC also used its exemption authority as a stick for creating
other governance requirements including how board meetings are to be
conducted.9 5
This pervasive regulation is sought to be justified on the ground that
"[u]nlike most business organizations.., mutual funds are typically
organized and operated by an investment adviser that is responsible for the
day-to-day operations of the fund., 96 "Investment advisers generally
organize and manage investment companies pursuant to a contractual
arrangement with the company. In return for a management fee, the
adviser selects the company's investment portfolio and supervises most

89. Id. § 80a-9.
90. Id. § 80a-13(a).

91. Id. § 80a-16(a).
92. Id. § 80a-10(a). The Investment Company Act also provides a safe harbor for the sale of an
advisory business if directors who are not interested persons of the adviser constitute at least seventyfive percent of a fund's board for at least three years following the assignment of the advisory contract.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f)(l)(A) (2000).
93. Those independent directors were also required to nominate other independent directors and
legal counsel for the outside directors was required to be independent. Role of Independent Directors of
Investment Companies, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,734, 3,736 (Jan. 16, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239,
240, 270, and 274).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4(b)(I)(ii) (2006) (stating that directors participating in board
meeting by phone must be able to communicate with other directors). Such requirements are normally
governed by state law. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(i) (2006) and Revised Model Bus. Corp.
Act § 8.20(b) (2000).
96. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3,736.
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aspects of its business. '"" "In most cases, the investment adviser is separate
and distinct from the fund it advises, with primary responsibility and
loyalty to its own shareholders. The 'external management' of mutual
funds presents inherent conflicts of interest and potential for abuses .... ."'
The role of investment advisers was deemed so sensitive that another
statute was layered on top of the already intrusive regulation of mutual
funds-the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.99 That act imposes a
registration requirement, imposes books and records and disclosure
regulations and places limits on the fees that may be imposed by the
adviser.
III. LATE TRADING AND MARKET TIMING
A. BACKGROUND

Mutual funds were not really the target of the Investment Company
Act of 1940. They were simply too young to have played any significant
role in the abuses that led to that legislation. However, mutual funds
became popular investment mechanisms beginning in the 1940s and soon
replaced the closed-end fund as the investment vehicle of choice for most
individual investors. In 1970, some 360 mutual funds held $47 billion in
assets in the United States."° Their growth exploded with the invention of
the money market mutual fund.10 1 By 1995, there were 5,700 mutual funds

97. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 50 (1981) (footnotes
omitted).
98. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3,736. As the Supreme
Court has noted:
Congress consciously chose to address the conflict-of-interest problem through the Act's
independent-directors section, rather than through more drastic remedies such as complete
disaffiliation of the companies from their advisers or compulsory internalization of the
management function....
Congress' purpose in structuring the Act as it did is clear. It "was designed to place the
unaffiliated directors in the role of 'independent watchdogs,"' who would "furnish an
independent check upon the management" of investment companies. This "watchdog"
control was chosen in preference to the more direct controls on behavior exemplified by the
options not adopted. Indeed, when by 1970 it appeared that the "affiliated person" provision
of the 1940 Act might not be adequately restraining conflicts of interest, Congress turned not
to direct controls, but rather to stiffening the requirement of independence as the way to
"remedy the act's deficiencies." Without question, "[the] function of these provisions with
respect to unaffiliated directors [was] to supply an independent check on management and to
provide a means for the representation of shareholder interests in investment company
affairs."
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1979) (alterations in orinigal) (citations omitted).
99. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l to 80b-21 (2000)).
100. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2004 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 105 (2004), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2004_factook.pdf.
101. Henry B.R. Brown and Bruce R. Bent were the inventors of the money market fund. Their
creation allowed investors to receive a higher rate of return on their cash holdings than was available

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

holding about $2.8 trillion in investor funds. As the new century began
some 8,000 mutual funds were holding almost $7 trillion in assets for
ninety-five million investors. 1 2 However, the bursting of the market
bubble in 2000, resulted in a sharp drop in the NAV of equity based mutual
funds. Mutual funds trading equities experienced a $1.4 trillion drop in the
value of their assets between 2000 and 2002.'0°
The drop in NAV also reduced mutual fund fees that were based on
amounts under management. Mutual funds were also facing competition.
Closed end funds had record years for attracting investor funds in 2002 and
2003.°4 Those securities could be traded at any time when a market was
open, unlike mutual funds that could only be bought or sold based on day's
end NAV. Another threat was the newly created exchange traded funds
("ETFs") that began with SPDRs (Standard & Poor's Depository Receipts)
or "spiders." ' 5 The ETF is the equivalent of a diversified mutual fund but
allows the investor to buy and sell their holdings at any time during the
trading day at then current market prices. 10 6 In contrast, mutual funds may

under the interest rate ceilings set by bank regulators at that time. Those interest rate ceilings were later
dropped, but the money market fund remained popular. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (2002).
102. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 100, at 105. Those mutual funds gave investors
a broad range of investment opportunities:
An investor seeking to invest in fixed income instruments could choose among mutual funds
investing in money market instruments, municipal securities of most states and many
subunits, federally insured bonds, mortgage-backed securities, and corporate bonds with sub
choices of convertible bonds, global bonds and with differing maturities, and ratings grades
down to and including junk bonds. Equity investors could pick from index funds on a broad
range of indexes, funds that invest in a particular business sector such, option funds, growth
funds and aggressive growth funds. Funds for contrarians trade against popular investment
views; for the internationally inclined, there are global equity funds and emerging market
funds for stocks of companies in lesser developed countries. Balanced funds (with varying
balances) invest in both fixed income and equity securities, while "quant" funds use
computer programs to make stock picks, and vulture funds invest in failing companies.
There are even mutual fund portfolios for politically correct investors that invest in
environmentally friendly companies and avoid tobacco stocks. For those interested in
politically incorrect investments, the Vice Fund was investing in tobacco, alcohol, gambling
and other sin stocks.
MARKHAM, supranote 3, at 424-25.
103. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 100, at 107. This reduction in NAV was due in
large measure to reduced portfolio values from the drop in stock prices during the downturn. That
downturn also caused many investors to pull their assets out of long term mutual funds. The number of
redemptions from such mutual funds increased from an annual rate of 21.7% in 1999 to 27.9% in 2002.
Id. at 126.
104. The assets held by closed-end investment companies increased from $147 billion in 1999 to
$213 billion in 2003. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 100, at 145.
105. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 426. "Exchange traded funds as we know them today were
launched in 1993 by State Street Global Advisors, though similar products traded in both the U.S. and
Canada in years prior to that." History of ETFs: From Institutions to Individuals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
2006, at R2.
106. The SEC has noted that:
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be bought and sold only every 24 hours at NAV price set on closing prices
at 4:00 p.m.
Their trading flexibility and certain tax advantages made ETF's
almost instantly popular.'0 7 The ETFs had assets valued at $464 million in
1993, the year they first started trading.' 8 By 2006, the number of ETFs
had increased to 205 and their assets were valued at $315 billion, an
increase of $90 billion over the prior year.0 9 That amount paled in
comparison to the trillions held in mutual funds, but their rapid growth was
a growing competitive threat to mutual fund fees." 0 In order to boost their
fees and to better compete with those closed-end companies and ETFs,
mutual funds began to allow market timing and late trading by hedge funds,
which were using SEC restrictions to engage in "regulatory arbitrages."
This was not a new problem for the mutual fund industry, although the
angle of attack had changed. Prior to the adoption of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 there existed a "two-price system" system for
mutual fund shares that created an active secondary market in those shares
that was being abused.

Exchange traded funds ("ETFs") are investment companies that are registered under the
Investment Company Act as open-end management investment companies or unit investment
trusts. However, unlike typical open-end funds or unit investment trusts, ETFs do not sell or
redeem their individual shares at NAV. Instead, ETFs sell and redeem their shares at NAV
only in large blocks, generally in exchange for a basket of securities that mirrors the
composition of the ETF's portfolio, plus a small amount of cash. Shares of ETFs are listed
on national securities exchanges for trading, which allows investors to purchase and sell
individual ETF shares among themselves at market prices throughout the day.
68 Fed. Reg. 70402, 70408 (Dec. 17, 2003).
107. Mutual fund holders must pay taxes on net capital gains on shares bought and sold by the funds
while ETFs avoid those taxes through exchanges in kind. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Keep
it Simple, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2006, at A10. However, ETF investors pay a commission on the
execution of their trades and have bid and ask spreads that may increase costs. Jen Ryan, Risks, Fees
Lurk in Overseas ETFs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2006, at C 15. The ETFs have raised some issues on the
valuation of the price/earnings ratios of the stocks composing their portfolios. Shefali Anand, The
Inexact Business of Valuing ETFs, WALL ST. J., March 13, 2006, at C3.
108. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, NET ISSUANCE OF SHARES By ETF's (2006) 1993-2000,
http://www.ici.org/stats/etf/etf figure2.pdf.
109. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, EXCHANGE TRADED FUND ASSETS: JANUARY 2006 1
(2006), http://www.ici.org/stats/etf/etfs 02_06.html#TopOfPage. The ETF offerings were increasing
from broad based indexes to narrow sectors and even to commodities. Diya Gullapalli, Too Narrow?
'Sector' ETFs Draw Investors, WALL ST. J., March 31, 2006, at Cl. Ann Davis, Silver Seduces the
Crowd, Again-Anticipation of Launch of ETF Pushes Price to 22-Year Highs, But Is the Metal Near
Its Peak?, WALL ST. J., March 31, 2006, at C1.
110. The mutual funds knew well how competition could damage a franchise. Government
regulations in the 1970s had prevented banks from paying market rates on deposits. The money market
mutual fund was invented to take advantage of that disability and drained massive amounts of deposits
from the banks. Indeed, within ten years of their first appearance, money market funds were the most
popular investment in America. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 6-7. At the end of 2003, there was
$2.051 trillion held in money market funds. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 100, at 107.
The percentage of funds held by American households as bank deposits was cut in half between 1979
and 1999 as a result of money market competition. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 298.
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Most funds computed their net asset values daily on the basis of the
fund's portfolio value at the close of exchange trading, and that figure
established the sales price that would go into effect at a specified hour on
the following day. During this interim period two prices were known:
the present day's trading price based on the portfolio value established
the previous day; and the following day's price, which was based on the
net asset value computed at the close of exchange trading on the present
day. One aware of both prices could engage in 'riskless trading' during
this interim period."'
Most investors could not take advantage of that situation because of
sales loads, but insiders were able to purchase shares without paying the
load and could purchase shares for immediate redemption at the
appreciated value. It was claimed that this diluted the equity of the existing
shareholders. "The existing shareholders' equity interests were diluted
because the incoming investors bought into the fund at less than the actual
value of the shares at the time of purchase.""12
Section 22 of the Investment Company Act" 3 was employed to
prevent those and other trading abuses by authorizing the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") and the SEC to regulate
the distribution and trading in mutual fund shares. They both adopted rules
that were thought to have put an end to riskless trading in mutual fund
shares. 1 4 The SEC was thought further to have sealed the fate of such
trading in 1968 when it enacted a "forward pricing" rule'.' that required
redemptions and purchases to be priced after receipt of the order from the
customer--"generally using' the
closing price for the stocks that were set at
16
the end of that trading day.""
There were other concerns with using mutual funds for quick in-anout-trading seeking short-term profits (market timing). The SEC had long
sought to prevent mutual fund salesmen from recommending market timing
in mutual funds to retail customers because sales loads and time and place
disadvantages made such trading unsuitable for them.'
However, market

I ll. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 707 (1975). "It was
possible ...for a knowledgeable investor to purchase shares in a rising market at the current price with
the advance information that the next day's price would be higher. He thus could be guaranteed an

immediate appreciation in the market value of his investment ....Id.
112. Id. at 708 n.17.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (2000).
114. Nat'lAss'n of Sec. Dealers,Inc., 422 U.S. at 709-10.
115. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,644, 29,647 (May22, 1979) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(a)).
116. David Ward, Protecting Mutual Funds from Market-Timing Profiteers: Forward Pricing
InternationalFund Shares, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 589 (2005).
117. The SEC thus prohibited the practice of "switching" mutual fund investors in and out of
different mutual funds in order to generate commissions. Such transactions were usually accompanied
by promises of short-term profits from trading opportunities that sought to anticipate favorable market

moves and make quick-in-and-out profits.

Such "market timing" was not appropriate for small

investors because of the large sales loads associated with some mutual fund classes. Further, as noted
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timing transactions in mutual funds by professional traders was not viewed
by the SEC to be a matter of concern since the professionals could look
after themselves or the investors whose money they were managing.18
Further, the restriction on buying and selling mutual fund shares at their net
asset value was a practical barrier to market timing even by professional
traders. Nevertheless, during the 1980s, there were some fifty money
managers who specialized in market timing mutual funds for even small
investors in amounts as low as $2,000.119 These market timers charged fees
of two percent or more on assets
under management, which was in addition
120
to any mutual fund sales loads.
Money Magazine conducted a study in 1988 of the five-year
performance of market timing by mutual fund money managers. 21 It found
that clients of J.D. Reynolds Co. experienced compound returns of more
than twenty percent. Most market timing managers were not that
successful, but two-thirds of those managers did better than the Lipper
mutual fund average. They were particularly successful in preserving
investor capital during market downturns. However, these earlier market
timers were not over night arbitrageurs like those involved in the Spitzergenerated scandals. For example, J.D. Reynolds Co. engaged in less than
four market timing transactions per year. 12 2 This was because the goal of
the market timers in the 1980s was to move investment funds between
equity and fixed income funds in anticipation of changes between those
two markets. For example, if interest rates were expected to increase and
equities to decline,
the market timer would move money out of stocks and
23
into bonds. 1
These market timers were not popular with mutual fund sponsors
because "[w]hen market-timing money managers move millions of dollars
at a time in or out of funds, as they often do, they force mutual fund
managers to buy or sell large blocks of stock at inopportune moments.
Hence, fund organizations view timers as disruptive."'124 Several no-load

in text, mutual fund investors had a time and place disadvantage. They could only liquidate or buy
mutual fund shares at the end of the day while professional traders could move in and out of the markets
quickly throughout the trading day on the primary market and even into the evening by using alternative
markets. See 23 JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAWS § 10:24 (2d ed. 2005) (describing SEC switching cases).

118. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or
Shorn Lamb? 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345 (1995) (describing SEC views toward institutional investors).
119. Jeanne L. Reid, Choosing Tactics in the War Against Risk, 17 MONEY 83, 83 (Sept. 1988). See
also Robert Runde, Services that Time Your Trades: We Identify the Few That Do it Well, 13 MONEY
71, 71 (May 1984) (describing role of these market timers).
120. Reid, supranote 119, at 83.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 84.
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mutual funds (a mutual fund that does not charge an investment
management fee) sought to discourage market timers by limiting the
number of switches that an investor could make, so the market timers
moved to load funds which charged management fees and were less likely
to impose such restrictions because of the incentive of those fees.' 25 That
was only a temporary solution. Market timers became more active during
the 1990S,126 and again aroused the ire of the mutual funds that had to deal
with their liquidations. Some mutual funds imposed redemption fees on
traders engaged in market timing in order to discourage such activity. 27
Those fees had been allowed by the SEC, up to two percent, since 1979.128
The number of funds imposing such fees increased substantially in the
1990s when the market run up was encouraging day trading and other
speculative trading.'2 9 Some mutual funds threatened to suspend the
redemption privileges of traders engaged in market timing. "Fair value
pricing" was also used to discourage market timers in international funds
that presented arbitrage opportunities because foreign markets might still
be open when NAV was computed. Fair value pricing sought to set a fair
price on foreign holdings at the close of trading in the United States in
order to reduce those arbitrage opportunities. 3 '
These attempts at curbing market timing were described in mutual
fund prospectuses. To an outside viewer of those disclosures, it appeared
that the mutual funds were opposed to market timers because they were
disruptive and harmful to the funds. As the new century began, however, a
new market timer appeared-the hedge fund 3 1-that found a way to entice
mutual funds into welcoming their trading.

125. Id. at 85-86.
126. Tim Quinson, Market-Timers Fiddle Around With FundAssets, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro,
N.C.), October 8, 1995, at E2.
127. See Robert McGough, Junk Funds Believe It's Time to Strike Back at 'Timers', WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 1, 1992, at C 1; Fidelity Puts the Padlock on Market Timers, 19 MONEY MAG. 50, 50 (Dec. 1990).
128. Carole Gould, Mixed Reviews on Redemption Fees, N.Y. TMES, May 12, 1991, §3, at 14.
129. See Tim Quinson, Mutual Funds Install Fees to Deter Those Who Cash Out Quickly, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 13, 1999, at 11H (describing the increased use of such fees).
130. Robert C. Pozen, 'Fair-Value' Pricing Protects the Investor, USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 1997, at
23A; Robert C. Pozen, Market Timers Befuddle Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1997, at B7 (describing
fair value pricing).
131. Hedge funds take many forms but are essentially a pool of funds collected from wealthy
investors and managed aggressively for big returns. As noted by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals:
"Hedge funds" are notoriously difficult to define. The term appears nowhere in the federal securities
laws, and even industry participants do not agree upon a single definition. The term is commonly used
as a catch-all for "any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by
professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public."
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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B. THE SCANDALS
Politically ambitious New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer saw
opportunity in the widespread publicity given to the financial scandals
occurring after the market downturn in 2000.132 He made headlines with
sensational charges against prominent financial analysts that resulted in a
massive $1.4 billion settlement with the firms where they worked.'33
Spitzer struck again in September 2003, when he charged Edward J. Stern
and a hedge fund he managed, Canary Capital Partners, LLC, with
improperly market timing and late trading in shares of the Strong mutual
fund complex. 3 4 Canary Capital Partners was required to pay $40 million
to settle this problem, part of which was to be used for restitution to mutual
fund investors. Edward Stern also agreed not to trade in mutual funds or
manage any public investment funds for ten years.13 1 Spitzer brought
several other suits against mutual funds and others for allowing or engaging
in market timing and late trading, resulting in more publicity and
extraordinarily large fines.'36
The charges filed by Spitzer ignited much controversy since it was not
entirely clear why a state attorney general was seeking to regulate mutual
funds that were under the pervasive regulatory control of the SEC. Indeed,
"because of perceived inefficiencies inherent in dual state and federal
securities registration schemes, Congress passed the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ('NSMIA'), 37 primarily to preempt
state 'Blue Sky' laws that required issuers to register many securities with

132. After reaching prominence from his prosecutions, Spitzer ran for the governorship in New
York. This Time, No Laurels for Eliot, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb. 3, 2006, at 10.
133. The financial analysts' scandals began after Eliot Spitzer revealed that a Merrill Lynch analyst,
Henry Blodget, had called stocks he was promoting to public investors "crap" and a "piece of junk" in
private emails. The scandal widened when it was revealed that Sandy Weill, the head of Citigroup Inc.,
had his bank make a $1 million contribution to an elite preschool as a part of an elaborate scheme to
acquire control of Citigroup, as well as to acquire the investment banking business of AT&T. Conflicts
of interests on the part of analysts were found to be widespread. Among other things, financial analysts
were being compensated for promoting their firm's investment banking business, undercutting their
independence as analysts. Spitzer was also attacking share "spinning" schemes in which underwriters
allocated shares in hot issue IPOs to executives of large companies in order to gain investment banking
business. In December 2002, ten investment banking firms agreed to a $1.4 billion settlement with
Eliot Spitzer and other state, federal, and self-regulatory organizations over the analysts' conflicts. See
MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 405-20 (describing those scandals).
134. N.Y. ATT'Y
GEN.,
CANARY
CAPITAL
PARTNERS
COMPLAINT
13
(2003),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary-complaint.pdf.
135. Riva D. Atlas, Trial Hears Testimony About Late Trading,N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2005, at 2.
136. See MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 421-39 (describing the mutual fund scandals). See also The
Associated Press, Bear Stearns to Pay Fine Over Mutual Fund Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2006, at
13 C3. (Bear Steams agreed in March 2006 to pay $250 million to the New York Stock Exchange and
the SEC to settle late trading charges in its mutual funds.).
137. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §77r).
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state authorities prior to marketing in the states.""13
That legislation
specifically exempted from state regulation shares of investment companies
registered with the SEC,'39 but provided that the states "shall retain
jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and bring
enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by
a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities
14
transactions.""
Spitzer was using that loophole by claiming fraud in his
late trading or market timing prosecutions. However, those claims were
premised largely on the SEC's forward pricing rule for mutual funds under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, which was for the SEC to enforce
rather than Spitzer.141

Spitzer created more controversy when he began affirmatively
regulating mutual fund by requiring them to reduce their fees as a part of
their market timing and late trading settlements. 42 Those fees had
previously been regulated under the Investment Company Act by the
NASD under the oversight of the SEC as mandated by Congress.143 Spitzer
simply ignored that congressional mandate and created his own public
utility regulatory program governed solely by his personal views on what
constitutes appropriate fees. Further criticism was directed at Spitzer for
criminalizing what were common business practices. In that regard, the
fact that market timing was occurring in mutual funds was known before
Spitzer's charges.' 44 Spitzer admitted as much when he cited in his
138. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 32 n.3 (2d Cir. 2005).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2) (2000).
140. Id. § 77r(c).
141. But see Paru v. Mut. of Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 04 Civ. 6907, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 28125, at
"13 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2006) (holding that Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
77p and 78bb did not preempt state breach of fiduciary duty claims for allowing market timing.).
142. Heather Timmons, 2 Fund Groups Agree to Pay $450 Million To End Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2004, §C, col. 5.
143. As noted by one author:
The NASD Rules of Fair Practice place a ceiling on the 'sales load,' or the sales commission,
for transactions in shares of open-end companies that an NASD member may charge to
investors. The limits placed on mutual fund sales loads are in sharp contrast to the free
competition with regard to brokers' commissions generally. The ceiling on sales loads is in
accordance with [Investment Company Act] section 22(b)'s mandate that the price allowed
by NASD rules 'shall not include an excessive sales load but shall allow for reasonable
compensation for sales personnel, broker-dealers, and underwriters and for reasonable sales
loads to investors.' Under these rules a fund is limited to a maximum sales charge of 7.25
percent, subject to mandatory quantity discounts, unless it offers additional services which in
the aggregate carry a maximum additional 1.25 percentage point value.
3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 719-720 (4th ed. 2002).
144. See, e.g., Walter Hamilton, Clear Vision Guides Success of a Corporate Watchdog: New York
Atty. Gen. Eliot Spitzer Goes After Abuses That Other Regulators Have Ignored, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2004, at Cl ("Market timing and late trading by mutual funds, meanwhile, were well-known practices
among Wall Street's stock-trading fraternity-and considered acceptable by many until Spitzer began
poking around."); Craig D. Rose, Tricks of the Trade: The SEC is Cracking Down on Two Mutual Fund
Scams, But Some Fear the Reforms Will be Ineffective, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 7, 2003,
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complaint against Canary Capital Partners a study published a year earlier
at Stanford University that claimed mutual funds were losing billions to
market timers.'45 Another article published almost three years earlier made
a similar complaint. 146 In 1998, David Dubofsky, a professor of finance at
Virginia Commonwealth University, published a paper on market timing
and notified the SEC of his findings. 147 Dubofsky began following market
timing practices after a student alerted to him to such trading after the
Stock Market Crash of 1987.148

Another weakness in Spitzer's crusade was that no court had ruled on
the validity of his claims. The only proceeding to contest his charges was a
criminal trial brought against Theodore Charles Sihpol III, an employee of
Banc of America Securities LLC. 149 Sihpol was in charge of the "most
extensive" of Canary Capital's late trading and market timing relationships
and arranged a $300 million line of credit for Canary Capital to use in such
trading. 5 ' The evidence against Sihpol was rather dramatic. He created an
electronic trading platform that allowed Canary Capital Partners to trade
late. Tape recordings also revealed that Sihpol was time stamping order

at H-1 ("Professor John Coffee Jr. of Columbia University, who specializes in the study of white-collar
crime, said an SEC survey found that 25 percent of brokers allowed the practice.").
145. N.Y. ATT'Y GEN., CANARY CAPITAL PARTNERS COMPLAINT
28 (2003)
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary-complaint.pdf.
146. Id. at 23 n.2.
147. Rahul Bhargava, Ann Bose & David A. Dubofsky, Exploiting International Stock Market
Correlationswith Open-End InternationalMutual Funds, 25 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 765 (1998). The
SEC was certainly aware of the problem of market timers, having granted no-action relief in November
2002 to the Investment Company Institute that allowed mutual funds to impose restrictions that would
discourage such activity. Alan Zibel, Trading in Trust, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Nov. 30, 2003. Goodwin
Procter LLP, SEC No Action Relief Permits Delayed Exchange Privileges to Combat Market Timers,
MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Nov. 29,2002.
148. Aaron Lucchetti, Discovering Profits in Timing Funds, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, § R, at 1
("A Business Week article had also charged in December 2002 that market timers were draining $5
billion from mutual funds by taking advantage of market disparities."). Amey Stone, When Market
Timers Target Funds: Thanks to 'Stale' Prices of Underlying Stocks, Traders Can Swoop In and Out of
Mutual Funds, Profitingat Long-Term Investors' Expense, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 11, 2002 ("Even
earlier
press
reports
were
complaining
of
market
timers."),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec2002/nf20021211 0384.htm.
See
David
McNaughton, In-out Mutual Tradinga Drain, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 2, 2002, at IF (complaining of
market timer trading in mutual funds); Sarah O'Brien, Investor Losses Put at $4 Billion a Year: Some
Funds Said to Flout SEC on Fair-ValuePricing,INVESTMENT NEWS, June 10, 2002, at 7; Stan Wilson,
Funds' Dilemma with Pricing, Timers Seen Getting Eye From SEC, EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Oct. 22, 2001 (discussing SEC staff concerns with market timers in mutual funds);
Bloomberg News, Fees added to penalize short-termfund trading, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 21,
2001, at 08D (discussion of efforts to stop market timing in international mutual funds); Redemption
Fee Rise Not Seen On Increased Market-Timing: Short-Term Investment Taxation, EUROMONEY
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1, 2001 (discussing market timing concerns).

149. Greg Farrell, Eliot Spitzer Drops Criminal Indictment in Market Timing Case, USA TODAY,
Nov. 22, 2005, at 6B.
150. N.Y. ATT'Y GEN., CANARY CAPITAL PARTNERS COMPLAINT
50 (2003)
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary-complaint.pdf.
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tickets in advance in order to conceal that the late trades had been entered
after 4:00 p.m. 5 ' Nevertheless, his criminal trial resulted in a not guilty
verdict on twenty-nine counts and a hung jury (I 1-1 in favor of acquittal)
on the four remaining counts. Spitzer initially announced that Sihpol
would be retried on the charges on which the jury was hung, but backed off
that decision after receiving much criticism, and the criminal charges were
dropped.'5 2 Separately, NYSE arbitrators entered a $14 million award
against Merrill Lynch for firing three brokers who had engaged in late
trading. Apparently, the arbitrators
were also unconvinced that late trading
153
was the crime of the century.

So was there fraud involved in these practices? Spitzer's civil suit
against Canary Capital Partners LLC charged that the late trader was
defrauding long term mutual fund shareholders by "diluting" their holdings
because the late trading arbitrageur's profits come "dollar for dollar" from
the mutual fund. Those profits "would otherwise have gone completely to
the fund's buy and hold investors."' 54 Spitzer noted that late trading was
exploiting the SEC's forward pricing rule for mutual fund purchases and
redemptions and charged that such conduct was fraudulent in violation of
the New York Martin Act. 5 5 Spitzer's press release accompanying the
Canary Capital Partners complaint stated that: "Allowing late trading is like
allowing betting on a horse race after the horses have crossed the finish
line" and that market timing trading "is like a casino saying that it prohibits
loaded dice, but then allowing favored gamblers to use loaded dice, in

151. Indictment at 1-5, People v. Sihpol, No. 1710/2004 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Apr. 5, 2004),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/apr/aprSb-04-attach.pdf.
152. Reuters, Spitzer Drops Charges Against an Ex-Broker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, § C, at 3.
Sihpol did settle SEC charges without admitting or denying those claims. He agreed to pay a civil
penalty of $200,000 and to be barred from the securities industry for five years. In the Matter of
Theodore Charles Sihpol III, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 27113, 2005 SEC LEXIS
2633 (Oct. 12, 2005).
153. Susanne Craig, Merrill Brokers Fired In Scandal Win $14 Million, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006,
at Cl (Merrill Lynch is appealing that decision.). Craig & Lauricela, supra note 1, at Al. An NASD
arbitration panel awarded $3.8 million to a broker fired by the Wachovia bank after it came under
investigation by Eliot Spitzer. The broker asserted that his market timing trades for hedge funds had
been approved by management at Prudential Securities, which merged with Wachovia. Bloomberg
News, Wachovia Must Pay Broker It Fired $3.8 million, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at C9.
154. N.Y. ATr'Y GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, CANARY CAPITAL PARTNERS COMPLAINT

18 (2003),

http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary-complaint.pdf.
155. N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-53 (Consol. 2005). That statute allows the New York Attorney
General to investigate and prosecute any person that:
employs, or is about to employ, any deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression,
fraud, false pretense or false promise, or shall have engaged in or engages in or is about to
engage in any practice or transaction or course of business relating to the purchase, exchange,
investment advice or sale of securities or commodities which is fraudulent or in violation of
law and which has operated or which would operate as a fraud upon the purchaser, or that
any broker, dealer, or salesman ....
Id. § 352.
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return for a piece of the action."'
Late trading involves the entry of a purchase or redemption of a
mutual fund share after 4:00 p.m., the time at which the NAV is computed
for the forward pricing of orders received earlier in the day. 5 7 The late
trader is using the mutual fund as a hedge to lock in price disparities that
occur in the one or two hour window used for late trading, but just how are
the holdings of other owners of the mutual fund diluted? If the price
increase in the alternate market carries over to the close of trading on the
following day, there seems, on its face, to be no harm and hence no foul
because the long term mutual fund investors will enjoy the same profit as
the late trader. If prices go up or down between the NAV computations on
succeeding trading days, the status of the late trader and the mutual fund's
long term investors remain the same. However, the late trader paid cash on
the day when he bought the mutual funds at their 4:00 p.m. NAV. That
cash may not be invested in time to capture the fluctuation in value. 158The
other mutual fund holders will have to bear the cost of that fluctuation.
Market timing is more problematic as a basis for claiming fraud.
According to Spitzer's complaint against Canary Capital Partners, such
trading is made possible by the fact that some mutual funds use "stale"
prices to compute NAV.'59 Spitzer did concede that market "[t]iming is not
156. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, State Investigation Reveals
at
3,
2003),
available
Fund
Fraud,
(Sept.
Mutual
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html. Spitzer's claim concerning market timing
was based on the fact that many mutual fund prospectuses stated that they discouraged market timing.
157. Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market VolatilityWhat Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 909, 930 (2005). Lawyers for the mutual funds had concluded that trading could continue as late
as 5:45 p.m. eastern time because, even though mutual funds were supposed to price funds at 4 p.m., the
funds did not actually report their pricing until 5:30 p.m., or later. The lawyers thought that a 5:45 p.m.
cutoff would prevent anyone from taking advantage of information to profit from knowledge of the
fund pricing and events occurring after the close of trading. However, sophisticated traders could price
the NAV themselves at the 4 p.m. close. David Hechler, Suit Highlights Issue of Legal Advice to
Brokers, N.Y. L. J., Sept. 30, 2004, at 5.
158. Late traders could also sell the stocks underlying the portfolio of a mutual fund short when the
fund's NAV is under priced. N.Y. ATT'Y GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, CANARY CAPITAL PARTNERS
COMPLAINT 17, 25 (2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary-complaint.pdf.
(describing complex arrangements under which such transactions were effected).
159. As noted in his complaint:
A typical example is a U.S. mutual fund that holds Japanese shares. Because of the time
zone difference, the Japanese market may close at 2:00 a.m. New York time. If the U.S.
mutual fund manager uses the closing prices of the Japanese shares in his or her fund to
arrive at an NAV at 4:00 p.m. in New York, he or she is relying on market information that is
fourteen hours old. If there have been positive market moves during the New York trading
day that will cause the Japanese market to rise when it later opens, the stale Japanese prices
will not reflect them, and the fund's NAV will be artificially low. Put another way, the NAV
does not reflect the true current market value of the stocks the fund holds. On such a day, a
trader who buys the Japanese fund at the "stale" price is virtually assured of a profit that can
be realized the next day by selling. This and similar strategies are known as "time zone
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entirely risk free .... For example, the timer has to keep his or her money
in the target fund for a least a day, so he or she may enjoy additional gains
or incur losses, depending on the market."16 Nevertheless, Spitzer charged
that the activity diluted the holdings of other mutual fund owners and
imposed transaction costs on them. Spitzer also focused on the fact that
mutual fund prospectuses warned that market timers were unwelcome and
that their redemption privileges could be suspended. He claimed that this
misled other investors into believing that such trading was prohibited.161
Actually, market timing seemed less like illegal activity and more like
mutual fund inefficiency, since the mutual funds could use "fair value"
pricing to prevent the 4:00 p.m. NAV from being stale.' 62 Some mutual
funds did use fair value pricing in their international funds in order to
prevent traders from arbitraging its funds, but critics claimed that such
pricing was arbitrary and resulted in differing values on the same assets
because of varying methodologies in making the valuations.'6 3 Fair value
pricing posed other problems. Garrett Van Wagoner, a popular mutual
funds manager, was charged by the SEC with improperly using fair value
pricing to improve his funds performance. 64 A subsequent SEC inquiry
into fair value pricing also resulted in industry comments which asserted
that fair value pricing alone would not prevent market timing.'65
As noted, some mutual funds imposed redemption fees' 66 and even
had "market timing police" to detect and prevent such trading.'67 However,
those restrictions were waived for large hedge fund traders. There was an
incentive for such waivers. The hedge funds engaged in market timing
increased the amount of funds under management by many millions of

arbitrage."
Id. at 9. The complaint further charged that:
A similar type of timing is possible in mutual funds that contain illiquid securities such as
high-yield bonds or small capitalization stocks. Here, the fact that some of the fund's
securities may not have traded for hours before the New York closing time can render the
fund's NAV stale, and thus open it to being timed. This is sometimes known as "liquidity
arbitrage."
Id. at 8.
160. Id. at 9.
161. Id. at 12.
162. Id. at 10.
163. Kunal Kapoor, Fund Spy: With InternationalFunds, the Price Isn't Always Right, MORNING
STAR
(July.
17,
2005),
available
at
http://news.momingstar.com/article/article.asp?id=138598&_QSBPA=Y.
164. In re Garrett Van Wagoner, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2281, Investment Company
Act of 1940 Release No.26,579, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1884, at *1 (Aug. 26, 2004).
165. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,328, 13,330 (Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
166. See id.
167, N.Y. ATr'Y GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, CANARY CAPITAL PARTNERS COMPLAINT 30 (2003),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary-complaint.pdf.
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dollars, which resulted in higher fees to mutual fund sponsors because
NAV was the basis for their compensation.1 68 The hedge funds also
provided the liquidity needed for market timing in the form of "sticky
assets," which were substantial long-term commitments of capital to the
mutual fund. Those sticky assets were to be used to meet the increased
costs of market timing liquidations and could be used to hedge against the
deleterious effects of such trading on the mutual fund. 169 However, those
sticky assets were "typically long-term investments made not in the mutual
fund in which the trading activity was permitted, but in one of the fund
manager's financial vehicles (e.g., a bond fund or a hedge fund
run by the
' 70
manager) that assured a steady flow of fees to the manager."'
C.

THE

SEC RESPONDS

The SEC's reputation had been badly blemished by the accounting
scandals at Enron Corp. and several telecoms, including WorldCom Inc.
Despite its pervasive and intrusive regulations and reputation for being an
aggressive regulator, the SEC had failed to prevent or detect those
problems.'' The agency had literally read about those scandals in the press
before becoming involved. Spitzer added to the SEC's growing aura of
incompetence with his spectacular charges against the financial analysts
that were also regulated by the SEC and by the late trading and market
timing scandals. Spitzer even began taunting the SEC and other federal
agencies, stating that they had been so "beaten down" and "neutered" and
diminished that they had been "rendered incapable of fulfilling their
fundamental mandate" and that they had "been sapped of the desire to
regulate.' 72
In an effort to regain some credibility, the SEC filed its own suits for
late trading and market timing, often in tandem with Spitzer.'73 Even with
168. Id. at 12.
169. Spitzer claimed that the fund contributions from hedge funds were ineffective in offsetting the
costs of market timing and were a deviation from the published trading strategies of the funds. Id. at 9.
170. Id. at 12.
171. See MARKHAM, supranote 3, at 421-40.
172. Hannah Bergman, Spitzer: OCC Is Blocking N.Y's Probe of Lenders, AMERICAN BANKER
(May 19, 2005), at 1. The SEC wilted from that blast, but one federal regulator, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), rejected Spitzer's rhetoric. News Release, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Acting Comptroller of the Currency Julie L. Williams Issues Statement
Responding
to
New
York
Attorney
General
(May
19,
2005),
available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2005-52a.pdf. The OCC then had Spitzer permanently enjoined by
a federal court from investigating discriminatory lending practices by national banks. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
173. See e.g., In re Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49,741,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,448, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1044 (May 20, 2004); In re Mass. Fin.
Servs. Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,347,
2004 SEC LEXIS 248 (Feb. 5, 2004); In re Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2205, Investment Company Act Release No. 26312, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2997 (Dec. 18,
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the pressure from Spitzer, the SEC's charges on market timing were
somewhat hesitant. The SEC thus conceded that market timing was not
"illegal per se,"' 74 but argued that
Market timing could damage the mutual fund because (a) it can dilute
the value of their shares if the market timer is exploiting pricing
inefficiencies, (b) it can disrupt the management of the mutual fund's
investment portfolio, and (c) it can cause the targeted mutual fund to
incur costs borne by other shareholders to17 5accommodate the market
timer's frequent buying and selling of shares.
The SEC was more emphatic about late trading, charging that such
17 6
"trading violates Rule 22c-1(a) under the Investment Company Act,

2003); In re Putnam Investment Mgmt., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2370, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26788, 2005 SEC LEXIS 675 (March 23, 2005); In re Canadian Imperial
Holdings Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8592, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 52,063,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26994, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1773 (July 20, 2005); In re Geek Secs.,
Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53,881, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2518, 2006
SEC LEXIS 1247 (May 30, 2006); In re Bear Steams & Co. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8668,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53,490, Investment Company Act Release No. 27262, 2006 SEC
LEXIS 623 (Mar. 16, 2006); In re Veras Capital Master Fund, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
54,568, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2232 (Oct. 4, 2006); In re Millennium Partners, L.P, Securities Act Release
No. 8639, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 52,863, Investment Company Act Release No. 27172,
2005 SEC LEXIS 3078 (Dec. 1, 2005); In re Federated Investors, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 52,839, Investment Company Act Release No. 27167, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3038 (Nov. 28, 2005); In
re Columbia Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8534, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 51,164, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2531, Investment Company Act Release No. 26752,
2005 SEC LEXIS 289 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Banc of Am. Capital Mgmt. LLC, Securities Act Release
No. 8538, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,756,
2005 SEC LEXIS 291 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Sw. Secs., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
53,460, 2006 SEC LEXIS 570 (Mar. 9, 2006); In re Pilgrim Baxter & Assocs., Ltd., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 54,073, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1529 (June 30, 2006); In re Brean Murray & Co.,
Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51,219, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,761, 2005
SEC LEXIS 383 (Feb. 17, 2005); In re Fiserv Secs., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51,588,
2005 SEC LEXIS 900 (Apr. 21, 2005); SEC v. Daniel Calugar and Sec. Brokerage, Inc., Litigation
Release No. 19,526, 2006 SEC LEXIS 3 1(Jan. 10, 2006); SEC v. JB Oxford Holdings, Inc., Litigation
Release No. 19,641, 2006 SEC LEXIS 767 (Apr. 5, 2006); SEC v. Geek Secs., Inc., Litigation Release
No. 19,597, 2006 SEC LEXIS 538 (Mar. 8, 2006); In re Waddell & Reed, Inc., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 54,193, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2537, Investment Company Act Release No.
27,424, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1651 (July 24, 2006).
174. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,328, 13,330 (Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 270); Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio
Holdings, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,402, 70,404 (Dec. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239 and 274).
175. In re Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49,741, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,448, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1044 (May 20, 2004).
176. This rule states in part that:
No registered investment company issuing any redeemable security, no person designated in
such issuer's prospectus as authorized to consummate transactions in any such security, and
no principal underwriter of, or dealer in, any such security shall sell, redeem, or repurchase
any such security except at a price based on the current net asset value of such security which
is next computed after receipt of a tender of such security for redemption or of an order to
purchase or sell such security ....
17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l (2006).
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defrauds innocent shareholders in those mutual funds by giving to the late
trader an advantage not available to other shareholders, ' 1and
harms
7
shareholders when late trading dilutes the value of their shares."
The SEC's claims against market timers and late traders were
encountering resistance in the courts. In SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund
Management, LLC,178 a federal district court dismissed the SEC's fraud

claims involving Canary Capital's late trading and market timing because
scienter had not been properly alleged. The court stated that
The market timing agreement with Canary, standing alone, could not be
considered per se a fraudulent device intended to defraud investors. The
SEC does not allege, nor could it, that market timing practices are per se
illegal, since many individual and institutional investors, as part of not
uncommon investment strategies 79 continue to attempt to time markets
with varying degrees of success.1
In another action, a federal district court dismissed SEC charges
against two senior executives at Columbia Funds Distributors, Inc. Those
executives had allowed market timing in mutual funds that were being sold
under prospectuses which stated that such trading was barred by the mutual
fund. The court stated that "market timing arrangements are not the kind of
sham transactions which have been held to qualify as schemes to
defraud."' 8 ° The SEC subsequently amended its complaint in that action to
charge that investors were misled by fund prospectuses that claimed the
funds were hostile to market timing.'8 ' However, a survey by the
Investment Company Institute found that most investors did not read their
mutual fund prospectuses and those that did were focused on other
issues.82

In another case, a federal district court dismissed aiding and abetting
charges brought by the SEC over market timing. However, that court and
two other district courts allowed fraud claims against defendants who had
used subterfuges and deceptive devices to avoid mutual fund restrictions on

177. In re Theodore Charles Sihpol III, Securities Act Release No. 8624, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 52,591, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 27113, 2005 SEC LEXIS 2633
(Oct. 12, 2005). The SEC complaint in the Sihpol case charged that, while the Investment Company Act
and SEC rules did not require a 4:00 p.m. hard cutoff in trading, mutual fund prospectuses had
represented that such time would be the normal point for orders received before that time: "Orders
received after the end of a business day will receive the next business day's net asset value per share."
Id.
178. SEC v. PIMCO Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
179. Id. at 468.
180. SEC v. Tambone, 417 F. Supp. 2d 127, 136 (D. Mass. 2006).
181. SEC Again Charges FormerExecs in Columbia Funds Market Timing Case, 38 FED. SEC.REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 920 (May 29, 2006).
182. Most Mutual Fund Investors Ignore Prospectuses, ICI Survey Finds, 38 FED. SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 927 (May 29, 2006).

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

such activity.'83 Motions to dismiss class action and derivative suits have
been denied where the defendants were charged with violations in
connection with late trading and market timing. Nevertheless, several
aspects of those claims were dismissed.'8 4
D.

SEC RULES
Despite their lack of success in Court, the SEC and Spitzer were able
to obtain settlements totaling over $4.25 billion in penalties, disgorgement
and reduced mutual fund fees by the end of 2005.185 The SEC also began
adopting proposed regulations that its staff thought would prevent market
timing and late trading. That effort was less than successful. One
regulatory fix proposed by the SEC for the mutual fund and late trading
problem was the adoption of a rule requiring a "hard close" of mutual funds
that would prevent the filling of any purchase or redemption requests after
4:00 p.m. Orders received after that time would have to be filled at the next
day's NAV. That approach proved to be too complex.'86 Another proposal
requiring mandatory redemption fees also stalled, 87 and the SEC adopted a
rule that "allowed" but did not require a two percent redemption fee.'88
Even this approach proved to be too complex when raised and the SEC
staff was examining the rule for amendment.1 9 Other rules were adopted
that, among other things, required mutual funds to disclose the effects of
market timing. 9 °
183. SEC v. Gann, No. 3:05-CV-0063-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9955, at *23 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13,
2006). See also SEC v. Druffner, 353 F. Supp. 2d 141, 153 (D. Mass. 2005); SEC v. JB Oxford
Holdings, Inc., No. CV-04-07084, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29494, *23 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2004).
184. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 873 (D. Md. 2005).
185. Craig & Lauricella, supra note 1, at Al. That total continued to grow in 2006. See, e.g.,
Landon Thomas Jr., Prudentialto Pay Fine in Trading,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 2006, at Cl (reporting
that Prudential Financial Inc. agreed to pay $600 million and admitted to criminal fraud under a
deferred prosecution agreement); Bloomberg News, Money Manager Agrees to Settle Regulators'
Market-Timing Case, N.Y. TtMs, July 25, 2006, at CI (reporting that firm agreed to pay $52 million to
settle market timing claims and to cut fees by $25 million).
186. Carol E. Curtis, Unfinished Business, SEC INDUSTRY NEWs, Aug. 8, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 12459138.
187. Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762, 11,763
(Mar. 11, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
188. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,328, 13,330 (Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
189. Judith Bums, SEC Floats Changes to Market-Timing Restraints, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at
B6. The SEC waited until October 2006 to adopt the rule amendments requiring mutual fund boards to
consider whether to impose a fee of up to two percent on redemptions within seven days of purchase.
71 Fed. Reg. 58257 (Oct. 3, 2006). Those amendments further required mutual funds to enter into
agreements with broker-deals holding shares on behalf of other investors in omnibus accounts. Those
agreements must allow the mutual funds to access information about transactions in those accounts in
order to enforce restrictions on late trading and market timings. Id.
190. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 69 Fed.
Reg. 22,300, 22,301 (Apr.23, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 239, 274). Another rule required
broker-dealers to give mutual funds access to information on trading in omnibus accounts that hold
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A particularly controversial rule adopted by the SEC required the
chairman of mutual fund boards to be independent from the chief executive
officer and increased the majority requirement for outside directors to
seventy-five percent. 9 ' Those outside directors would have to meet in
separate sessions at least quarterly and be allowed to have their own
staff.112 Although there was no evidence that such a corporate governance
structure was more efficient or provided greater shareholder protection, the
SEC had long pursued efforts to increase participation by outside directors
in public corporations as a check on management excesses. This has also
been a popular cause for corporate reformists over the last quarter century.
Their efforts stepped up after the Enron Corp. scandal, leading the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and Nasdaq to require that at least a
majority of the board of directors of their listed companies be composed of
outside directors and that nominating and compensating committees be
composed entirely of such directors. 193 However, audit committees at
public companies had been required since 1977 to be composed entirely of
outside directors, but that requirement did nothing to check the audit-based
scandals at Enron and elsewhere that arose after the market downturn in
2000.194

There is also no empirical evidence to support requirements for
majority outside director boards:
An important article by Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black
reviews the results of 112 empirical studies of various aspects of
corporate governance, from the 1980s and 1990s. On the basic question
whether independent directors improve economic performance, they
conclude that 'studies of overall firm performance have found no
convincing evidence that firms with majority independent boards
perform better than firms without such boards.' Indeed, firms with a
majority of inside directors 'perform about as well' as firms with a
majority of independent directors. 195

finds of several customers so that the mutual funds could determine if market timing was occurring in
those accounts. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, 71 Fed. Reg. 11351, 11531 (Mar. 7, 2006) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
191. See Martin E. Lybecker, Mutual Funds, Hedge Funds: A Flawed Concept That Deserves
Serious Reconsideration,83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045, 1046-47 (2005) (discussing and criticizing this rule).
192. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,384-85 (Aug. 2, 2004) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
193. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303(A)(.01), (.04) (2004),
available
at
http://www.nyse.com/RegulationFrameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.comnaudiencellistedcomp
anies.html&displayPage=/aboutlisted/1022221393251.html;
NAT'L ASSOC. OF SEC. DEALERS, NASD
MANUAL,
Marketplace
Rule
4350
(2006),
available
at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=l 189&elementid=1 159000635.
194. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It
Just Might Work) 35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 947 (2003).
195. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes But

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Bhagat and Black also concluded that "firms with supermajorityindependent boards [i. e., those with only one or two inside directors] might
even perform worse, on average, than other firms."'1 9 6 Anecdotal evidence
also suggests that increasing the number of outside directors added nothing
to good governance. 97 The boards of directors at Enron and WorldCom
and other centers of scandal were comprised of large percentages of
prominent outside directors who were unable to do anything to prevent the
problems at those companies. 198 In addition, most outside directors are not
selected by shareholders. Rather, their nomination comes from the chief
Uncertain Benefits, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 349, 367 (2000), citing Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 923,
46(1999).
196. Bhagat & Black, supranote 195, at 922-24.
197. Consider the troubling case of Eastman Kodak Co.:
[Itwas] among the one percent of companies receiving a perfect score for corporate
governance in a survey of public corporations by an international governance rating body.
Kodak's board of directors consisted of eleven outside directors and only one inside
director.... [Yet, despite this politically correct structure] Eastman Kodak is possibly the
worst managed company in America. For decades, shareholders there were pummeled by
management blunders. The company first lost out to foreign film makers and then
completely misjudged the digital revolution in cameras. The price of Eastman Kodak stock
dropped from $76 in 1999 to $25 in April 2004, after the company cut its dividend from
S1.80 to fifty cents and slashed 16,000 jobs ...[bringing the total to over 100,000 employees
being laid off since 1988, twenty times the number ofjobs lost at Enron.] [Kodak] was taking
accounting charges of over $1.3 billion and was dropped from the list of stocks included in
the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the new century.... [It also announced a further $1.3
billion loss in the third quarter of 2005].
MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 259 (2006). Eastman Kodak made the Wall Street Journal "Laggard List"
of 1000 major U.S. companies in 2005. Eastman Kodak was last in that list for ten-year performance
with a negative 7.2 percent return. Performanceof 1,000 Major US. Companies Compared With Their
Peers in 76 Industry Groups, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2006, at R4. Problems were continuing into 2006.
Eastman Kodak posted a second quarter loss of $282 million and announced another 2,000 layoffs. Its
stock then fell to a 28 year low. David Tyler, Kodak Faltersin 2nd Quarter,DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE
(Rochester), Aug. 2, 2006 at Al.
In contrast, Berkshire Hathaway, one of the most successful companies in the country in
recent years, had one of the most politically incorrect board of directors until the Enron era
reforms. The members of its board included Warren Buffett, his wife (before her death), his
son, his longtime business partner and an insider who was a co-investor.... Berkshire
Hathaway itself existed at all only because of a loophole in the Investment Company Act of
1940 administered by the SEC. Were it required to register as an investment company,
Berkshire Hathaway's decidedly non-independent board would have to be restructured and
its operations terminated. 'Berkshire Hathaway escapes the 1940 Act only by folding its
strategic investment activities into an insurance subsidiary, and exploiting Nebraska's
permissive insurance statute in a fashion that no other company can be expected to
duplicate.'
MARKHAM,supra note 3, at 260 (2006) (quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment
Companies as GuardianShareholders: The Placeof the MSIC in the CorporateGovernance Debate, 45
STAN. L. REV.985, 1003 (1993).
198. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 341-42, 261 (2006). A massive accounting scandal also occurred
at Fannie Mae that had a board of directors composed largely of outside directors who were unable to
detect or prevent manipulations by managers. Peter Wallison, $1.5 Trillion of Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar.
7, 2006, at A12.
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executive officer who often chooses them because they are golfing buddies
or have some other social relationship with that officer.' 99 There was thus
little empirical support for the corporate governance reforms that were
added after the Enron and WorldCom scandals.2 °0
Adding more outside directors to mutual fund boards as a way of
stopping future scandals in that industry has an even shakier foundation.
The requirement for a majority of outside directors that was already 2in
°
place did nothing to prevent the late trading or market timing scandals. '
199. Landon Thomas, Jr., A Path to a Seat on the Board? Try the Fairway,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2006, at Al (describing several such relationships).
200. As one author notes with respect to reforms contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX"):
The fact that the literature indicates that the corporate governance provisions in SOX are ill
conceived raises the puzzling question of why Congress would enact legislation that in all
likelihood will not fulfill its objectives. Simply put, the corporate governance provisions
were not a focus of careful deliberation by Congress. SOX was emergency legislation,
enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media frenzy involving
several high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases. These occurred in conjunction
with an economic downturn, what appeared to be a free-falling stock market, and a looming
election campaign in which corporate scandals would be an issue. The healthy ventilation of
issues that occurs in the usual give-and-take negotiations over competing policy positions,
which works to improve the quality of decision making, did not occur in the case of SOX.
That is because the collapse of Enron and its auditor, Arthur Andersen, politically weakened
key groups affected by the legislation, the business community and the accounting
profession. Democratic legislators who crafted the legislation relied for policy guidance on
the expertise of trusted policy entrepreneurs, most of whom were closely aligned with their
political party. Insofar as those individuals were aware of a literature at odds with their
policy recommendations, they did not attempt to square their views with it. Nor did
legislators of either party follow up on the handful of comments that hinted at the existence
of studies inconsistent with those recommendations. Republican legislators, who tended to
be more sympathetic to the regulatory concerns of accountants and the business community,
dropped their bill for the Democrats', determining that it would be politically perilous to be
perceived as obstructing the legislative process and portrayed as being on the wrong side of
the issue.
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1528-29 (2005); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. I 2002)).
201. Indeed, several other mutual funds scandals emerged in the wake of the late trading and market
timing cases involving "shelf space" payments to sales staff to prefer one mutual fid over another in
their recommendations to customers; failure to disclose breakpoints (commission discounts based on
the size of the investment); and lavish entertainment provided to investment advisers as an incentive to
direct mutual fund trades to broker-dealers. See MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 437-40 (discussing those
problems). For shelf space cases, see e.g., In re PA Fund Mgmt. LLP, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 50384, Investment Company Act Release No. 26598, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2085 (Sep. 15, 2004); In re
Mass. Fin. Services Co., Investment Advisors Act of 1940 Release No. 2224, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26409, 2004 SEC LEXIS 734 (Mar. 31, 2004); In re Rudney Associates, Inc., Investment
Advisors Act of 1940 Release No. 2300, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2147 (Sep. 21, 2004). Edward Jones paid
$75 million to settle claims that it was sharing revenues with a group of mutual funds in 2004 and
another $127 million in 2006 over shelf space payments. Edward Jones Agrees to Settle 9 Lawsuits,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at C2. Morgan Stanley agreed to pay the SEC $50 million to settle charges
in connection with its sale of mutual funds. Among other things, that firm was directing customers to
mutual funds based on commissions paid for those funds, rather than the appropriateness of the
investment for the customer. Certain "preferred" funds paid higher commissions to Morgan Stanley
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A study by the Fidelity mutual funds submitted in response to the SEC's
request for comment on its then-proposed 75 percent outside director
requirement actually showed there was empirical evidence to the contrary.
That study was given "short shrift" by the SEC.2 °2 The SEC gave similar
treatment to legislation passed by Congress in response to the agency's
then-proposed requirement for splitting the role of chairman and chief
executive officer at mutual funds. In a highly unusual move, Congress
required the SEC to provide "justification" for such a requirement.2 °3 The
SEC did not do so. Instead it passed the independent chairman and
seventy-five percent outside director rule by a 3-2 vote that was highly
politicized along party lines.2 °
The SEC mutual fund governance rule was promptly challenged by
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and was set aside by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the SEC had the
authority to adopt such a proposal, but held that the SEC had not
adequately considered its costs or available alternatives.0 5 The SEC
shrugged off that ruling by readopting the same rule only one week after it
was stricken, without even awaiting the mandate of the Court of Appeals.
The re-passage of the rule was also once again highly politicized, being
approved once again over the dissenting votes of two Republican
commissioners, one of whom apologized to the Court of Appeals for the
majority's high-handed approach. 2 °6 The new rule was challenged and was
set aside once again by the Court of Appeals. 20 7 The Court held that the
SEC should have sought public comment before adopting the rule so
quickly after the Court's prior ruling. The Court did stay its judgment for
ninety days in order to allow the SEC to seek public comment, which the

registered representatives as an incentive to push those products. The Morgan Stanley sales force was
failing to disclose "at the point of sale" that its Class B mutual shares of certain of its proprietary funds
charged higher fees for large transactions. In re Morgan Stanley DW Inc., Securities Act Release No.
8339, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 48789, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2732 (Nov. 17, 2003). However,
the Sixth Circuit dismissed class action claims against Morgan Stanley for this conduct, finding no duty
to disclose. Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 614 (6th Cir. 2005).
202. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
203. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2,809, 2,910 (2004),
but that demand was brushed aside by the SEC in adopting the rule by an assertion that the evidence on
the value of an independent chairman was inconclusive either way. Investment Company Governance,
69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,382-85 (Aug. 2, 2004).
204. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,390.
205. Chamber of Commerce ofthe U.S., 412 F.3d at 136.
206. Investment Company Governance, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390, 39,398 (July 7, 2005) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270). Hasty action was necessary because SEC chairman William Donaldson was
leaving the SEC and there would no longer be a majority of activist commissioners to readopt the rule.
That act set off a storm of controversy and did even further damage to the already tarnished reputation
of the SEC. Id.
207. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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2
agency proceeded to do. 11
More embarrassment to the SEC followed after a Harvard Business
School study in 2006 revealed that mutual funds were still wrongly pricing
their mutual fund assets. 20 9 The study found that, while most mutual funds
calculated NAV by using the closing price on the day of the pricing, they
applied that value to the shares held on the previous day. That could result
in substantial differences in pricing, depending on market conditions.1 ° In
all events, the intrusive regulation mandated by the Investment Company
Act of 1940 had failed completely in preventing scandal. Hampered by
that regulation, mutual fund performance was less than impressive.2 '
Market studies found that mutual funds on an overall basis were lagging
behind the market.212 Depending on the study, the lag in performance
ranged from severe to moderate.213 Some 6.5 percent of equity funds were
also closed or merged each year in order to boost mutual fund complex
trading records.21 4

E.

HEDGE FUNDS

The hedge funds were at the center of the market timing and late
trading scandals because they were the ones engaging in that trading. The
hedge fund is a relatively new entrant into the financial world, tracing its
history back to A.W. Jones & Co., a firm that was founded in 1949 by
208. In the meantime, the SEC staff was restructuring mutual fund governance through settlements
in enforcement proceedings, a process that the Wall Street Journal has called "Governance at
Gunpoint" in the context of shareholder lawsuits. Phyllis Plitch, Governance at Gunpoint, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 17, 2005, at R6. The Federated funds thus recently agreed to pay $72 million to settle late trading
and market timing charges. It was also forced to hire an independent chairman; to take no board action
without approval of a majority of outside directors (which must comprise a minimum 75 percent of the
board); and to hire an "Independent Compliance Consultant" approved by the SEC staff who will
decide how the company should be managed in the future. In re Federated Investors, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 52,839, Investment Company Act Release No. 27167, 2005 SEC LEXIS
3038 (Nov. 28, 2005). See also In re Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
49,741, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,448, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1044 (May 20, 2004)
(imposing similar governance changes).
209. Peter Tufano et al., Live Prices and Stale Quantities: T+J Accounting And Mutual Fund
Mispricing, at 24 (March 13, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=881615; Mark Hulbert, Uh-Oh. Something Else is Stale at Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2006, at B6.
210. Peter Tufano et al., supra note 209, at 24.
211. Former directors of the SEC's Division of Investment Company Regulation have expressed
concern that the maze of requirements and expense associated with mutual fund regulation is barring
new entrants who might provide competition and reduce investor costs. Four Former SEC Directors
Agree Mutual Fund Industry Overregulated,38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 376 (Mar. 6, 2006).
212. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 425.
213. Id. Not all mutual funds were bested by the market. Bill Miller, the manager of Legg Mason
Value Trust Fund, did beat the S&P 500 for the fifteenth straight year in 2005. Legg Mason Value
Trust Beats S&P Index for the 15th Year, MONEY MARKETING, Jan. 5, 2006, at 1.
214. Eleanor Laise, Mutual-FundMergers Jump Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2006, at DI (noting
that such mergers are sought to be justified as creating cost savings).
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Alfred Winslow Jones. That company rewarded its managers with an
incentive fee of 20% of the profits gained from the collective investment of
its clients' funds. By 1961, Jones's hedge fund had obtained a 21% annual
rate of return, with gains of over 1,000 percent in one ten year period.
Even so, Jones's fund operated in obscurity until an article published in
1966 in Fortune magazine described its operations. It then became the
model for other funds. 215 By 1969, there were about 150 hedge funds
operating in the United States. Those funds held some $1 billion invested
by about 3,000 investors. The funds used borrowed money to obtain
leverage, engaged in exotic derivative and other complex transactions and
often sold short. 216 By 1994, some 800 hedge funds were holding $75
billion in assets. 217 The number of hedge funds had jumped to 6,000 as the
new century began, and they were managing some $600 billion.218 In 2004,
there were some 7,000 hedge funds managing an estimated $850 billion.2 19
Assets under management by hedge funds reached an estimated $1.2
trillion in 2006.220
Hedge fund corporate governance sought to place investment
decisions in the hands of its managers. Investors are not treated as
shareholders in the enterprise who have a say in governance. As one court
noted:
Another distinctive feature of hedge funds is their management structure.
Unlike mutual funds, which must comply with detailed requirements for
215. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 358.
216. Id. at 358-59.
217. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 218.
218. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 439.
219. The SEC noted at the end of 2004 that:
It is difficult to estimate precisely the size of the hedge fund industry because neither we nor
any other governmental agency collects data specifically about hedge funds. It is estimated
that there are now approximately $870 billion of assets in approximately 7000 funds. What
is remarkable is the growth of the hedge funds. In the last five years alone, hedge fund assets
have grown 260 percent, and in the last year, hedge fund assets have grown over 30 percent.
Some predict the amount of hedge fund assets will exceed $ 1 trillion by the end of the year.
Hedge fund assets are growing faster than mutual fund assets and already equal just over one
fifth of the assets of mutual funds that invest in equity securities.
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054-56
(Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 and 279). Compensation for hedge fund managers
was sometimes massive. James Simmons at Renaissance Technologies received $1.5 billion and T.
Boone Pickens Jr. made $1.4 billion in 2005. George Soros, a celebrity hedge fund manager who was
equally famous for his advocacy of left wing causes, received a relatively paltry $840 million. Jenny
Anderson, Atop Hedge Funds, Richest of the Rich Get Even More So, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at C 1.
220. Deborah Solomon, Congress May Let Hedge Funds Manage More Pension Money, WALL ST.
J., July 28, 2006, at Al. Pending legislation in Congress would encourage even further growth by
allowing hedge funds to manage more pension money without being treated as a fiduciary under the
Employee Retirement Security Act. Id. However, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has suggested that
the SEC may increase qualification requirements for accredited investors who may invest in hedge
funds. Zachery Kouwe, SEC ChiefTalks Tough on Hedge-Fund Controls, N.Y. POST, July 26, 2006, at
31.

Fall 2006]

MUTUAL FUND SCANDALS

independent boards of directors, and whose shareholders must explicitly
approve of certain actions, domestic hedge funds are usually structured
as limited partnerships to achieve maximum separation of ownership and
management. In the typical arrangement, the general partner manages
the fund (or several funds) for a fixed fee and a percentage of the gross
profits from the fund. The limited partners are
221 passive investors and
generally take no part in management activities.

Hedge funds sometimes posed problems. Several hedge funds
experienced large losses when bond prices dropped abruptly in 1994. More
serious were the losses that occurred at Long-Term Capital Management
("LTCM"), a hedge fund that lost ninety percent of its $4.8 billion in
capital in September of 1998 as a result of its trading positions. LTCM
employed twenty-five Ph.D.s on its payroll, including some academic
superstars, to guide its "market-neutral" trading. 222 LTCM's problems were
of such a size that concern was raised that its failure would pose a systemic
risk to the American economy. 22 3 That concern resulted in a rescue
arranged by the Federal Reserve Board. 24
The SEC, until the market timing and late trading scandals, had
resisted the regulation of hedge funds. Initially, those funds avoided
regulation under the Investment Company Act through a provision that
exempted investment companies with less than 100 investors. That
exemption applied regardless of the amount of money under management,
221. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
222. LTCM was engaged in "convergence" trading. In one instance, it borrowed Brady bonds,
selling them short and buying non-Brady bonds issued by the same countries. LTCM anticipated a
narrowing of the price gap between the Brady bonds and the non-Brady bonds. If the prices widened
between these two securities, however, LTCM lost money. Another LTCM investment involved total
return swaps in which it agreed to pay an institution a fixed interest rate on the amount it would cost to
buy a block of stock. The institutional investor agreed to pay LTCM an amount equal to the dividends
generated by the stock during the period of the swap, as well as any increase in the price of the stock.
LTCM had to pay any decrease in value in the stock. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 317-8.
223. See generally Lakonia Mgmt Ltd. v. Meriwether, 106 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(describing the breakdown); PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

(Apr. 1999) (report containing

recommendations on regulatory responses thought necessary to respond to that crisis, including a desire
for more transparency, reduction of leverage and greater internal controls), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf.
224. Tiger Management, another high profile hedge fund that had $23 billion under management,
lost $2.1 billion in September and $3.4 billion in October of 1998. That hedge fund lost $2 billion from
currency trading losses in the latter month. But, even with that loss, the hedge fund showed a positive
performance for the year. Another hedge fund experiencing trouble in October of 1998 was Ellington
Capital Management. George Soros's $20 billion Quantum Group suffered large losses when the
Russian government defaulted in August of 1998. Soros then announced that he was shutting down a
$1.5 billion emerging markets hedge fund that was a member of his Quantum hedge fund group.
MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 317. A $5 billion loss in one week by Amaranth Advisors in September
2006 was also raising eyebrows. Ann Davis, How Giants Bets on NaturalGas Sank Brash Hedge-Fund
Trader, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at Al. See also Landon Thomas Jr,. A $700 Million Hdge Fund,
Down From $3 Billion, Says It Will Close, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at C3 (withdrawals casue hedge
fun operated by two former Salomon Brothers traders to close).
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provided that the company was not making a public offering of its
securities. 221 "The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996226 gave more flexibility to hedge funds. It allowed investment
companies to act without registration, if their investors were qualified
purchasers - that is, large,
sophisticated investors - without limitation as to
' 227
the number of persons.

The treatment of hedge funds in the futures industry was markedly
different. Many hedge funds trade regulated commodity futures contracts.
As a CFTC commissioner has noted, the "commodity pool industry...
which includes many of the largest hedge funds, plays an extremely
important role in the functioning of the futures markets in the United States
as well as the rest of the world. ' 22' That trading activity initially required
those funds to register with the CFTC as commodity pool operators
("CPOs") and commodity trading advisers ("CTAs") under the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936.229 However, "[i]n 1992, the CFTC adopted a key
liberalizing measure, Rule 4.7, which preserved CPO registration
requirements but provided an exemption from most regulatory

225. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000).
226. Pub. L. No. 104-290, sec. 102, 18(b)(1), 18(b)(2), 110 Stat 3416, 3417-18 (codified at 15
U.S.C. 77r(b)(1)-(2) (1998)).
227. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 218-19. A "qualified" investor would include someone owning
$5 million in investments. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(5 1)(A) (2002). As one court noted:
The Investment Company Act of 1940, directs the Commission to regulate any issuer of
securities that "is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily ... in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities." Although this definition nominally describes
hedge funds, most are exempt from the Investment Company Act's coverage because they
have one hundred or fewer beneficial owners and do not offer their securities to the public, or
because their investors are all "qualified" high net-worth individuals or institutions.
Investment vehicles that remain private and available only to highly sophisticated investors
have historically been understood not to present the same dangers to public markets as more
widely available investment companies, like mutual funds.
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
228. CFTC, CFTC WEEKLY ADvISORY (Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/adv05/opawal405.htm. See also Testimony of Jams A. Overdahl, CFTC Chief Economist, U.S. S. Banking Subcomm.
on Securities and Investment, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 30,237 (May 16, 2006) (Hedge fund trading
plays a "vital role" in keeping prices of related markets in alignment and "contributes to the formation
of liquid and well-functioning markets.").
229. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). As a CFTC commissioner has noted:
Based on data collected by the CFTC with help from the NFA, the number of Institutional
Investor's Platinum 100 largest hedge funds that were registered as Commodity Pool
Operators (CPOs) under the CFTC's delegated authority grew from 55 in 2002, to 65 of the
top 100 funds in 2003, and we have continued to see growth in 2004. In addition, 50 out of
the 100 largest hedge funds were also registered with the CFTC as Commodity Trading
Advisors (CTAs) in 2003 and this has also grown in 2004. Among the 25 largest hedge
funds, the proportions get even higher, with 68% registered as CPOs in 2003. Thus, a
significant proportion of the hedge fund industry is duly registered with the CFTC and this
number is growing.
CFTC CommissionerAddresses FIA/FOA InternationalDerivatives Conference, U.S. FED NEWS, June
29, 2004.
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requirements for pools offered only to highly accredited investors," which
composed most of those persons investing in hedge funds.23 °
Similar relief was not given for CTA registration. In measuring
whether the exemption from registration for advisers with less than fifteen
clients is available under the Commodity Exchange Act where a
corporation or other business entity was being advised,231 the CFTC had
looked through to count the number of clients of the separate corporation or
entity. The CFTC's look-through position was upheld by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in an early challenge on that issue. 32 At about the same
time, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar ruling with
respect to investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
holding that a general partner of a limited partnership was an adviser to the
limited partners rather than to the limited partnership as an entity.233
However, in 1985, the SEC adopted a rule234 that "permitted advisers to
count each partnership, trust or corporation as a single client," allowing
"advisers to avoid registration even though they manage large amounts of
client assets and, indirectly, have a large number of clients."23
The CFTC's look-through position swept up a lot of hedge funds as
CTAs even though those entities were advising only wealthy and
sophisticated clients. In contrast, the SEC's rule excluded those hedge
funds from the Investment Advisers Act registration requirement. 36 "By
230. Susan C. Ervin, Letting Go: The CFTC Rethinks Managed Futures Regulation, 24 FUTURES &
DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 n.5, 8 (May 2004). Several hedge funds remained registered with the CFTC as
CPOs, including Long Term Capital Management ("LTCM"). See Brooksley Born, International
Regulatory Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 607, 635 (2001) (describing registration of LTCM). It has
been noted that:
any hedge fund that uses the markets under CFTC's jurisdiction, even if their advisors
qualify for an exemption from registration, continue to fall under the legal definition of a
CPO or CTA, meaning that certain of the CFTC's rules and provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act-such as those proscribing fraud or manipulation--continue to apply.
CFTC CommissionerAddresses FIA/FOA InternationalDerivatives Conference, U.S. FED NEWS, June
29, 2004.
231. 7 U.S.C. § 6m (2000).
232. In CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 268 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit held that clients of a
separate entity would be counted for purposes of determining whether CTA registration was required
under the CEA.
233. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862,877 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
234. SEC Definition of "Client" of an Investment Advisor, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2006).
235. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054,
72,054-72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 and 279).
236. As one author has noted:
Ever since hedge funds became participants in the securities markets in the 1950s, they have
endeavored to operate as unregulated entities and the SEC has been uncertain about how, if at
all, to regulate them. Most hedge funds in the United States are formed as limited
partnerships in order to obtain flow-through tax treatment. The general partner of the
partnership falls within the definition of an "investment adviser" under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisors Act), but if the hedge fund is counted as only one client, the

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

regulating commodity pools of all shapes and sizes and treating investment
funds as the sum of their individual investors, the CFTC became, by
default, the only active regulator of any portion of the hedge fund
'
marketplace."237
However, the CFTC began rethinking its regulatory role
after the enactment of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of
2000.238 That statute was a statutory reflection of a CFTC decision to
deregulate the commodity markets for transactions in which only wealthy
and sophisticated investors are involved. The CFTC was, therefore,
receptive to a petition from the "Managed Funds Association. . . , a trade
association for hedge fund managers and CPOs" that sought "a
'sophisticated investor' exemption" from registration as a CTA for advisors
advising only wealthy and sophisticated clients. 23 9 That exemption was
adopted by the CFTC on August 8, 2003.240 It was designed to conform to
the SEC position on not looking through entities to count clients for
purposes of registration as an adviser.241
One commentator predicted that, as a result of that and other changes
made to CFTC rules, "the CFTC's regulatory role in the managed futures
markets will shrink to a fraction of its former size and this development
may well presage a new regulatory map in which the ...[SEC] exercises
regulatory oversight over the hedge fund marketplace, including
commodity pools and trading advisors previously regulated by the
CFTC. 24 2 Indeed, that process was already underway at the SEC where
the staff was considering whether regulation of hedge funds was needed as
a result of their involvement in the market timing and late trading at the
mutual funds. Not surprisingly, government being what it is, the SEC staff
study concluded that regulatory control over the hedge funds was needed,
seeking to have them register as investment advisers. 243 The SEC staff was
additionally seeking corporate governance reforms in its settlements with

entity is exempt from registration because it has fewer than fifteen clients and it does not
hold itself out to the public as an adviser.
Karmel, supra note 157, at 923.
237. Ervin, supra note 230, at 3.
238. Reauthorization of the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)
(codified as amended at 238.Reauthorization of the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 1).
239. Ervin, supra note 230, at 3.
240. Additional Registration and Other Regulatory Relief for Commodity Pool Operators and
Commodity Trading Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,221, 47,221 (Aug. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 4).
241. Exemption From Registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(10)
(2006). See Additional Registration and Other Regulatory Relief for Commodity Pool Operators and
Trading advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. at 47,221, 47,226 (Aug. 8, 2003) and 68 Fed. Reg. 12,622, 12,62812629 (Mar. 17, 2003) (both to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 4).
242. Ervin, supranote 230, at 1.
243. STAFF OF THE SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FuNDS xi (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
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244
hedge funds involved in the late trading and market timing cases.
Some sixteen months after the CFTC acted to adopt the SEC's
approach on looking-through entities to count clients, the SEC changed its
position and adopted the old CFTC view and began looking through hedge
funds to count the number of clients in order to require the registration of
hedge funds as investment advisers.24 5 That action was taken after another
highly politicized vote of 3-2 by the SEC commissioners. That rule
required hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC as investment
advisers by February 1, 2006.246 Predictably, that requirement was to
become the basis for more regulation after every new hedge fund
scandal. 247 As it was, registered hedge funds would be subject to SEC
audits, would be required to maintain specified books and records, and
would be required to hire a compliance officer and establish a compliance
also be required to disclose the amount
program. Those hedge funds would
248

of money under management.

The hedge fund investment adviser registration requirement was
challenged in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. That court
concluded that the SEC had acted arbitrarily in defining clients to include
hedge fund participants. 249 The Court stated: "That the Commission
wanted a hook on which to hang more comprehensive regulation of hedge
funds may be understandable. But the Commission may not accomplish its
objective by a manipulation of meaning., 25" That action was another
embarrassment to the SEC's efforts to dictate corporate governance in the
financial services industry.2 5'
244. See, e.g., Millennium Partners L.P., Securities Act Release No. 8639, Exchange Act Release
No. 52,863, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,172, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3078 (Dec. 1, 2005). A
hedge fund and some of its employees agreed to pay $180 million to settle late trading and market
timing charges. The hedge fund also agreed to create a Compliance, Legal and Ethics Oversight
Committee to oversee its operations.
245. SEC Definition of "Client" of an Investment Advisor, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2006), and
Methods for Counting Clients in Certain Private Funds, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2006). See
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054
(Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 and 279).
246. Excepted from the registration requirement were hedge funds that required clients to keep their
funds invested in the hedge fund for at least two years, absent extraordinary circumstances. 17 C.F.R. §
275.203(b)(3)-l(d)(2) (2006). About 1,100 hedge fund advisers were registered with the SEC prior to
the rule. Its adoption resulted in almost another 1,000 registrations. Kara Scannell, Making Hedge
Funds Less Secret, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006, at C1.
247. See Michael R. Koblenz, et al., The SEC's New Regulatory Agenda: What Every Hedge Fund
Manager Needs to Know, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1935 (BNA) (2005) (discussing likelihood of more
regulation).
248. Scannell, supra note 246, at Cl.
249. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
250. Id. at 882.
251. After this debacle a former SEC chairman charged that lawyers at the SEC were trying to
dictate economics through its mutual fund and hedge fund rules. Harvey L. Pitt, Over-Lawyered at the
SEC, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2006, at Al 5. A congressional investigation of hedge fund regulation in
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IV. REGULATION OF COMMODITY POOLS
A.

THE ROLE OF COMMODITY POOLS

The SEC's failures in regulating mutual funds gave rise to the
question of whether alternative regulatory schemes for collective
investments might be preferable. One such alternative is the commodity
pool operator regulated by the CFTC under the Commodity Exchange Act
of 1936 ("CEA").252 A commodity pool is the commodity futures
industry's analogue to an investment company, but it is regulated under a
regime that varies significantly from the one employed under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.253 A commodity pool is essentially an
entity soliciting funds from a group of customers and trading those funds in
commodity futures contracts through a single collective account.254
"The advantage of a commodity pool is that individuals who would
not otherwise have the time or expertise to devote to futures trading may
receive the benefits of expert advice from the commodity pool operator or
'
its commodity trading adviser."255
"The separate corporate existence or,
most frequently, the use of limited partnerships is common to commodity
'
pools."256
This is done to limit liability to the amount of the investment in

June 2006 embarrassed the SEC once again after a SEC lawyer claimed that he was discharged from the
agency for pressing an investigation of a hedge fund too aggressively. The hedge fund under
investigation was Pequot Capital Management which had $7 billion under management. Walt
Bogdanich & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. is Reported to Be Examining a Big Hedge Fund, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at Al. The SEC lawyer claimed that he was fired because he insisted on
subpoenaing John Mack, an executive at the hedge fund who was being appointed as the new head of
Morgan Stanley. David Wighton, Mack to be Questioned by SEC in Pequot Case, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), July 22, 2006, at 9.
In any event, the credit rating agencies are expanding their coverage on hedge Funds, which will impose
some informal regulation. Anuj Gangahar, Rating Agencies to Draw Uphedge [sic] Fund Criteria,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug. 24, 2006, at 1.
252. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§1-27 (2000).
253. Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD.
L. REv. 1, 28 (1996) (commodity pool operators are "the futures analogy to a mutual fund"); Rosenthal
& Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 1986) ("A commodity pool is the commodity-futures
equivalent of a mutual fund; the investor buys shares in the pool and the operator of the pool invests the
proceeds in commodity futures."); Frank A. Camp, Note, The 1981 Revisions in the CFTC's
Commodity Pool Operator Regulations, 7 J. CORP. L. 627, 630 (1982) (earlier in their history
commodity pools were referred to as "commodity mutual funds").
254. As noted in one treatise:
To summarize, a commodity pool is typically an organization that raises capital through the
sale of interests in it, such as shares or limited partnerships, and uses that capital to invest
either entirely or partially in commodity contracts. In its features, the typical commodity
pool bears a strong resemblance to mutual funds and similar investment companies that have
operated for decades in the securities industry.
1 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 1-250-251 (2004).
255. 13 JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION 17A-8 to 9 (2005).
256. Id. at 17A-9.
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contrast to the unlimited liability of an individual trader. In addition, the
commodity pool provides diversification and eliminates margin calls on its
investors.257
Like hedge funds, the commodity pool is a relatively new entrant to
the field of regulation. Little has been written about them, their history is
obscure, and the basis for their regulation is uncertain. "Legislative history
regarding the derivation of the concept of the commodity pool operator is
sparse indeed., 258 What is known is that a run up in commodity market
prices in the 1970s gave rise to concerns at the Commodity Exchange
Authority (a now-defunct bureau in the Department of Agriculture) that
registration of CPOs and CTAs was needed "in order to eliminate practices
that had enticed unsuspecting traders into the markets with, far too often,
substantial loss of funds. 259
Some commodity exchanges had already adopted rules requiring
disclosures concerning the affiliation of commodity pools with the
exchanges in order to assure that investors were not misled. The
commodity exchanges also imposed special margin requirements that were
needed because of the limited liability of the commodity pool owners and
the size of the pool positions. 2 " Those rules were deemed inadequate by
Congress when it overhauled the CEA26' through the passage of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.262 CPOs were
required to register with the CFTC,263 a process now administered by the

257. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 254, at 1-251.
258. Jeffery S. Rosen, Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 941 (1983).
259. JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION
64 (1987) (quoting H.R. REP. 93-975, at 79 (1974)). The House Report also stated that the legislation
was needed to protect "unsophisticated traders." Id.
260. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supranote 254, at 1-251.
261. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§1-27 (2000).
262. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389.
263. The CEA defines a "commodity pool operator" as:
any person engaged in the business which is of the nature of an investment trust, syndicate,
or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives
from others, funds securities or property, either directly or through capital contributions, the
sale of stock or other forms of securities, or otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any
commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market, but does not
include such persons not within the intent of this definition as the Commission may specify
by rule or regulation or by order.
7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(4) (2000). This definition has been interpreted by the courts:
Those courts which have raised the issue require the following factors to be present in a
commodity pool: (1) an investment organization in which the funds of various investors are
solicited and combined into a single account for the purpose of investing in commodity
futures contracts; (2) common funds used to execute transactions on behalf of the entire
account; (3) participants share pro rata in accrued profits or losses from the commodity
futures trading; and (4) the transactions are traded by a commodity pool operator in the name
of the pool rather than in the name of any individual investor.
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National Futures Association ("NFA"), a self-regulatory organization much
264
like the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD").
265
"Associated persons" of those entities are also required to register.
There are presently some 3,500 commodity pools managed by CPOs,
with approximately $600 billion in assets. 266 Most oof those commodity
pools are privately placed and would fall into the category of hedge funds
that are sold only to institutions such as pension plans, university
endowments and other sophisticated investors. 267 However, a relatively
small number of commodity pools are publicly offered and registered with
the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933268 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.269
B.

COMMODITY POOL REGULATIONS

270
The CFTC opted for a disclosure approach in regulating CPOs.
"This is one of the few areas where the CFTC had sought specific
disclosures in other than a very summary form" as a part of its regulation of
registrants. 27 The CFTC requires CPOs to provide clients with a brochure

Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 805 F.2d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 1986) ((citing CFTC v. Heritage Capital
Advisory Services, Ltd. Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,627, 26,384 (N.D. 111.1982) and Meredith v.
ContiCommodity Services, Inc. COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, p. 24, 462 (D.D.C. 1980)). See
also Nilsen v. Prudential-Bache, 761 F.2d 279, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Essentially, a commodity pool
operator is one who manages an investment fund, similar to a mutual fund, in which the assets of
several investors are invested together with gains or losses shared pro rata by the participants.").
264. Minimum Financial and Related Reporting Requirements, 49 Fed. Reg. 39,530, 39,918 (Oct. 9,
1984) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pts. 1, 3, 140, and 145).
265. 17 C.F.R. § 3.12(a) (2006). Commodity pools are subject to periodic inspections (once every
three years) by the NFA. A similar requirement is imposed by the SEC on investment advisers.
266. The growth in commodity pools over the last thirty years has been substantial. The amount of
funds under management in commodity pools in 1976 was estimated to be only about $75 million.
Rosen, supranote 258, at 943 n. 19. A CFTC commissioner noted that, while the over $600 billion now
under management at commodity pools is small in comparison to the almost $9 trillion in mutual funds,
"it is a significant amount of money - even here in Washington." Opening Statement of Acting CFTC
Chairman Sharon Brown-Hruska Before the CFTC's CPO and Commodity Pool Roundtable, April 6,
2005.
267. The CFTC plans to exempt entities or persons from the CPO registration requirement. Such
exemptions include uncompensated single pool operators, small commodity pool operators managing
less than $400,000 and funds with no more than fifteen investors. 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
Also exempted are certain pools that restrict their futures trading to a small percentage of their
investment activities. 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(1) (2006). Still another exemption from registration applies
to investment companies (including mutual funds), banks, insurance companies and certain pension
plans. Those entities must file a notice of exemption with the NFA. 17 C.F.R. § 4.5 (2006).
268. 15 U.S.C. §§77a-bbbb (2000)
269. Id. §§78a-mm (2000)
270. This regulatory approach apparently stems from the report and recommendations of the
CFTC's Advisory Committee on Commodity Futures Trading Professionals. MARKHAM, supra note
259, at 92.
271. Jerry W. Markham, FiduciaryDuties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 199, 246 (1992).
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containing specified information.272 A key part of that document is a "risk
disclosure statement" that warns in stark terms of the high risk of
derivatives trading, the effects of restrictions on the withdrawal of investor
funds and the substantial fees that may attach to investments in commodity
pools.273 The use of such summary risk disclosure requirements was
adopted after the CFTC rejected the "suitability" rule in the securities
industry that prohibits a broker-dealer from recommending a security that
is not suitable in light of the particular investments needs and objectives of
the customer.274 The CFTC risk disclosure statement tells customers that
they should themselves carefully consider whether commodity futures
trading is suitable for their own investment interests.275
The CFTC further requires the CPO brochure to provide substantive
disclosures such as background information on the CPO and its CTAs.276
Disclosure is required of the "principal risk factors" associated with
participation in the pool, including the use that will be made of the
proceeds obtained from investors, a description of the instruments to be
traded, and the investment programs and polices to be followed by the
pool. 27 7

In addition, a summary description of the pool's CTA is

required.2 78

Disclosure is required of restrictions on transfer of pool

272. 17 C.F.R. §4.21 (2005). That information may be supplied electronically through the Internet.
Brooksley Born, Symposium: Derivatives & Risk Management, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 764 (1997).
Interestingly, the SEC also has a written disclosure requirement for investment advisers, which in some
respects requires less disclosure than the CFTC regulation. Compare SEC rule 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3
(2006) (requiring disclosure statement containing information in Part H of ADV registration statement)
with CFTC rules 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.31, 4.34 (2006) (requiring a broad range of disclosures including track
records).
273. 17. C.F.R. § 4.24 (2006).
274. See MARKHAM, supra note 255, at § 9:1. The North America Securities Administrators
Association, however, has sought to impose suitability and other requirements on CPOs through model
state regulation. James G. Smith, A Securities Law Primerfor Commodity Pool Operators, 1996
COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 281, 323 (1996). The states were not deterred in imposing such regulation by the
National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416.
275. The differences in the regulatory approaches of the SEC and CFTC is evidenced by the risk
disclosure statement required for single stock futures over which the SEC was given joint regulatory
control with the CFTC. Instead of the brief warning used by the CFTC for high risk futures contracts,
the disclosure statement for single stock futures became a long, complex, mini-prospectus, negating its
value as a warning to unsuspecting investors. 67 Fed. Reg. 64,162 (Oct. 17, 2002). See also
MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 359.
276. 17 C.F.R. § 4.24 (2006).
277. 17 C.F.R. §4.24(g) (2006).
278. 17 C.F.R. §4.24. The following is a summary of the disclosures required in the CPO brochure:
the name and main address of the commodity pool operator and each of its principals as well
as their business commodity pool operator and each of its principals as well as their business
background for the preceding five years; the business background, for the same period, of
any commodity trading advisor to the pool (and its principals); any actual or potential
conflict of interest" in regard to the pool by the operator or manager, major commodity
trading advisor (or their principals), or service provider (or their principals or introducing
brokers);... whether the operator, commodity trading advisor, or any principal has a
beneficial interest in the pool and, if so, the extent of that interest; an identification of all
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ownership interests,279 distribution policies and the federal income tax
" '
effects of distributions.2 8 Redemption policies must also be disclosed.28
Redemption policies vary, but a cursory survey of several public
commodity pools suggest that most CPOs allow redemptions at NAV at
month end, often requiring from five to ten days advance notice. This
effectively prevents market timing in those pools. In order to further
discourage market timers, many CPOs require funds to be held in the pool
for eleven months or more before withdrawal. Other CPOs impose a
redemption fee varying from 3 percent or more where a withdrawal is made
before the end of such a period.282
"The centerpiece of the disclosure document is the 'track record'
types of expenses and fees that were incurred by the pool in the preceding fiscal year and are
expected to be incurred in the current year; information regarding any minimum or maximum
contribution requirements and, if applicable, what will be done with the funds until trading
begins; how the pool will fulfill its margin requirements on transactions, and how it will use
funds in excess of margin requirements; any restrictions upon transfer or redemption of
interests in the pool; the extent to which pool participants may be liable in excess of their
capital contributions; the pool's distribution policy with respect to profits or capital, and its
federal income tax effects for the participants; any "material" administrative, civil, or
criminal action against the operator, commodity trading advisor, or a principal in the
preceding five years; any fee payable by the operator, commodity trading advisor, or a
principal to any person for soliciting capital contributions to the pool; whether the operator,
commodity trading advisor, or a principal trades (or intends to) and, if so, whether
participants will be permitted to inspect those trading records; a statement that all participants
will receive monthly or quarterly account statements and either a certified or uncertified
annual financial report; and on the cover page of the disclosure document, a disclaimer that
the Commission has neither reviewed nor passed on the accuracy or completeness of that
document.
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 254, at 1-257-58.
279. 17 C.F.R. §4.24(p) (2006).
280. 17 C.F.R. §4.24(r) (2006). Federal income tax treatment has driven the use of limited
partnerships as the format for commodity pools because otherwise there would be a double tax, one at
the pool level and one at the investor level. Smith, supra note 274, at 296-297. There is no double tax
exemption such as the one available for mutual funds. 26 U.S.C. §§ 851-852 (2000). A "publicly
traded partnership" is also subject to a double tax because they are taxed as corporations. 26 U.S.C §
7704 (2000). However, double taxation can be avoided if the limited partnership is not considered to be
publicly traded. That is accomplished by imposing restrictions on transfers of limited partnership
interests, which many large publicly owned commodity pools have done. Avoiding the status of a
publicly traded partnership also allows deduction of the pool's losses up to the extent of the investor's
taxpayer's basis in the pool. See e.g., Rogers Int'l Raw Materials Fund, L.P., Prospectus, 2,000,000
Units of Limited Partnership Maximum at 51-57 (Mar. 31, 2005) (discussing those issues). The
taxation of gains from commodity futures contracts was changed by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 §§ 501-09, after a massive tax shelter scandal in the futures
markets. See Jerry W. Markham, ProhibitedFloor Trading Activities Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 22-29 (1989) (discussing those scandals and the tax law changes). Gains
from regulated futures contracts are taxed at a mixture of the 60% long term capital gains rate and 40%
short term rates, regardless of the holding period. Open positions are marked-to-market and any gains
taxed at those rates, which can cause some cash flow issues. 26 U.S.C. § 1256 (2000).
281. 17 C.F.R. §4.24(p) (2006).
282. Compare Rogers Int'l Raw Materials Fund, L.P., supra note 280, at 42-43 (explaining that 10
days notice before end of month is required for redemption but no redemption fee is charged).
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provision, which requires that the disclosure document set forth the actual
performance record in mandated form for the pool, other pools operated by
the commodity pool operator, and commodity interest accounts directed by
the pool's commodity trading advisor.' 283 This requires disclosure of past
trading performance,8 4 including the actual trading performance of the
pool and its CTAs for the preceding five years. That performance must be
in a form specified by CFTC regulations which require, among other
things, disclosure of the "worst peak-to-valley drawdown during the most
recent five calendar years. 2 85 This requirement is a recognition that
commodity pool investors are consumers who are seeking a product with
the best performance after costs and fees.
CFTC regulations prohibit CPOs from co-mingling the funds of a pool
with any other person.286 Participants in larger pools must be given
monthly account statements in the form of a statement of income and a
statement of changes in net asset value computed in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles.287 Pool participants must be
given an annual report containing financial statements certified by an
independent public accountant.288 CFTC regulations also contain a
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002289 type requirement that requires each account
statement and annual financial report to contain a "signed oath or
affirmation of the sole proprietor, general partner of a partnership, or chief
executive or chief financial officer of a corporate pool29that
these reports are
°
accurate and complete to the best of his or her belief.,
C.

COMMODITY POOL GOVERNANCE

"A significant provision under the 1940 [Investment Company] Act,
but absent from the commodity pool regulatory structure, is the role of
independent directors."'2 9' Moreover, the outside director requirements
adopted by the New York Stock Exchange after the Enron scandal were not
applied to limited partnerships because of their "unique attributes.,

292

It is

283. Rosen, supra note 258, at 982.
284. 17 C.F.R. §4.24(n) (2006).
285. 17 C.F.R. §4.25(a) (2006).

286. 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(c) (2006).
287. 17 C.F.R. § 4.22 (2006).
288. 17 C.F.R. §4.24(u) (2006). The form for that annual report is also specified in CFTC
regulations. 17 C.F.R. §4.22 (2006).
289. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and

29 U.S.C. (Supp. 112002)).
290. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 254, at 1-260, referencing 17 C.F.R. §4.22(h).
291. Smith, supra note 274, at 290.
292. That rule mandated that at least a majority of the board of directors of listed companies be
composed of outside directors and that nominating and compensating committees be composed entirely
of such directors. However limited partnerships were exempted from those requirements. See N.Y.
STOCK EXCH.,
NYSE
LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303(A)
(2004),
available at
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also "noteworthy that the CEA [Commodity Exchange Act], unlike the
Investment Company Act, does not mandate a corporate form for CPOs,
and thus permits a contract form of governance and greater flexibility than
the Investment Company Act in advisory arrangements."2' 93
"Commodity pools are not subject to specific governance procedures
under the CFTC regulations. Rather, the relationship between the pool and
the pool participants is based on state law depending on the form of
entity."'2 94 For tax reasons, "[t]he limited partnership is the most common
form of commodity pool, although the limited partnership is often set up
'
with a corporation acting as the general partner."295
The governance
structure of limited partnerships is regulated by state law, usually some
form or another of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.2 96 Those
statutes require the limited partnership to file a statement before
commencing business, with the Secretary of State or some other state
functionary. Usually, that statement must contain the name and address of
the general partner and little else.2 97
The general partner manages the limited partnership's business while
the limited partners play a passive role. 98 Unlike the limited partners, the
general partner does not have limited liability but may shield its owners by
incorporating.2 99 Most general partners in large CPO limited partnerships
http://www.nyse.com/RegulationFrameset.html?nyseref=http/3A//www.nyse.com/audience/listedcomp
anies.html&displayPage=/about/listed/l022221393251.html. Those requirements do apply at the
general partnership level if the general partner is a listed corporation, which would be rare for a CPO.
Nasdaq also exempts limited partnerships from its outside directors requirement. See NAT'L ASSOC. OF
SEC.
DEALERS,
NASD
MANUAL,
Marketplace
Rule
4350 (2006),
available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=l 189&elementid=l 159000635.
293. Daniel F. Zimmerman, CFTC Reauthorizationin the Wake of Long-Term CapitalManagement,
2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 121, 135-136 (2000), (citing Stephen K. West, The Investment Company
Industry in the 1990s: A Rethinking of the Regulatory Structure Appropriatefor Investment Companies
in the 1990's, The Background and Premisesfor Regulation, REPORT FOR THE INVESTMENT COMPANY
INSTITUTE, 16-17 (1990)).

294. Smith, supra note 274, at 291.
295. Camp, supra note 253, at 630. Pools operating as corporations were initially so rare that the
CFTC had to make a special exemption for them under its regulations. Rosen, supra note 258, at 951.
296. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 64-75 (2d ed. 2006) (describing state regulation of limited partnerships). See also id. at
21 (describing advantages and disadvantages of limited partnerships).
297. See, e.g., REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Act §2001 (1997). New York law is more

expansive in the information to be filed with the county clerk by limited partnerships, requiring a
statement of the term of the limited partnership, a description of the contributions of limited partners,
and policies for making distributions to limited partners. N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 91 (Consol. 1977).
298. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 296, at 64-66.
299. See, e.g., Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 562 P.2d 244, 245 (Wash. 1977).
The limited liability of a corporate general partner has led the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
to "permit a wholly-owned subsidiary of a national bank to act as sole general partner and commodity
pool operator to trade, invest in, and hold forward, option, and futures contracts that are permissible for
a national bank to purchase and execute either for their own account or for the account of their
customers." Steven McGinity, Symposium on Derivative FinancialProducts: Derivatives-RelatedBank
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are incorporated.3"' This means that, "[u]nlike a traditional corporate entity
whose managers are natural persons, a pool's managers are typically
corporations or other entities." ''
A general partner of a limited partnership owes fiduciary duties under
state law to limited partners but their scope and application is uncertain.3 2
CFTC regulations also seem "to recognize that commodity trading advisers
and commodity pool operators owe greater duties to their customers and
that their customers need special protection.""3 3 Of particular concern to
the CFTC has been the fees charged to pool participants. It had initially
considered "adopting a restriction on the amount of management and
advisory fees a commodity pool might charge. After considering such a
measure and the negative comments received, however, the Commission
decided not to impose such a rule."3 4
Another contrast between the securities and futures industry is their
treatment of incentive fees paid on the basis of profits from trading. The
CFTC rejected a prohibition on incentive fees from trading profits such as
the one contained in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.305 That decision
was made after the CFTC Advisory Committee on Commodity Futures
Trading Professionals concluded that the Investment Advisers Act's
prohibition on incentive fees was due to the fact that Congress thought that
such arrangements resulted in undue risk taking.30 6
The advisory
committee believed that concern was inapplicable to futures trading
because 30speculation
and risk-taking are an accepted part of the futures
7
industry.

Instead of the more parental restrictions used by the Investment

Activities as Authorized by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve
Board, 71 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 1195, 1120 (1996).
300. A limited liability company (LLC) structure may also be used. See Brian L. Schorr, Limited
Liability Companies: Featuresand Uses, 805 PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. AND PRAC. HANDBOOK
SERIES 191, 199 (1993) (stating that LLCs are desirable for commodity pools).
301. Smith, supra note 274, at 287.
302. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 296, at 64-66.
303. Markham, supra note 271, at 237.
304. Rosen, supra note 258, at 959. The CFTC has also struggled with commission and fee
disclosure requirements for commodity futures commission merchants, the futures industry analogue to
the broker-dealer in the securities industry. The agency has required disclosure of fees where they are
material but rejected claims that an excessive fee or commission is inherently fraudulent. An issue
raised periodically is whether, in addition to their amounts, disclosure of the effects of excessive fees

and commissions is required. See MARKHAM,supra note 255, at § 8:10.
305. Id. The prohibition in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 applies to "capital gains" or
"capital appreciation" of the funds under management. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(l) (2006). The SEC has
exempted from that prohibition advice given by an investment adviser to defined wealthy clients.

17

C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2006).
306. A Senate report to that legislation likened such arrangements to a "heads I win, tails you lose"

investment approach. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 22 (1940).
307. Rosen, supranote 258, at 959.
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Advisers Act, the CFTC opted for its disclosure approach. This includes
disclosure in the CPO brochure of management fees, brokerage
commissions, trailing commissions, allocations from the pool to any
person, trading adviser fees, clearing fees, and professional and
administrative fees, including legal fees." 8 The CPO must provide in
tabular format an analysis of the pool's break even point and that analysis
must include all fees and commissions. Certain additional and specific
disclosures are required for incentive fees.3 °9 Some of those incentive fees
can be significant. In addition to management and brokerage fees ranging
from around
2% to 65% of NAV, a 20% incentive fee based on profits is
310
common.
Another concern based on fiduciary principles is reflected in the
CFTC regulations that require disclosure in the CPO brochure of "any
actual or potential" conflicts of interest. 31' This includes disclosure of
arrangements in which any person might benefit from the maintenance of
the pool's account with a particular futures commission merchant or its
introduction by an introducing broker. This would include payments for
order flow or soft dollar arrangements,3 12 which have also raised concerns
at the SEC.3" 3 Another disclosure required by the CFTC that is also
popular with the SEC is that of related party transactions. 3 4 The CFTC
requires disclosure of costs to the pool of transactions (for which there is no
publicly disseminated price) between the pool and any affiliated persons.315
Where the CPO, CTA or their principals plan to trade for their own
account, disclosure must be made of that fact and any written policies
governing such trading. In addition, disclosure must be made as to whether
pool participants will be allowed
3 1 6 to inspect the trading records of the
persons engaging in such trading.
D. OVERLAPPING SEC JURISDICTION
The SEC has maintained a regulatory role over commodity pools
through the backdoor of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities

308. 17 C.F.R. §4.24(i) (2006).
309. 17 C.F.R. § 4.21(i)(3) (2006).
310. See, e.g., The Beacon Financial Futures Fund L.P., Prospectus at 13 (May 13, 2005) (disclosing
20% percent incentive fee); JWH Global Trust, Prospectus at 31-32 (Nov. 1, 2004) (disclosing 20%
incentive fee and 6.5% annual brokerage fee).
311. 17 C.F.R. § 4.240) (2006).
312. 17C.F.R. § 4.24(k) (2006).
313. Id. at § 6:13 (describing payment for order flow issues). See MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note
117, at § 5:8. (describing soft dollar restrictions and SEC enforcement cases).
314. The scandal involving the Enron Corp. was occasioned by the disclosure of certain suspect
related party transactions involving the company's chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow. MARKHAM,
supra note 3, at 82.
315. 17 C.F.R. § 4.24(k) (2006).
316. 17 C.F.R. § 4.24(m) (2006).
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Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC claims those ownership interests are
"securities" subject to its regulation. Whether the SEC had jurisdiction
over such securities was in doubt after the CFTC was created because the
latter agency was given "exclusive" jurisdiction over the regulation of
futures trading.317 Clouding the picture further was the issue over whether
discretionary commodity futures accounts were securities subject to SEC
regulation.3 1 The courts are divided on the issue of whether such accounts
are securities, an issue that hinges on whether "vertical" commonality, as
opposed to "horizontal" commonality, meets the investment contract
definition established by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.319
The majority of the courts seem to have concluded that discretionary
accounts are not securities subject to SEC jurisdiction,32 ° but there is more
horizontal commonality in commodity pools so the result might have been
different for investments in those entities.
The CFTC early in its history asserted exclusive jurisdiction over the
operation and investment activities of pools, and the SEC did not challenge
that claim. Therefore, even publicly offered commodity pools are not
subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 unless they are also trading
securities and do not otherwise fall within in an exemption to that statute.
However, the CFTC declined to decide whether the solicitation of funds by
commodity pool operators were within its exclusive jurisdiction or whether
the SEC had concurrent jurisdiction over such solicitation under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.321 As a
consequence of this uncertainty most commodity pools registered their
public offerings with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933, but not the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Nevertheless, the issue of what
regulations applied remained open because the SEC and CFTC were locked
in a jurisdictional war from their inception over their respective regulatory
roles for futures type instruments that involved securities.322
The SEC got the worst of its jurisdictional fights with the CFTC in the
Seventh Circuit,323 and it entered into a demarche with the CFTC in 1981
317. 7 U.S.C. §2(a)(1)(A) (2006).
318. The issue of whether a discretionary commodity account is a security gave rise to much
litigation and not a little commentary. See, e.g., John Letteri, Note, Are Discretionary Commodity
Trading Accounts Investment Contracts? The Supreme Court Must Decide, 35 CATHOLIC U. L. REV.
635, 635 (1986); Bradley D. Johnson, DiscretionaryAccounts as Securities: An Application of the
Howey Test, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 639, 639 (1984).
319. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See THOMAS L. HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION 23-27 (2d ed. 1996).
320. MARKHAM, supra note 255, at § 21:3.
321. Don L. Horwitz & Jerry W. Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission:
Scene!!, 39 Bus. LAW. 67, 75 (1983).
322. See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The
United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L. J. 1993, 2024-2027 (1988) (describing those
conflicts).
323. Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1167 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated as
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that allocated jurisdiction between the two agencies. That agreement was
called the Shad-Johnson Accords in honor of the chairmen of those
agencies who negotiated the agreement. The Shad-Johnson Accords did
not end the jurisdictional turf battles between the SEC and CFTC,324 but did
lead to legislation that defined the boundaries for futures and options
trading.325
The Shad-Johnson Accords also addressed the regulation of
commodity pools. In order to resolve the uncertainty in this area, those
Accords sought legislation that would provide that nothing in the CEA
would affect the applicability of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to securities issued by
commodity pools. "Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, commodity
pools and persons managing them may be subject to the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 and, if a pool conducts not only a commodities
business but also acts as an investment company, the Investment Company
Act of 1940.326 In seeking this amendment, however, the agencies made
clear that they did not intend to "imply that the Investment Company Act of
1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 are applicable to the
activities of commodity pools, commodity pool operators, and commodity
trading advisors when such entities or persons purchase commodity futures
contracts (or options thereon) based on securities or give advice as to the
purchase and sale of futures contracts (or options thereof) based on
securities. '
In response to that request, the CEA was amended in 1982 by
Congress during a periodic CFTC reauthorization process, "so that the
CEA now reflects that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 apply to solicitations for investments in a
commodity pool. 3 28 However, as the House Agriculture Committee report
to that legislation noted, the Investment Company Act of 1940 would not
apply to the CFTC regulated instruments,3 29 "giving the CFTC exclusive

moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
324. See e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 550 (7th Cir. 1989) and Bd. of
Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713, 726 (7th Cir. 1999) (both cases rejecting expansive
claims by the SEC to jurisdiction over futures instruments).
325. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294.
326. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,332 at p. 25,605 (Feb. 2, 1982).
327. S.REP. No. 97-384, at 82 (1982).
328. Horwitz & Markham, supranote 321, at 75.
329. H.R. REP. No. 97-565, pt. 1, at 82-83 (1982), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3889; Horwitz
& Markham, supranote 321, at 75. As the SEC has somewhat confusingly noted:
It appears, therefore, that without regard to whether futures on securities or options on such
futures are securities, an entity investing in such interests is not subject to the jurisdiction of
the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940 unless such entity is otherwise an
investment company under the Investment Company Act, in which case the person advising
the investment company about its investments in futures may be an "'investment adviser' of
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jurisdiction over the form of the pool, fee setting practices, and trading
conduct," while subjecting sales of investment interests to SEC regulation
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.330

Oddly, given their history, there has been very little tension between
the SEC and CFTC over the joint regulation of commodity pools. This is
apparently due to the fact that many commodity pools would be exempt
from SEC registration requirements in any event because their offerings are
limited to sophisticated wealthy investors. 33 In addition, the disclosures
mandated by the CFTC for registered CPOs are not substantially different
from those required by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933.332
Further, the financial reports required by the CFTC for registered pools can
be readily conformed to meet the reporting requirements created by the
SEC under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act.333
To the extent that a commodity pool invests in securities instead of
commodity instruments, concerns arise over whether the pool becomes an
investment company, subjecting the CPO to the provisions of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and the CTA to the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 .3" However, there are several exemptions available under

an investment company" under section 2(a)(20) of the Investment Company Act and its
contract subject to the provisions of section 15 of the Investment Company Act. A person
giving advice concerning the making of investments in futures on exempted securities (other
than municipal securities) or in futures on indices of securities as permitted pursuant to the
Futures Trading Act of 1982, or as previously approved by the CFTC, or on options on such
futures is excluded by the CEA from being subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC under the
investment Advisers Act of 1940 unless the person provides advice about investing in
securities, otherwise than by advising about such futures or options on such futures or about
certain securities which may be termed, generally, United States government securities.
Peavey Commodity Futures Funds 1, I and III, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,511 (June 2, 1983).
330. Commodity pools making public offerings disclose in their prospectuses filed under the
Securities Act of 1933 that they are not registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. For
example, the prospectus of one high profile commodity pool states: "The Index Fund is not a regulated
investment company or 'mutual fund' subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940. Therefore, you
do not have the protections provided by that statute." Rogers Int'l Raw Materials Fund, L.P.,
Prospectus, 2,000,000 Units of Limited Partnership Maximum, at p. 4 (March 31, 2005).
331. Many such offerings use Rule 506 in SEC Regulation D to avoid registration under the
Securities Act of 1933. That regulation allows offerings to be made in an unlimited amount to an
unlimited amount of "accredited investors." 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006.
332. Smith, supra note 274, at 281 (comparing the disclosure requirements mandated by the SEC for
securities offerings and the CFTC for CPOs).
333. Id. at 303-304. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (supp. 2002) and 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 13a-15 (2006).
334. Thus, "in appropriate circumstances, commodity pools and persons managing them may be
subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and if a pool conducts not only a commodities business
but also acts as an investment company, the Investment Company Act of 1940." H.R. REP. No. 97-626,
pt. II, at 14 (1982). The IRS is challenging mutual funds that use swaps, threatening to revoke their
mutual fund pass-through tax treatment if swaps exceed a certain portion of assets. Eleanor Laise,
Investors Are Cautioned to Review FundStrategiesAmid IRS Ruling, WALL ST.J., Dec. 21, 2005, at D2.
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those statutes. For example, the Investment Company Act will not apply if
the CPO does not hold itself out as being "primarily" engaged in the
business of investing or trading in securities... and does not own
investment securities in value exceeding forty percent of the pool's total
assets (exclusive of cash and government securities) on an unconsolidated
basis.336 Conversely, mutual funds may avoid registration as CPOs under
the exemption granted by the CFTC.337
E.

COMMODITY POOL ISSUES

Regulatory problems involving traditional commodity pools regulated
by the CFTC have been relatively moderate.33 8 Of recent interest are the
public commodity pools that traded through Refco, Inc. That firm was a
large futures commission merchant that failed two months after its initial
public offering when it revealed that its chief executive officer had hidden
$430 million in obligations from its auditors. That was a failure of the
SEC's full disclosure regime, but a commodity pool sponsored by celebrity
commodity trader James B. Rogers had $362 million on deposit with
Refco, and its bankruptcy placed those funds at risk. The Rogers Fund
sued Refco claiming that the monies in that commodity pool should have
been held at the CFTC regulated arm of Refco where they would be
immune
from claims of other Refco creditors. 339 Refco has denied that
34 °
claim.

335. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l)(A) (supp. 2004).
336. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l)(C) (supp. 2004).
337. 17 C.F.R. § 4.5 (2006). Investment companies engaged in futures trading have encountered
some esoteric issues over whether the leverage in those contracts and the posting of margin creates a
"senior security" that is subject to some special restrictions in the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Export, Individual Validated, Special and Reexports Licensing General Policies and Procedures, 37
Fed. Reg. 12,790 (June 9, 1972) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 370-374). Meeting margin requirements
for futures contracts also required the creation of "safekeeping" accounts, but that requirement was later
dropped because it was largely redundant of CFTC segregation requirements. MARKHAM & HAZEN,
supranote 117, at § 5:8.
338. The CFTC could not resist the temptation of involving itself in the mutual fund late trading and
market timing scandals. In Veras Investment Group, LLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
30,162
(C.F.T.C. 2005), the CFTC, by consent, found that a hedge fund that was registered with it as a CPO
and CTA had created a number of subsidiaries to evade market timing restrictions imposed by several
mutual funds. The CFTC charged that this "deceptive technique" was not disclosed to pool participants
and that such information was material to those investors. The CFTC further found that the respondent
had claimed that it was using complex models to exploit mispricings in mutual fund shares when in fact
it was late trading on the basis of stale NAV pricings.
339. Rogers was co-founder of the Quantum Fund with George Soros, the billionaire hedge fund
manager. Rogers was also a popular business talk show commentator, and he had written a book
advocating commodity investments as a profitable alternative to stocks and other investments.
Published before the Refco bankruptcy, the book noted that his funds were up 165% and included the
best performing index fund in the world in any asset class. See MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 577-80
(describing the Refco scandal and Rogers' funds).
340. See Alistair Barr, Refco Rebuts $362M Customer Claim, MARKETWATCH, Nov. 2, 2005.
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?siteid-mktw&dis.html (describing

Fall 2006]

MUTUAL FUND SCANDALS

For CFTC regulated CPOS and CTAs, the use of hypothetical instead
of actual trading results to profile trading systems without proper
disclosures has also been a recurring problem, and books and records
violations are not uncommon. In other instances, the disclosure brochure
given to clients was either false or its stated policies were not followed.34 '
The worst abuses have involved fly-by-night operators using high pressure
sales tactics to downplay risks and overstate the likelihood of profits. Such
pools are usually unregistered and are simply Ponzi schemes, looting
customer assets before finally collapsing.342 Since these same problems
have been plaguing the securities industry in even greater magnitude for
years, it is hard to assign blame on the basis of the regulator involved.343
However, those fraud schemes are now being carried out under the hedge
fund banner because stories of large hedge fund profits are attracting
unsophisticated investors.
As the SEC has noted, "[t]he growth in hedge funds has been
conflicting claims by the Rogers Funds and Refco lawyers).
341. See MARKHAM, supra note 255, at §§7:7 and 24:15 (describing these CPO and CTA regulatory
problems).
342. Id. at § 24:15 (describing these CPO and CTA regulatory problems). Some scandals have also
involved registered CPOs and their CTAs. See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1540
(1 th Cir. 1986); CFTC v. Chilcott Portfolio Management, Inc., 713 F.2d 1477, 1480 (10th Cir. 1983)
("An FBI investigation disclosed evidence that, from 1975 to 1981, Chilcott had attracted nearly $80
million in investments for a commodities pool from approximately 400 persons. The FBI estimated that
in 1981 the commodities pool had only about $8 million in liquid assets, over one-half of which were
held by Chilcott in his own name. The remainder was allegedly diverted by Chilcott into personal
ventures or lost in speculative trading.").
343. To cite a few examples, the Republic of New York Securities Corp. pleaded guilty to two
felony counts of securities fraud and agreed to pay $606 million in restitution as the result of looting
conducted through its facilities by Martin Armstrong. He had been running a Ponzi scheme that cost
Japanese institutional investors about $700 million. In another Ponzi scheme, Martin Frankel looted
about $200 million before fleeing. Frankel was arrested in Germany with twelve passports in different
names and diamonds worth millions of dollars. Patrick Bennett was the architect of one of the largest
Ponzi schemes in American history. He defrauded investors of $700 million. InverWorld, Inc.
defrauded clients in Mexico of $475 million. J.T. Wallenbrock & Associates sold promissory notes to
over 6,000 investors, raising over $230 million in that Ponzi scheme. Reed E. Slatkin bested that fraud
with a $600 million Ponzi scheme. Over $250 million of that amount could not be recovered. Kevin
Leigh Lawrence pled guilty for his involvement in a $100 million Ponzi scheme. D. W. Heath &
Associates Inc. and others defrauded some 800 elderly investors out of $60 million. Eric Stein
defrauded 1,800 investors of $34 million through a Ponzi scheme targeting those over age fifty. Even
bigger was the sale of by Kenneth Kasarjian of over $800 million in lease assignments that had already
been assigned or which did not exist. Terry L. Dowdell was the mastermind of a $120 million scheme
involving what he claimed were foreign bank trading instruments that provided a return of 160%.
David and James Edwards and others raised $98 million from 1,300 investors through a prime bank
scheme. The Credit Bancorp. Ltd. (CBL) defrauded investors of $210 million. That scheme was
master minded by Richard J. Blech. See MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 487-89 (describing this pandemic
of Ponzi schemes). See also lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Failed Hedge Fund Haunts Celebrities, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 22, 2006, at Cl (celebrities, including Sylvester Stallone, were sued after taking profits before a
hedge fund running a Ponzi scheme collapsed); Randall Smith & Ian McDonald, Suits Target Early
Pullouts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2006, at C3 (non-celebrities being sued on the same grounds after the
collapse of another hedge fund running a Ponzi scheme).

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

accompanied by a substantial and troubling growth in the number of our
hedge fund fraud enforcement cases. In the last five years, the Commission
has brought 51 cases in which we have asserted that hedge fund advisers
have defrauded hedge fund investors or used the fund to defraud others in
amounts our staff estimates to exceed $1.1 billion." 344 However, the
amount of losses cited by the SEC from hedge fund frauds was only a small
percentage of the $870 billion managed by over 7,000 hedge funds in the
United States3 45 and constitutes just a small proportion of the funds looted
in Ponzi schemes in the securities industry.
Among the hedge funds committing fraud was the Manhattan
Investment Fund managed by Michael Berger. Investors there lost $350
million. In Naples, Florida, David Mobley's Maricopa Index Hedge Fund
turned out to be a Ponzi scheme that defrauded some 300 wealthy investors
of over $120 million between 1993 and 2000. Mobley used the money for
personal extravagances, including expensive real estate in Naples and a
fleet of luxury automobiles.346 On the opposite coast, another hedge fund,
the KL Group, defrauded wealthy Palm Beach investors of an estimated
$200 million.3 47 Another hedge fund, Bayou Securities LLC, which had
$450 million under management was found to be missing large amounts of
those funds after its founder, Samuel Israel III, announced that he was
retiring at age forty-six in order to spend more time with his family. Israel
and his chief financial officer, Daniel Marino later pleaded guilty to
criminal charges of fraud.348

344. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72054,
72056 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at C.F.R. 275, 279).
345. That would be .001149%.
346. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 441.
347. Shawn Bean, The Fund and Damage Done, FLA. INT'L. MAG., Mar. 2006, at 118.
348. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 591; In re Israel, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53775,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2515, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1038 (May 9, 2006) (imposing sanctions
against Israel). The SEC has uncovered abuses by hedge funds dealing in PIPEs (private investments in
public equity), which have become a popular tool for raising private equity. In such transactions, hedge
funds purchase unregistered stock of a public company at a substantial discount. These transactions are
used where the expense of a public offering or other concerns make the private equity market more
attractive. See generally George L. Majoros, Jr., Comment, The Development of "PIPEs" in Today's
Private Equity Market, 51 CASE W. RES. 493 (2001) (describing losses from PIPEs). The abuses
uncovered by the SEC involved purchases by hedge funds of PIPEs where they anticipate a drop in the
price of the stock. The hedge funds then sold the sold the company's stock short and covered with the
short sale with their unregistered PIPE shares. See Floyd Norris, A Troubling Finance Tool for
Companies in Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at C4. One hedge fund is claimed to have
persuaded an independent research firm to delay release of a negative report on a company so that the
hedge fund could short its stock. Jenny Anderson, True or False: A Hedge Fund Plotted to Hurt a
Drug Maker, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at BU2. For other cases involving hedge fund abuses, see In
re Springer Investment Management, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2434, 2005 SEC
LEXIS 2390 (Sept. 21, 2005) (over-valuing hedge fund assets); Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill
Asset Mgmt., LLC, 376 F. Supp.2d 285, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (over-valuation claims); In re Matter of
Dickey, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53555, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2505, 2006
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The CFTC charged another hedge fund, Tradewinds International II
LP, with overstating the value of its assets. The hedge fund claimed assets
of over $18 million when the actual amount was $1.1 million and gains of
twelve percent when it was actually experiencing losses. The fund's
manager, Charles L. Harris, used monies not lost in trading to buy himself
luxury cars, a house in Florida and a yacht. Harris sent his investors a
DVD of himself confessing to improper trading while fleeing authorities in
his yacht. He was later caught.349
The CFTC's approach to the regulation of commodity pools has
defaulted to the full disclosure approach used by the SEC for any other
public offering.
The CFTC, however, has not used its exclusive
jurisdiction over the operations of commodity pools to adopt the intrusive
regulatory schemes found in the Investment Company Act or the
Investment Advisers Act. There is no evidence that the CFTC's hands off
regulatory approach for CPO governance and operations has provided any
less investor protection than that available for mutual fund investors or that
the intrusive SEC regulations provide any greater protection from fraud.35 °
V. BANK COMMON TRUST FUNDS
A.

BACKGROUND

Another mechanism for collective investments is the common trust
fund in which the funds of several individual trusts are pooled for

SEC LEXIS (Mar. 27, 2006) (over-valuing hedge fund assets).
349. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 441.
350. The limited partnership form of governance used by CPOs has been used for fraud in other
contexts, but those entities were publicly traded under the SEC's jurisdiction, suggesting that the SEC's
investor protection rules add nothing to the CFTC's regulatory structure. In the 1980s, for example, tax
shelters were being sold as limited partnerships in large numbers to the public through inadequate or
fraudulent disclosures on their tax benefits and potential losses. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 146.
Most spectacular was a scandal involving Prudential Securities Inc. ("PSI"), which was charged by the
SEC with fraud in selling some 700 limited partnerships valued at over $8 billion to "tens of thousands"
of unsuitable investors. See In re Matter of Prudential Securities, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 33082, 1993 SEC LEXIS 2866 (Oct. 21, 1993) (consent settlement without admitting or denying
the allegations). More than ten million people invested approximately $90 billion in limited
partnerships during the 1970s and 1980s." See also John Gesche, RegulatingRollups: General Partners
Fiduciary Obligationsin Light of the Limited PartnershipAct of 1993, 47 STAN. L. REv. 85, 88 (1994)
(hereinafter "Regulating Rollups"). Much of their value was lost after passage of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085. That legislation sharply undercut the tax advantages of tax
shelters sold through limited partnerships. Such enterprises were no longer able to multiply their tax
deductions. The value of many of these investments also dropped sharply in economic downturns in
real estate and oil and gas. Many of the limited partnerships were then reorganized by being
consolidated and "rolled up" with other limited partnerships.
Those roll-ups often were
disadvantageous to the investors being rolled up. The SEC adopted regulations and Congress passed
the Limited Partnership Roll-Up Reform Act of 1993 to deal with abuses in such transactions. Pub. L.
No. 103-202, 107 Stat. 2359.
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Although the
collective investment by bank trust departments.
management of those funds raised conflict of interest concerns, they have
not been regulated in the same manner as mutual funds, largely as a matter
of history and the separate regulatory structure created for banks. Banking
regulation is pervasive, but it has not focused on corporate governance as
the basis for regulating common trust funds. Rather, common law
fiduciary principles have been its guiding force. Those principles were at
first constraining but have adapted to modern portfolio theory. Still, the
strictures of trust investment requirements and their illiquidity have been
other constraints that prevented banks from competing directly with mutual
funds. Instead, as will be seen, the dropping of restraints on bank mutual
fund activities led the banks to sponsor their own mutual funds and even
covert their common trust funds into mutual funds.
The operation of collective investments by banks has a long history
that traces back to the introduction of the trust fund concept from England
early in our history.352 The trustees appointed to administer trusts were
often family members or some other individual known and trusted by the
creator of the trust. A problem with such appointments was that the trustee
might die before the completion of the objects of the trust. That event
would require the appointment of another individual, but the creator of the
trust was also often deceased, and the new appointment might not have met
with his approval. Another concern was that friends and relatives of the
creator often did not have the expertise to invest the trust funds. Those
problems were solved by the trust companies that began appearing in
America as early as 1818. One such company formed in that year
commingled trust funds for collective investment.353
The trust companies, which engaged in a wide variety of financial
activities, met competition in their trust operations from insurance
companies that acted as trustees, as well as underwriting and selling
insurance. For example, the New York Life Insurance and Trust was
formed in 1830 and was followed by similar enterprises. The United States
Trust Company was the first company to act exclusively as a trustee for
trust funds. It was formed in 1853 .3 " As custodian of customer funds,
banks were in a natural position to serve as trustees for trusts, but
regulatory restrictions limited such activity; the trust companies operated
outside of most bank regulatory structures in the nineteenth century. Some
351. Banks held almost $I trillion in assets for trusts and estates in 2009, but that was only a small
portion of the total of $23 trillion held under other custodial arrangements such as pension funds.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ASSET DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF ACCOUNT (2001),
http://www2.fdic.gov/structur/trust/tables00/00tablea2.txt.
352. The trust concept was given explicit recognition in England in 1536 with the adoption of the
Statute of Uses. Markham, supra note 271, at 208.
353. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 375.
354. Id.
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banks formed their own trust companies to compete with the trust
companies.
Gradually, banks were allowed to manage trusts internally. That
business had developed to the point that the American Banking Association
created its own Trust Department in 1897 so that members could keep
themselves informed of developments in that area of their business.355 That
business was largely concentrated in state banks, but the stock market crash
in 1907 resulted in a boost in trust business for national banks. That crash
was triggered by the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company and set
off a long running investigation by a Senate committee that resulted in the
creation of the Federal Reserve Board in 1913.356 Section 11(k) of the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 also authorized the Federal Reserve Board to
grant of trust powers to national banks. 57 The exercise of such powers was
subject to state laws governing the operation of trusts and the
responsibilities of trustees.358
B.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES

State laws governing trusts imposed fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care on trustees. The duty of loyalty prohibited self-dealing and other
conflicts of interest on the part of trustees. The duty of care sought to
assure careful consideration by trustees in investing trust fund assets. That
duty of care received its most famous explication in the 1830 decision in
Harvard College v. Amory,35 9 where the Massachusetts court created the
"prudent man" rule. That rule required trustees to act in the same manner
"as men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs,
not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
income, as well as the probable safety
their funds, considering the probable
360
of the capital to be invested.,

355. There is also a degree of self-regulation for bank trust activities. The American Banking
Association created the National Trust School in 1965. It provides preparation for the Institute of
Certified Bankers (ICB) and Certified Trust & Financial Advisor (CTFA) exam. AMERICAN BANKERS
ASSOCIATION, ABA NATIONAL TRUST SCHOOL (2006), http://www.aba.com/Events/NGTS.htm.
356. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 358.
357. 12 U.S.C. § 92a (2000). That power was later shifted to the Comptroller of the Currency
("OOC") in 1962. American Trust Co. v. South Carolina State Bd. of Bank Control, 381 F. Supp. 313,
324 n.14 (D.S.C. 1974). The grant of trust powers to the national banks was attacked by the trust
companies on constitutional grounds but was upheld by the Supreme Court. First Bank of Bay City v.
Fellows, 244 U.S. 416, 428 (1917).
358. This meant that a national bank could be surcharged in state court proceedings for breaches of
fiduciary duty in investing trust fund assets in an imprudent manner. First Alabama Bank of
Montgomery, N.A. v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 429 (Sup. Ct. Ala.1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938
(1983). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency could also revoke its permission for a national
bank to engage in trust activities where the bank had unlawfully or unsoundly exercised those powers.
Cent. Nat'l Bank of Mattoon v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 906 (7th Cir. 1990).
359. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
360. Id.
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The prudent man rule was disliked by trustees because it was
uncertain in scope and a breach resulted in personal liability to the trustee
who was surcharged for imprudent investments. To relieve that concern,
many states passed statutes creating so-called "legal lists" that specified
certain securities that a trustee could safely invest in as a prudent man36
Those legal lists were supplanted in recent years by modern portfolio
theory that is based on a strategy of diversification that might even include
some speculative investments in the portfolio.362
Another development was the adoption of statutes that permitted the
commingling of funds of several trusts into one or more common trust
funds.363 As in the case of single trusts, state laws required periodic
accountings in a judicial proceeding for common trust funds that tested the
investments made by the trustee for prudence.3" Those proceedings were
binding and relieved the trustee of any liability for investments approved
by the court.365 The easing of investment restrictions led to the creation of
"discretionary common trust funds," which were no longer restricted to
investments on the state legal list.366
Common trust funds were boosted in 1936 by the addition of
provisions in the Internal Revenue Act of 1936, which granted passthrough tax treatment to the beneficiaries of trusts participating in a
common trust fund, an advantage enjoyed by mutual funds as well.3 67 The
Federal Reserve Board amended its regulations in 1937 to allow national

361. One issue was whether trustees could permissibly invest trust funds in equity securities.
Colorado amended its constitution in 1950 to allow trustees to make such investments. The Model
Prudent Man Investment Act also eased investment restrictions. Twenty-two states adopted that
legislation by 1963. LISSA BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANKING FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIEs 763 (2d ed. 2004). See also John H. Langbein, The Uniform PrudentInvestor Act
and the Futureof Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 645 (1996) (describing that legislation).
362. Markham, supra note 271, at 213-14.
363. As the Supreme Court has noted:
Mounting overheads have made administration of small trusts undesirable to corporate
trustees. In order that donors and testators of moderately sized trusts may not be denied the
service of corporate fiduciaries, the District of Columbia and some thirty states ... have
permitted pooling small trust estates into one fund for investment administration. The
income, capital gains, losses and expenses of the collective trust are shared by the constituent
trusts in proportion to their contribution. By this plan, diversification of risk and economy of
management can be extended to those whose capital standing alone would not obtain such an
advantage.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307 (1950).
364. Class action lawsuits were also used to challenge whether particular investments made by bank
trustees for common investment funds were in accordance with fiduciary standards. See First Alabama
Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 429 (Sup. Ct. Ala.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938
(1983).
365. Id. See generally In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1974) (periodic accounting
proceeding for discretionary common trust fund).
366. In re Onbank & Trust Co., 688 N.E.2d 245, 246 (N.Y. 1997).
367. 26 U.S.C. §§ 851-852 (2006).
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banks to operate common trust funds for "bona fide fiduciary purposes"
and not "solely" for investment purposes. The Investment Company Act
exempted common trust funds from its reach,368 and the Securities Act of
1933369 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were amended in 1970 to
exclude those collective investments from their reach.37 °
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") dropped the
limitation on bona fide fiduciary purpose requirement in 1963 in an
unsuccessful effort to allow banks to operate their own mutual funds.371 In
2001, in another effort to expand national bank trust fund activities, the
OCC amended its regulations to allow national banks to engage in multistate trust operations. The OCC asserted that the states could restrict those
operations only to the extent that state imposed restrictions on state
chartered trustees.372 The OCC also proposed a rule that would have
created uniform standards of care for national bank trust departments.3 73
That proposal met with opposition, and its adoption was deferred.374
C.

MUTUAL FUND COMPETITION

The common trust fund is often likened to a mutual fund, but there are
some significant differences between those two forms of investments.
Mutual fund shareholders may select their own investment strategy, while
the bank will, for the most part, make the investment decision for trust
beneficiaries. The investor in a mutual fund may freely redeem his
holdings at NAV, while the trust beneficiary is subject to the terms of the
trust, rendering the investment illiquid. Interestingly, some banks invested
their common trust funds into mutual funds, which somewhat diminished
their money management role.375 The breakdown in the restrictions in the

368. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (2000). The exemption is available only where:
such fund is employed by the bank solely as an aid to the administration of trusts, estates, or
other accounts created and maintained for a fiduciary purpose; (B) except in connection with
the ordinary advertising of the bank's fiduciary services, interests in such fund are not-(i)
advertised; or (ii) offered for sale to the general public; and fees and expenses charged by
such fund are not in contravention of fiduciary principles established under applicable
Federal or State law.
Id.
369. Federal-State Extended Unemployment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 401, 84 Stat. 695
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (Supp. 2004)).
370. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(ii)).
371. Inv. Company Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 621-622 (1971).
372. 66 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,792 (July 2, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 5 and 9). In
response to that action, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors adopted a Model Multi-State Trust
Institutions Act that was adopted in whole or part by several states. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note
361, at 759.
373. 65 Fed. Reg. 75,872 (Dec. 5, 2000).
374. 66 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (July 2, 2001).
375. In In re Onbank & Trust Co., 649 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), a New York court
considered a claim that a national bank had improperly delegated its discretionary trust powers by
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Glass-Steagall Act's 376 prohibitions on investment banking activities by
commercial banks before its repeal by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in
1999377 witnessed some aggressive efforts by banks to enter into the mutual
fund business on their own. Those efforts were not always successful. In
Investment Company Institute v. Camp,37 the Supreme Court held that a
commingled managing agency account authorized by the OCC for national
banks was actually a mutual fund that was not a permissible investment for
nation banks.379 Undeterred by that defeat, national banks began marketing
mutual funds through "independent" sponsors38 and then began sponsoring
their own mutual fund complexes.38 The banks were also authorized by
legislation enacted in 1996 to convert their common trust funds into mutual
funds, thereby providing liquidity for the underlying trusts.382 The banks
investing trust assets in mutual funds. The court noted that, under OCC regulations, state law would
control that determination. The court held such investments were permissible because the bank trustee
retained control of the investment decision by selecting mutual funds that conformed with the
investment objectives of the underlying trusts. However, the court concluded that it was improper for
the trustee to charge what in effect amounted to a double fee for the management of the trust assets, i.e.,
the trustee's fee and that of the mutual fund. The New York legislature then acted to specifically
authorize mutual fund investments by a bank common trust fund, and the New York Court of Appeals
dismissed the case. In re Onbank & Trust Co., 688 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1997).
376. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
377. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 900 Stat. 1999.
378. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
379. That plan was described by the court as follows:
Under the plan the bank customer tenders between $ 10,000 and $ 500,000 to the bank,
together with an authorization making the bank the customer's managing agent. The
customer's investment is added to the fund, and a written evidence of participation is issued
which expresses in "units of participation" the customer's proportionate interest in fund
assets. Units of participation are freely redeemable, and transferable to anyone who has
executed a managing agency agreement with the bank. The fund is registered as an
investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The bank is the
underwriter of the fund's units of participation within the meaning of that Act. The fund has
filed a registration statement pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. The fund is supervised
by a five-member committee elected annually by the participants pursuant to the Investment
Company Act of 1940.... The actual custody and investment of fund assets is carried out by
the bank as investment advisor pursuant to a management agreement. Although the
Investment Company Act requires that this management agreement be approved annually by
the committee, including a majority of the unaffiliated members, or by the participants, it is
expected that the bank will continue to be investment advisor.
Id. at 622-623.
380. By 1987, over 200 mutual funds were being distributed through banks. MARKHAM, supra note
101, at 239. Concord Holding Group and some sixteen other entities were handling bank mutual funds
by 1993. Id. In 1994, federal bank regulators adopted an inter-agency directive requiring banks to
maintain written procedures governing their sales of mutual funds and other non-deposit services that
included requirements of disclosures to customers. Id. at 239.
381. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 239-40.
382. Those conversions were facilitated by the Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, which amended the tax treatment of conversions into mutual funds under
Section 584 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. More recently, one commentator has noted that:
We're now starting to see the banks having second thoughts about whether it was a good idea
to convert their collective funds to mutual funds. And some of them are going back and
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then began competing with the traditional sponsors of mutual funds for that
business.383 The banks were in turn receiving "competition in their trust
activities from other financial services firms such as Vanguard, Fidelity and
MetLife. A survey showed that banks and savings and loans held only
about forty percent of the trust services market in 2002."384
D.

GOVERNANCE CONCERNS

"A bank is the corporate trustee of the common trust fund. There is
no other governing body. The underlying assumption is that the bank will
be responsible for making all decisions., 385 That arrangement is in contrast
to the arrangement for mutual funds in which the investment adviser
actually manages fund assets. OCC Regulation 9 supplements state
regulations governing trusts.3 86 With respect to corporate governance, that
regulation states that a "national bank's fiduciary activities shall be
managed by or under the direction of its board of directors. In discharging
its responsibilities, the board may assign any function related to the

reconverting them back to collective funds. We're starting to see a movement where
investment advisors are teaming up with bank trust departments and creating collective funds
as investment options for 401(k) plans because the world has changed. Back then, collective
funds did not have daily valuation. Today, you can get daily valuation in a collective fund.
The values of a collective fund are not published in the newspaper, but any participant has
easy access on the internet to go to a website and find the daily valuation of its interest in its
collective fund. And while you cannot move the interest in your collective fund to another,
to an IRA if a participant leaves its plan, leaves the employer, that seems to be of less
concern today than the fact that the collective funds come in at lower costs than the mutual
funds. And there's lots of debate as to why the collective funds are less expensive to
maintain, whether they have less regulatory costs, whether they're-they don't have a
distribution network in place and are less of a retail oriented product. Nevertheless, we see
collective funds being offered at where the asset management fee and the other fees are less
than comparable mutual funds. And that's providing significant competitive opportunity for
these collective funds.
Donald Myers, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Conference on The Regulation of Mutual
Funds: Competition With other Investment Vehicles for Retirement Savings (Jan.3, 2006), available at
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID. 1223/transcript.asp.
383. By 2005, banks were sponsoring ten percent of all mutual fund complexes. INV. CO. INST.,
at
1
(2005),
available
BOOK
§
MUTUAL
FUND
FACT
2005
http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/2005-factbook.pdf.
384. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 361, at 766. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act narrowed "the
exemption from Investment Company Act registration for bank common trust funds; under the Act, the
exemption will continue to be available only to those bank common trust funds that are not advertised
or offered to the general public except in connection with the ordinary advertising of the bank's
fiduciary services." Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammam, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4
N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 23 (2000).
385. Martin E. Lybecker, Comparison of the Regulation of Common Trust Funds Subject to the
Comptroller of the Currency's Regulation 9 and the Regulation of Mutual Funds Subject to Federal
Securities Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Paper Presented at an
America Enterprise Institute Conference Held in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 24, 2005) (unpublished paper
on file with the author).
386. 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.101 (2006).
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exercise of fiduciary powers to any director, officer, employee, or
'
committee thereof."387
Annual or "continuous" audits of the bank's trust
operations are required. Those audits must be conducted under the
direction of a "fiduciary audit committee.38 8 Written procedures are
389
required to assure that the bank trustee meets its fiduciary responsibilities
and recordkeeping requirements are imposed.39 °
Banks operating a common trust fund are paid fees by the individual
trusts. They normally do not charge a separate fee for the management of
the common trust fund. 39 1
"If the amount of a national bank's
compensation for acting in a fiduciary capacity is not set or governed by
applicable law, the bank may charge a reasonable fee for its services. 392 In
addition, certain self-dealing and conflict-of-interest transactions are
prohibited such as purchasing the bank's own stock for trust accounts.393
Custody safeguards are required for trust assets.394
The banks are also regulated intensively on safety and soundness
issues. That regulation includes loan limits, capital requirements and
regular inspections by bank examiners.395 Some officer and director
conflicts are also addressed, such as limitations on loans to officers.396
Until recently, there were no particular outside director requirements.
Following the general hysteria surrounding the Enron scandal, however,
Sarbanes-Oxley required audit committees of publicly traded companies to
be staffed by outside directors,3 97 a requirement previously imposed by the

387. 12 C.F.R. § 9.4 (2006).
388. 12 C.F.R. § 9.9 (2006). The fiduciary audit committee:
must consist of a committee of the bank's directors or an audit committee of an affiliate of
the bank. However, in either case, the committee:
(1) Must not include any officers of the bank or an affiliate who participate significantly
in the administration of the bank's fiduciary activities; and
(2) Must consist of a majority of members who are not also members of any committee
to which the board of directors has delegated power to manage and control the fiduciary
activities of the bank.
Id.
389. 12 C.F.R. § 9.5 (2006).
390. 12 C.F.R. § 9.8 (2006).
391. Martin E. Lybecker, Comparison of the Regulation of Common Trust Funds Subject to the
Comptroller of the Currency's Regulation 9 and the Regulation of Mutual Funds Subject to Federal
Securities Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, paper presented at an AEI
conference held in Washington, D.C. on October 24, 2005.
392. 12 C.F.R. § 9.15 (2006).
393. 12 C.F.R. § 9.12 (2006).
394. 12 C.F.R. § 9.13 (2006).
395. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 361, at chs. 5, 7, & 8.
396. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 361, at chs. 331-332. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits
loans to officers of publicly traded companies but exempts bans from that prohibition where the loans
are in accordance with bank regulatory requirements. Id. at 332.
397. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). Bank regulators announced that they would
extend that requirement to non-public banks with assets of more than $500 million. Bill Stoneman,
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New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq.398 Those self-regulatory bodies
also require that nominating and compensation committees be composed of
outside directors, as well as requiring a majority of all board members to be
independent.399
E.

BANK PROBLEMS

The banks were heavily involved in the late trading and market timing
scandals through their mutual funds, but had not previously experienced
much scandal in their money management activities. One case of interest
involved a proxy fight over the merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq in
2002. Walter B. Hewlett, a family member of one of the company's
founders, challenged that vote in the Delaware chancery court. He claimed
that Carelton (Carly) Fiorina, the Hewlett-Packard chief executive officer,
bought votes by threatening Deutsche Bank with a loss of Hewlett-Packard
business, if its money mangers did not vote the stock they controlled in
favor of the merger. Banks usually form a committee that votes proxies for
stocks held in their common trust fund portfolios. They often use the
services of corporate governance firms to decide how to vote those proxies.
The money mangers at Deutsche Bank, under some slightly irrational
theory of fiduciary duties, were planning to vote Compaq shares under their
management in favor of the vote, while voting the Hewlett-Packard shares
they managed against the merger.
The Delaware court dismissed Hewlett's charges even though Fiorina
had placed much pressure on Deutsche Bank executives to change their
opposition votes. In one phone call to one of her own executives that was
taped Fiorina stated that "you and I need to demand a conference call, an
audience, etc., to make sure that we get them in the right place.... get on
the phone and see what we can get, but we may have to do something
extraordinary for those two to bring 'em over the line here." After leaving
that message, Fiorina called the Deutsche Bank officials, and they switched
their vote on seventeen million of the twenty-five million shares they had
under management in favor of the Hewlett-Packard-Compaq merger. The
Delaware judge found no misconduct in that call, which had been taped
without Fiorina's knowledge.4"' The SEC was not so forgiving; the
investment advisory unit of the Deutsche Bank was fined $750,000 by that
agency. The SEC claimed conflicts of interest because the advisory unit
failed to disclose that it had worked for Hewlett-Packard and that it was

Governance Reforms a Puzzle for Small Banks, 168 AM. BANKER, Sept. 19, 2003, at 6A.
398. See supra, note 193.
399. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 296, at 194.
400. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard, No. 19513-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35, at *64 (Del. Ch. Apr.
27, 2002).
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intervening in the voting process.4"'
Another concern with common trust fund management is the misuse
of inside information from the bank's commercial banking operations. To
avoid such problems, the OCC requires national banks to maintain written
procedures designed to ensure "that fiduciary officers and employees do
not use material inside information in connection with any decision or
recommendation to purchase or sell any security."4 2 Banks create Chinese
Walls to isolate common trust fund managers from their commercial
banking colleagues' activities. There apparently have been few leaks
through those walls, but the financial analysts scandals exposed by Eliot
Spitzer evidenced that the Chinese Walls employed by the SEC that
separated the analysts and the investment bankers at broker-dealers were
quite porous.4" 3
VI. PENSION FUNDS
A.

PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS

Related to the common trust fund are collective investment funds that
manage pension plan assets. Private sector pension funds in America trace
their beginning to a retirement plan created in 1875 by the American
Express Co. for its employees. Thereafter, some large railroad companies,
such as the B&O Railroad began offering pension plans that included both
employer and employee contributions. By 1905, about one-third of
railroad employees in the country were participating in pension schemes.4 4
The Illinois Railroad allowed its employees to buy the company's stock.
The Proctor & Gamble Co. created a profit-sharing plan for its employees
in 1886.405 Nearly 200 companies were offering employee pensions as the
1920s began. They were holding almost $90 million in assets to support
those obligations.4 6 The number of pension plans doubled in the next few
years after the Revenue Act of 1921 exempted employer contributions to
pension plans from taxation. By the middle of the 1920s, some 4 million
workers were covered by pension plans.4" 7
The Investment Company Act of 1940 excluded from its reach
401. In re Deutsche Asset Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2160, 2003 SEC
LEXIS 1977 (Aug. 19, 2003).
402. 12 C.F.R. § 9.5 (2006).
403. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 406-16 (describing Chinese walls and analysts' conflicts with
investment banking activities of their firms).
404. In future decades, railroad employees were covered by the Railroad Retirement System Act
administered by the Railroad Retirement Board. Pub. L. No. 93-445, 88 Stat. 1305 (1974) (codified at
45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231v (2000)).

405.
406.

MARKHAM,
MARKHAM,

407. Id. at 124.

supra note 14, at 325-26.
supra note 26, at 90.
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"employees stock bonus, pension, or profit sharing plans" that met certain
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code." 8 This spurred further growth.
By 1950, the number of pension plans had expanded to 2,000, holding
about $8 billion in assets. By the end of that decade, 14 million employees
were participating in pension plans that were holding assets valued at $22
billion. 9 The growth of the labor movement resulted in increased
demands for pensions. In particular, John L. Lewis, the head of the United
Mine Workers of America fought for and succeeded in creating a broad
pension scheme in the coal industry. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act allowed
the creation of union pension funds jointly managed by the unions and
contributing employers.410
Pension fund growth accelerated in the 1960s, adding assets at a rate
exceeding $3.5 billion per year. Early pension plans had largely invested
their assets in corporate bonds, but by the 1960s many plans were investing
in common stock after General Motors announced that it would be making
such investments for company pension plans. Morgan Guaranty Co. had
$9 billion in pension funds under management in 1968.411 In 1970,
collective investment trust funds maintained by banks for the collective
management of pension funds were excluded from the provisions of the
Investment Company Act of 1940.412 Banks were then able to expand their
role as professional managers of some pension funds. By 1982, banks and
other professional advisers were managing about one half of the pension
fund assets that totaled almost $570 billion. Pension plans were then
holding about twenty percent of publicly traded securities.4t 3
B. ERISA
Management of defined benefit plans 414 were subjected to regulation

408. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1 1) (2000).
409. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 318.
410. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (2000). See generally Stephen Fogdall, Exclusive Union Controlof Pension
Funds: Taft-Hartley's Ill-Considered Prohibition,4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 215 (2001) (describing
such plans). The union pensions were sometimes abused as demonstrated by the conviction of Jimmy
Hoffa, the head of the Teamsters in the 1960s, for pension fund fraud. James B. Jacobs & Ellen Peters,
LaborRacketeering: The Mafia and the Unions, 30 CRIME & JUST. 229, 236 (2003).
411. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 357.
412. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1 1) (2000).
413. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 98.
414. Pension plans are broadly broken down into two categories; "defined benefit" and "defined
contribution" plans:
In the often opaque morass of pension terminology, the distinction between defined benefit
and defined contribution plans is surprisingly clear. A defined benefit pension, as its name
implies, specifies an output for the participant. Traditionally, such plans defined benefits for
particular employees based on the employees' respective salary histories and their periods of
employment. Thus, for example, a prototypical defined benefit formula specifies that a
participant is entitled at retirement to an annual income equal to a percentage of her average
salary times the number of years of her employment with the sponsoring employer.
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under the provisions of Employment Retirement Income Security Act in
1974 ("ERISA"). 4" That statute was passed in response to the failure of
the Studebaker Corp., an automobile company that failed and left 4,000
employees with unfunded benefits. ERISA created the Pension Benefits
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") to insure the "vested" rights of workers
participating in defined benefit plans from such failures. 416 ERISA also
imposed some incredibly complex regulations on the activities of plan
administrators and fiduciaries, including record keeping requirements,
disclosure obligations, investment standards and conflict of interest
regulations.4 7
Among other things, the common law of trusts was engrafted by
ERISA onto the requirements imposed on plan fiduciaries, which included
the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care (prudence). 418 The statute adopted
the prudent man standard for investment decisions made by plan
fiduciaries.4" 9 The Secretary of Labor, who was given administrative
authority over the application of ERISA, adopted regulations that
recognized modem portfolio theory, which assesses portfolio performance
on an overall basis, rather than the common law standard that examined
each investment for prudence.4 20

In contrast, a defined contribution arrangement, as its equally apt moniker indicates, specifies
an input for the participant. Commonly, the plan defines the employer's contribution for
each participant as a percentage of the participant's salary for that year. Having made that
contribution, the employer's obligation to fund is over because the employee is not
guaranteed a particular benefit, just a specified input. In a defined contribution context, the
participant's ultimate economic entitlement is the amount to which the defined contributions
for her, plus earnings, grow or shrink.
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined ContributionParadigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455 (2004) (footnotes
omitted).
415. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
416. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) ("ERISA protects employee pension and
other benefits by providing insurance" for vested pension rights); see generally Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980) (describing insurance program administered by
PBGC). The PBGC insured up to $47,659 per year per worker for underfunded defined benefits. That
amount was sufficient to insure all of the benefits claimed by ninety percent of workers in under funded
pensions. Pension Benefit Gaur. Corp., PBGCAnnounces Maximum InsuranceBenefit for 2006, PBGC
(Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/2005/pr6-09.html.
417. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1993).
418. Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985).
419. 29 U.S.C. § l l04(a)(1)(B) (2000).
420. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(2) (2006). However, the scope of investment discretion by a plan
fiduciary may be limited by the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(D) (2000). Applying modem
portfolio theory, the Fifth Circuit ruled in Laborers National Pension Fund v. Northern Trust
Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313, 323 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 967 (1999), that
the purchase of high risk "interest only" payments stripped from mortgage pools was not an imprudent
investment and in accordance with that plan's investment guidelines. The standard of performance for
plan fiduciaries is thus process based. The courts will look for whether the investment was permitted
by modem portfolio theory and that it was in accordance with the plan's guidelines. The courts then
consider whether due care was used in selecting the investment. If those tests are met, no liability will
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ERISA proved to be a costly failure. The liabilities imposed on the
PBGC became massive and the Retirement Protection Act of 1994421 was
passed to shore up the PBGC and provide greater supervision over
underfunded plans.422 That had a positive effect for a time, but the market
downturn in 2000 increased liabilities. By the end of 2005, PBGC had a
$23 billion negative position and the total funding gap for liabilities from
private sector pensions was estimated to be $450 billion.423 The costs and
liabilities imposed by ERISA on defined benefit plans led to their
abandonment by many employers.
Several large corporations tried to establish "cash balance" plans that
were designed to reduce those liabilities and costs. 424 However, those plans
were successfully challenged in the courts, and they too are now being
dropped by employers.425 For example, after its cash balance plan was held
to violate age discrimination laws,426 IBM announced on January 6, 2005
that it was freezing its cash balance pensions and turning to Section 401(k)

lie even if the investment selected generated large losses. Laborers Nat'! Pension Fund, 173 F.3d at
323; Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251
(1984); and Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040
(1984).
421. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109).
422. JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATE FINANCE 932-933 (2004).
423. Bradley D. Belt, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Remarks to the American
Institute
of
Certified
Public
Accountants
(Dec.
12,
2005),
available
at
http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/ExecutiveSpeech/sp15290.html.
Congress was considering
legislation in 2006 to once again rescue the PBGC from its own bankruptcy. Michael Schroeder,
Congress Seeks to Rein in Special Executive Pensions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2006, at Al.
424. Barry Kozak, The Cash Balance Plan: An Integral Component of the Defined Benefit Plan
Renaissance, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 753, 753 (2004) (describing growth of cash balance plans). One
court defined a cash balance plan as:
a defined benefit plan rather than a defined contribution plan, but resembles the latter. The
ordinary defined benefit plan entitles the employee to a pension equal to a specified
percentage of his salary in the final year or years of his employment. The plan might provide
for example that he was entitled to receive 1.5 percent of his final year's salary multiplied by
the number of years that he had been employed by the company, so that if he had been
employed for 30 years his annual pension would be 45 percent of his final salary. A cash
balance plan, in contrast, entitles the employee to a pension equal to (1) a percentage of his
salary every year that he is employed (5 percent, in the case of the Xerox plan) plus (2)
annual interest on the 'balance' created by each yearly 'contribution' of a percentage of the
salary to the employee's 'account,' at a specified interest rate that in the Xerox plan is the
average one-year Treasury bill rate for the prior year plus 1 percent. These annual
increments of interest are called future interest credits.
Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d 755, 757-58 (7th Cir.2003). See generally
Edward Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAx REv. 683 (2000) (describing operations
of cash balance plans.).
425. See, e.g., Berger, 338 F.3d at 764 (benefits under cash balance plan computed wrongly).
426. Cooper v. IBM Pers. Benefit Plan, 274 F. Supp.2d 1010, 1021 (S.D. Ill. 2003), rev'd, 457 F.3d
636 (7th Cir. 2006).
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defined contribution accounts.427 Even before that action, almost ten
percent of existing defined benefit plans had frozen participation in their
defimed benefit plans. 28 Large companies in the automobile and airline
industries were also seeking to reduce retirement and other defined benefits
that were bankrupting those industries.42 9
C. DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
Starting in 1962 with legislation allowing private retirement accounts
for the self employed, Congress has been continually adding legislation
encouraging individual tax-advantaged retirement and savings accounts
that are self-directed by the employee. Those plans include Individual
Retirement Accounts ("IRAs") created by ERISA, Simplified Employee
Pension Plans ("SEP" accounts), Money Purchase Plans, Target Benefit
Plans, Roth Accounts, Section 401(k) Plans and so- called "Education
IRAs" (that include 529 Plans and Coverdell Accounts). 43" These plans
proved to be popular with employees and became the pension plan of
choice for many employers. The number of defined benefit plans dropped
by sixty percent between 1979 and 1999, while the number of participants
in defined contribution plans more than doubled between 1980 and 2000.431
"Indeed, between 1984 and 1993 alone, defined contribution plans have
grown by almost 900%. "432 By 2003,43 3individual retirement accounts were
holding a total of $3 trillion in assets.
Defined contribution plans are only lightly regulated under ERISA 434
because, for the most part, they are self-directed, which eliminates concern
with conflicts of interest on the part of a plan adviser.435 Indeed, ERISA
427. Mary Williams Walsh, I.B.M. to Freeze Pension Plans To Trim Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2006, at Al.
428. Pension Benefit Gaur. Corp., 9.4 Percent of Pension Plans Frozen, PBGC Study Says, PBGC
(Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/2005/prO6-12.html (last visited on January
25, 2006).
429. MARKHAM, supranote 3, at 544.
430. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 422, at 945-47.
431. MARKHAM, supranote 4, at 102.
432. Kathleen H. Czarney, Note, The Future of American's Pensions: Revamping Pension Fund
Asset Allocation to Combat the Pension Fund Guaranty Corporation's Deficit, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
153, 169 (2004).
433. Sarah Holden et al., The Individual Retirement Account at Age 30: A Retrospective, 11
PERSPECTIVE
1,
1 (Feb. 2005), available at
INVESTMENT
COMPANY
INSTITUTE
http://www.ici.org/pdf/perl 1-01 .pdf.
434. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNtKA SUNDEN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K)
PLANS 9 (2004) (the main thrust of ERISA is defined benefit plans).

435. As has been noted:
Under ERISA section 404(c), if a defined contribution plan permits each employee to direct
the investment of the funds in his own account, the plan's trustee bears no liability to the
employee for investments, on the apparent assumption that the employee is deciding for
himself. Such participant direction of plan investments is not feasible in the defined benefit
context because the defined benefit participant has no discrete subset of assets earmarked to
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has even blocked employers from providing investment advice on
employee choices for their Section 401(k) accounts, but recent legislation
that allows such advice has caused much controversy.436 There are in fact
some dangers in employer promoted investments as illustrated by the losses
in employee Section 401(k) retirement accounts at the Enron Corp. when
that company collapsed. The holdings of employees there were heavily
concentrated in Enron stock that became worthless when Enron became
bankrupt.437 Such concentration was a risky investment strategy but was
widespread in other companies and sometimes generated huge gains as in
the case of Microsoft, where over 20,000 employees became millionaires
as the result of investments in that company's stock.438 Professional
management would undoubtedly introduce greater diversification into
individual retirement accounts, lessening losses such as those experienced
439
at Enron and reducing gains such as those realized at Microsoft.
The problems at Enron have given rise to concerns that employees do
not have sufficient sophistication to manage their own financial affairs.
There is "a substantial consensus that many (perhaps most) employees in
self-directed defined contribution arrangements are poor investors,
regardless of how much is spent educating and advising them. '44 1 That
consensus concern may be unwarranted.441 Most American households
(almost seventy percent) own their own homes and automobiles and are
otherwise capable of handling their own finances.44 2 Moreover, most stock
him that he can manage for himself. Rather, the defined benefit participant has a claim for
future benefits against the totality of a common fund.
Zelinsky, supra note 414, at 479 (footnote omitted).
436. Jennifer Levitz, Congress is Split on 401(k) Advisers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at D2. The
growth and structuring of advisory services to employees is now underway. Jeff D. Opdyke & Eleanor
Laise, More Employers to Offer Advise on 401(k) Plans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at DI.
437. As has been noted:
ERISA established a strict numerical limit on the amount of the sponsoring employer's stock
that may be held for a defined benefit plan, capping such stock holdings at ten percent of
total plan assets. In contrast, ERISA enacted no such numerical limit on the employer stock
held for individual account plans. As l'affaire Enron demonstrated, many employers grasped
this difference, established defined contribution plans, and loaded them with quantities of
employer stock that would not have been permitted for defined benefit plans.
Zelinsky, supra note 414, at 479-80 (footnotes omitted).
438. MARKHAM, supranote 3, at 102-07.
439. Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four Truths of Personal Social Security Accounts:
Evidence From the World of 401 (k)
Plans, 81 N.C. L. REv. 901,950 (2003).
440. Zelinsky, supra note 414, at 459 (footnote omitted). See generally Stabile, Freedom to Choose
Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participantsto Make Their Own
Decision, 11 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 361 (2002) (asserting that protection is needed).
441. Nevertheless, the lack of financial education in American schools is appalling. Foreign
languages that, while enlightening, will never be used by most students and are given higher priority
than financial matters that are vital to everyone. Consequently, most financial learning is self-taught.
Investor education was sought to be encouraged by Congress through the Savings are Vital to Everyone
Retirement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-92, 111 Stat. 2139 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146-47 (2000)).
442. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 522-23.
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(eighty-five percent as the new century began) was held through mutual
fund shares, thereby providing at least some degree of professional
management once the employee sets his or her investment goals." 3
Nevertheless, the need for professional management of defined
contribution plans led to some collective investment mechanisms for selfdirected retirement plans.
In 1986, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in Investment
Company Institute v. Conover,44 that national banks could be authorized by
the OCC to manage individual IRA accounts through a common trust fund.
That decision was followed by other circuits. 445 The OCC has also adopted
a regulation to govern the operation of collective investment funds. 446 That
regulation requires a written plan by the bank governing the operation of
such funds, as well as audits and financial reports.447 Certain conflicts of
interests are prohibited and management fees are required to be reasonable.
The SEC has been struggling for some time in separating the roles of
broker-dealers in providing investment advice to their customer in
connection with brokerage activities and as acting as advisers in more
formal financial planning roles, as for example in retirement planning. The
SEC ultimately adopted a rule requiring separate investment adviser
regulation where fees are charged specifically for investment advice and
not as a part of execution activities." 8
D.

GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS

Another collective investment involves government pension plans.
The federal government first entered the pension forum on a large scale
basis after the Civil War. 449 The Civil Service Retirement System was

443. Id. at 4.
444. 790 F.2d 925, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
445. See Curtis J. Polk, Banking and Securities Law: The Glass Steagall Act-Has It Outlived Its
Usefulness?, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 812 (1987).

446. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (2006).
447. Id. at § 9.18(b). The written plan must contain the following:
(i) Investment powers and policies with respect to the fund;
(ii) Allocation of income, profits, and losses;
(iii) Fees and expenses that will be charged to the fund and to participating accounts;
(iv) Terms and conditions governing the admission and withdrawal of participating accounts;
(v) Audits of participating accounts;
(vi) Basis and method of valuing assets in the fund;
(vii) Expected frequency for income distribution to participating accounts;
(viii) Minimum frequency for valuation of fund assets;
(ix) Amount of time following a valuation date during which the valuation must be made;
(x) Bases upon which the bank may terminate the fund; and
(xi) Any other matters necessary to define clearly the rights of participating accounts.
448. 70 Fed. Reg. 20424, 20422 (Apr. 19, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
449. Jerry W. Markham, PrivatizingSocial Security, 38 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 747, 759 (2001).
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created in 1920 for federal employees.45 ° It was followed by a pension plan
for Federal Reserve Board employees in 1924.4 11 The Civil Service
Retirement System was a defined plan that ultimately proved to be too
expensive for even the federal government and was privatized in the 1980s.
Civil service employees were then shunted into a defined contribution
program with a fairly wide and sophisticated choice of investment funds.452
There are some 3 million federal government employees covered by this
plan.453 The federal government also manages the Social Security System.
That collective investment program operates much like a Ponzi scheme and
is heading toward bankruptcy, making it a poor model for other collective
investments.4 54
State and municipal pension plans hold large amounts of funds for
collective investment for the defined benefit plans they operate. The first
of those funds was the New York City pension fund for policemen that was
created in 1857. In recent years, many state pension funds have become
corporate governance gadflies, using their large equity holdings to demand
governance reforms by publicly traded companies."' As noted by one
court, the New York City Employees' Retirement System uses its
shareholder status as a "bully pulpit. 4 57 The most prominent of those
institutions is the California Public Employee Retirement System
("Calpers"). Their demands on corporate management are sometimes
conflicted, as when Calpers used its status as a shareholder of the Safeway
grocery store train to try and aid a strike of a union that had been headed by

450. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331-8351.
451. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 124.
452. As noted elsewhere:
This retirement program is called the Federal Thrift Savings Plan. It is managed by a Federal
Retirement Thrift Investment Board that is composed of three members appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate and in consultation with certain House
leaders for two of those appointments. The Board is advised on investment policy by the
Employee Thrift Advisory Council composed of fourteen representatives of employee
organizations. An Executive Director is given overall responsibility for implementing
investment policy, and the Board is barred from interfering with specific investment
decisions of the Executive Director. Fiduciary duties are imposed on the Executive Director
and to private sector advisers investing funds.
Markham, supra note 449, at 807 n.318 (citations omitted). Civil Service employees may contribute
up to a maximum of $10,000 of pretax earnings to the Federal Thrift Savings Plan, and the federal
government makes matching contributions of up to five percent. THRIFT SAVS. PLAN, TSP FEATURES
FOR CIVILIANS, http://www.tsp.gov/features, at chs. 1 and 3.
453. Note & Commentary, Keeping the Promise: Will the Bush Administration's Plan to Privatize
the Social Security System Actually Work?, II CONN. INS. L. J. 433, 451 (2004).
454. Markham, supranote 449, at 756 n.48.
455. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 325.
456. See generally Stewart J.Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
ShareholderActivism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018 (1998) (asserting that this phenomenon
is useful).
457. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Calpers' president.4" 8
These institutions have also become professional plaintiffs under the
federal securities laws, suing every public corporation that has a financial
problem. Institutional investors were given preferred plaintiff standing in
class action lawsuits under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA").4 5 9 These lawsuits are billed as reform efforts but are
really an effort to increase the pension plans returns over what would be
received from a diversified portfolio under modem portfolio theory.46 ° In
any event, the managers of those plans, which are often controlled by union
officials or state functionaries, have proved to be less than successful in
their management. One estimate concludes that the total underfunding for
all state pension funds may be as high as $460 billion. 46' The West
Virginia Teachers Retirement System is underfunded by seventy-eight
percent.462 The Illinois pension system is under funded by $38 billion.463
These losses suggest that this is not a collective investment management
system that should be emulated.46
E.

TIAA-CREF
The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association ("TIAA") was
founded in 1918 by the Carnegie Foundation as a means to provide
458. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 644.
459. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1-78u-5
(2000)).
460. One study concluded that pension plans were being over-compensated in these lawsuits
because of their diversification and that small, undiversified investors were being under-compensated.
Kenneth M. Lehn, PrivateInsecurities,WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16.
461. Roger Lowenstein, The End of Pensions,N.Y. TIMES MAO., Oct. 30, 2005, at 56, 70.
462. Id. at 63.
463. Id. As a New York Times editorial noted: "Public employee pension plans are a financial time
bomb in many states and localities. Now New York City's independent actuary says his calculations
suggest a potential future shortfall of up to $49 billion." Editorial, Public Pensions in Trouble, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at Al 8.
464. Reform efforts have commenced in the form of proposed uniform state legislation for state and
municipal pension funds:
In July, 1997, the Uniform Law Commissioners approved the final text of an Act designed to
bring uniformity to some aspects of public pension fund management. The Uniform
Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act ('UMPERS Act') contains a
tightly interconnected set of reforms focused on two important aspects of pension fund
management, fiduciary duties, and disclosure obligations. First, the Act articulates the
fiduciary duties of those who control public pension systems. These duties apply in all areas,
but particularly in the areas of investment and financial management. In this regard, the
impetus for the Act was the set of profound changes that have occurred in our understanding
of the investment process during the past generation. This knowledge is generally called
'modem portfolio theory' ('MPT'). The UMPERS Act follows in the path of other Uniform
Law Commission products and other revisions elsewhere in the law that are designed to
permit and encourage the use of MPT.
Steven L. Willbom, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement
Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 141, 143-144 (1998).
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annuities to teachers. It was managed like an insurance company in
investing reserves. Subsequently the College Retirement Equity Fund
("CREF") was created as a means for teachers to invest in equities and
operates as a defined contribution plan that operates like a mutual fund.
The two now act as a combined entity ("TIAA-CREF").46 5 In 1997, TIAACREF was holding the pension funds of some 1.5 million educators and
had total assets of $125 billion.466 By 2004, those numbers had grown to
over two million covered employees and assets of $340 billion, making it
one of the largest retirement plans in the world. 467 Almost all TIAA-CREF
accounts are defined contribution plans that provide participants with a
number of investment choices in the equivalent of mutual funds. Those
funds are managed in-house by TIAA-CREF.465
TIAA-CREF performance record shows a 4.5% return on its
retirement annuities for 2005, with a five year average return of 6.4%. Its
supplemental retirement annuities showed a lower 4% return in 2005 with a
five-year average of 5.9%.469 TIAA-CREF lost its tax exempt charitable
status in 1997, but continues to manage retirement assets for teachers.4 7 °
TIAA-CREF claims low costs in its management of teacher retirement
funds and has developed a squeaky clean image, supporting social
investing and good corporate governance.47'

465. MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 90.
466. MARKHAM, supra note 101, at 319-20.
467. TIAA-CREF, ANNUAL REPORT 2004 1 (2004).
468. The TIAA-CREF website asserts that:
TIAA-CREF has developed a uniform investment approach for its stock accounts (except for
those which are fully indexed or use social screens). Its Dual Investment Management
Strategy' integrates two equity management techniques: Active Managers select specific
stocks that they believe represent more potential for growth, while Quantitative Managers
build an overall portfolio designed to reflect the basic financial and risk characteristics of the
fund's benchmark index. Quantitative Managers may also attempt to boost performance by
slightly varying the amount of certain holdings versus the index, bzsed on proprietary scoring
models designed to identify over- and underperforming stocks. The Dual Investment
sM
Management Strategy seeks to achieve higher returns over each Fund's benchmark index,
while attempting to maintain a risk profile for each Fund similar to its benchmark index.
http://www.tiaa-cref.org/finance/our-philosophy.html.
469. TIAA-CREF, Retirement Investments and IRAs: Current Performance, http://www.tiaacref.org/charts/ra-performance.html.
470. Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REv.
873, 947 (1997).
471. It has, however, encountered a corporate governance scandal of its own. TIAA-CREF's chief
executive officer, Herbert M. Allison, Jr., who was being paid a generous $9 million per year, failed to
inform the TIAA-CREF board of a business arrangement between two TIAA-CREF trustees and the
TIAA-CREF auditor, Ernst & Young, to jointly market a method for expensing employee stock options
in order to comply with accounting changes made in the wake of the Enron scandal. That arrangement
was a violation of the SEC's auditor independence requirements. The two trustees resigned at the
demand of the SEC staff. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 641.
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F.

ENDOWMENTS AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS

Another collective investment of no small size is the endowments
funds managed by universities, charities and not-for-profit organizations
such as ballets, symphony orchestras and think tanks. Harvard University's
endowment fund, the largest, reached $25.47 billion in 2005.472 The top ten
university endowments totaled over $100 billion.4 73 Total university and
college endowments exceeded $300 billion. A survey of 746 higher
education endowment funds showed an average return of 9.3% in 2005,
with a five-year average of 3.3% and a ten-year average of 9.3%.474 The
university endowments with over $1 billion did much better than those
averages. Harvard had a return of 19.2% in 2005 and an average return
over the prior ten year period of 16.1%. Yale's numbers for those periods
respectively were 22.3% and 17.4%.475 The average hedge fund returned
only 7.61% in 2005 and had a five year average of 7.94%.476
The significant returns on large endowments reflect the fact that those
funds are aggressively managed in the same manner as a hedge fund.
Indeed, the Harvard endowment was managed by Jack Meyer who left that
position after a compensation dispute and started his own hedge fund.477 In
2005, Stanford had 50% of its funds invested in equities, 16% in real estate
and only 12% in fixed income instruments. Investments by university
endowments grew to include junk bonds, venture capital startups and exotic
derivative instruments.478 In one instance, the Class of 1960 Trust, settled
by members of that graduating class for the benefit of Harvard, was using
companies it created to securitize airline travel credit card receivables.479
Such risk-oriented investment strategies were made possible by uniform
state legislation adopted by many states that allows the use of modern
portfolio theory in endowment and other charitable investments.4 8
472. Yale University has the second largest endowment, which totals $15.2 billion. Jason Singer,
Ivy Leave: Yale Parts Ways With Hedge Fund, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2006, at C1.
473. John Hechinger, Venture-Capital Bets Swell Stanford's Endowment, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
2006, at Al.
474. Damon J. Manetta, Higher Education Endowments One Year Return Matches Long Term
Investment Goals, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY BUSINESS OFFICERS (Jan.
23, 2006), http://www.nacubo.org/x7616.xml.
475. Hechinger, supra note 473. Yale was choking on risk in one hedge fund. The university
removed $500 million from the Children's Investment Fund Management (U.K.) LLP after it doubled
investor's monies. Singer, supra note 472.
476. Stephen Schurr, Hedge Fund Returns are in the Doldrums as the Industry Is Bedeviled by
Absence of Volatility, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 2, 2006, at 21.
477. Stephen Schurr, Harvard'sMeyer Raises Dollars 5bn for fund Convexity Capital, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 3, 2006, at 29.
478. Hechinger, supra note 473, at Al.
479. Letter from Marc Weitzen to SEC Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Investment
Management (Aug. 8, 1986) (on file with the author).
480. As one author has noted:
Before the 1960s, educational endowment managers were extremely conservative in their
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Risk and diversification did lead to large drops in the value of many
endowment fund assets when the market bubble burst in 2000.481
Nevertheless, the investment policies of endowments and other charitable
trusts have received little regulatory attention.482 Rather, the principal
concern raised with their operations has centered on their spending
programs. 483 For example, massive litigation is under way at Princeton
where donors are challenging the use of endowment funds.4 84 A matter of
larger concern has been whether the endowment funds are being spent fast
enough. Many endowments limit such expenditures to assure their
perpetuity. 485
Federal tax law has sought to curb some abuses by charitable
foundations, particularly with respect to self-dealing transactions. 486 There

investment strategies. During the 1960s and into the latter half of that decade, there was a
large amount of controversy between endowment investment officers over the appropriate
level of risk-taking when investing their endowment funds. Specifically, many endowment
officers felt that investing in capital markets for capital appreciation would allow
endowments to maximize their returns. These endowment managers believed that investing
to produce larger income growth at the expense of stability in that income was better than
their current system of investing to preserve the purchasing power of the endowment. In
response to this movement, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA) in 1972. The
creation of the UMIFA helped solve this controversy and other problems plaguing
endowment management. Among these other problems, the UMIFA set guidelines on the
delegation of investment authority, the trustees' authority and responsibility for the
management of an endowment, and the use of the total return concept in investing
endowment funds
Jason R. Job, The Down Market and University Endowments: How the PrudentInvestor Standard in the
Uniform Management of InstitutionalFunds Act Does Not Yield Prudent Results, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 569,
572-73 (2005) (footnotes omitted). See generally J. PETER WILLIAMSON, FUNDS FOR THE FUTURE 9798 (1975) (describing earlier endowment investment policies).
481. Job, supra note 480, 572-73.
482. For a description of the growth of charitable foundations and their regulation, see generally
Evelyn Brody, InstitutionalDissonance in the NonProfitSector, 41 VILL. L. REv. 433 (1996).
483. One scandal involved the use by the Red Cross and the United Way of donations made in the
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to unrelated causes. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 46.
484. John Hechinger & Daniel Golden, Poisoned Ivy: Fight at Princeton Escalates Over Use of a
Family's Gift, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2006, at Al.
485. In that regard:
Jack Meyer, the president of the Harvard Management Company, asserts: 'We have to keep
pace with or outperform the growth in university expenses each year, and in addition
disburse between 4.5 and 5 percent of the fund's capital value each year.' Under such a
strategy, Harvard spent $322 million from its endowment in the year ended June 30, 1996,
during which time it earned $1.8 billion. The amount of Harvard's unspent endowment
return could just about have covered its total annual budget of $1.5 billion!
Brody, supranote 470, at 933.
486. As one author notes:
For example, prior to the enactment of minor reforms in 1950 and more significant ones in
1969, private foundations were free to make asset purchases from and sales to a donor, the
donor's family members, and the donor's controlled corporations; they could accumulate
income in the discretion of their trustees, thereby deferring indefinitely the distribution of any
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are few corporate governance requirements placed on endowments and
foundations.4 87 However, New York Attorney General Spitzer has prepared
a booklet for charitable foundations that advocates a broad number of
corporate governance requirements including internal controls, audit
committees composed of outside directors, independent accountants, codes
of ethics and conflict of interest policies.488 Spitzer also became a
champion for not-for-profit organizations, even suing Richard Grasso, the
retiring head of the New York Stock Exchange for receiving excessive
compensation.489
VII. INSURANCE COMPANY RESERVES

A.

BACKGROUND

Insurance companies keep massive amounts of reserves to meet
probable losses from their insured risks. 490 Those funds are managed
collectively by the individual insurance companies for investment returns.
Massachusetts required such reserves in 1837, which it called an "unearned

value to charitable ends; and they could operate businesses, sometimes on terms that were
thought to provide an unfair advantage over competing firms that were organized as profitseeking entities.
Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REv. 59,
60 (2004).
487. See generally Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80
CHI-KENT L. REv. 641 (2005) (describing charitable trust governance).
488. ELIOT SPITZER, INTERNAL CONTROLS AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NOT-FORPROFIT BOARDS (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/intemal-controls.pdf"
489. Grasso had been paid a retirement package of S 187.5 million. The New York Stock Exchange
subsequently became a for profit corporation, which meant that any recovery would go to the
immensely wealthy members of the exchange. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 498, 505. An earlier
scandal of a similar ilk involved William Aramony, president of the United Way of America, who was
jailed in the 1990s for fraud and income tax violations after it was revealed that he was receiving a
salary of $463,000 and flying on the Concorde. See Brody, supra note 482, at 454-55.
490. As the Supreme Court has noted:
The term "reserve" or "reserves" has a special meaning in the law of insurance.... [Un
general it means a sum of money, variously computed or estimated, which with accretions
from interest, is set aside, "reserved," as a fund with which to mature or liquidate, either by
payment or reinsurance with other companies, future unaccrued and contingent claims, and
claims accrued, but contingent and indefinite as to amount or time of payment.
[Reserves] are held not only as security for the payment of claims but also as funds from
which payments are to be made. The amount "reserved" in any given year may be greater
than is necessary for the required purposes, or it may be less than is necessary for the
required purposes, or it may be less than is necessary, but the fact that it is less in one year
than in the preceding year does not necessarily show either that too much or too little was
reserved for the former year. It simply shows that the aggregate reserve requirement for the
second year is less than for the first, and this may be due to various causes.
Md. Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 350-52 (1920).
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premium fund."491 New York imposed a similar requirement in 1853. That
regulation spread to other states, but not to the federal government because
the Supreme Court ruled in 1868 that insurance was not interstate
commerce and could be regulated by the states as if it were an entirely local
business.492
The insurance business increased by almost 600 percent between 1870
and 1905. That growth led to criticism from Louis D. Brandeis who stated
in 1905 that insurance companies were "the greatest economic menace of
today" and that as "creditors of [the] great industries," they used their
power "selfishly, dishonestly [and] inefficiently."493 Brandeis's criticism
was supported by a scandal at the Equitable Life Assurance Company
where its leader, James Hyde's, extravagant spending in New York society
led to an investigation by the insurance industry by the New York
Superintendent of Insurance. The Superintendent was concerned that Hyde
was using the company's reserves to sustain his flamboyant lifestyle.
The New York legislature also appointed an investigating committee
headed by Senator William W. Armstrong. Among other things, the
Armstrong Committee expressed concern with the fact that insurance
company reserves were increasingly being invested in the stocks. Before
1890, life insurance companies had only small equity holdings-about two
percent-but that profile changed quickly as the amount of equity holdings
increased. The Armstrong Committee viewed this to be a speculative and
dangerous practice and recommended the prohibition of insurance
companies' investment in stocks. The New York legislature thereafter
restricted the ability of insurance companies to invest in common stocks.494
Because insurance companies were forced out of common stock
investments, they were able to avoid the excesses of the 1920s and escaped
federal regulation. An effort was made to impose such regulation during a
study by the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), which
was studying the concentration of wealth in America just before World
491. Id.at 348.
492. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
493. Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the GrammLeach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CoRP. L. 723, 730 (2000). The insurance companies were then financial giants:
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the largest American financial institutions were not
banks, which today have aggregate assets far exceeding any other type of financial
institution, but insurance companies. Insurers were larger than banks by not just a hair; the
largest insurance companies were twice as large and were already moving into adjacent
financial areas. They were underwriting securities. They were buying bank stock and
controlling large banks. They were assembling securities portfolios with the power to control
other companies. The three largest insurers were fast growing and on the verge of becoming
huge financial supermarkets.
Mark J. Roe, Foundationsof CorporateFinance: The 1906 Pacificationof the InsuranceIndustry, 93
COLUM. L. REV.639, 639 (1993).
494. Broome & Markham, supra note 493, at 730-31.
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War II. The insurance companies caught that committee's attention, and
the SEC joined in with a proposal for federal regulation of that industry.
However, both the Democratic and Republican Party platforms had
pledged that supervision of insurance companies would be left to the states,
and the SEC proposal was rejected.495
TNEC did express concern with the enormous size of life insurance
reserves, which had grown by over eight hundred percent between 1906
and 1938. TNEC asserted that the "investment policies and practices of the
legal reserve life insurance companies admittedly influence practically
every phase of this country's economic life.' 496 Another concern was that
these reserves were largely concentrated in fixed income instruments,
rather than equities. TNEC believed this was "in effect sterilizing the
savings funds received and preventing them from flowing into new
enterprises or undertakings where the element of venture or risk is present.
Thus the small businessman or average industrialist is denied access to this
more important capital reservoir.' 9 In addition, the demand for bonds was
causing companies to issue more debt, thereby unbalancing debt-to-equity
ratios and reducing interest rate returns. TNEC wanted more equity
investments, a reversal of the Armstrong Committee's efforts. Insurance
companies, however, successfully argued that their avoidance of equity
investments had prevented the insurance industry from being devastated by
the stock market crash of 1929.498
The insurance company thus dodged the New Deal bullets of
regulation that were imposed on other financial services. However, the
Supreme Court ruled in 1944 that insurance companies were subject to the
federal antitrust laws.499 Congress responded by passing the McCarranFerguson Act in 1945,"' which granted immunity from federal antitrust
laws to the extent an insurance company was regulated by state law. That
picture changed a bit after the Supreme Court ruled that securities-based
variable annuities and other variable insurance products were securities
subject to SEC regulation. Those instruments were created to compete
with mutual funds that were draining funds away from whole life and
annuity insurance." 1 Variable insurance products shifted the risk of the
rate of return to the investor based on investments through payment into
accounts that operated like mutual funds. Those assets had to be held in
495. Id. at 732.
496. Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearing Before the Temp. Nat ' Econ.

Comm., 76th Cong., Monograph No. 28, at 378 (1940).
497. Id.
498. Broome & Markham, supra note 493, at 733-34.
499. United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 594 (1944).
500. 15 U.S.C. § 10 12(b) (2000).
501. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 72 (1959); SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 212 (1967).
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"separate accounts" that were subject to SEC requirements. °2 Otherwise
reserve requirements remained with the states, which required life
insurance companies to maintain reserves "based on the type of contract,
age of issue, and mortality and interest assumptions involved.""5 3
Insurance companies doubled their assets in the ten years following
adoption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Life insurance companies
remained the largest single lender in the corporate bond market, but they
were seeking alternate sources of investment, including commercial
buildings. Investments in common stock increased as state law restrictions
on such investments were eased." 4 Assets of life insurance companies
tripled between 1945 and 1960 and continued to be invested mostly in
fixed income investments, often in the form of private debt placements.
Insurance companies were managing about half of all pension fund assets
in the 1970s. 5 Insurance company assets exceeded $1.75 trillion in 1988
and increased to $1.182 trillion in 2004. Those investments were heavily
weighted in favor of fixed income instruments; less than twenty percent
were held in equities506 The mix of investments was changing. Mortgage
holdings were less than ten percent, "the lowest percentage since record
keeping began in 1890. In 1998, Kentucky and Minnesota allowed life
insurers to invest up to twenty percent of their assets in common stock.
The limit was ten percent in Arkansas, Ohio, and Indiana. '50 7 New York
limited the common stock holdings in life insurance company reserves to
five percent of total assets. 0 8
Investment programs for insurance company reserves are now affected
by capital requirements imposed by state insurance regulators. This
regulation began In the 1990s when the states began to modify their
approach to regulation. Those regulators began using risk-based capital
standards that were determined by a risk assessment of the assets held by
the insurance company. That effort was in response to a number of
insurance company failures. 0 9
The adoption of risk-based capital

502. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1964) (describing nature of
separate accounts).
503. Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearing Before the Temp. Nat ' Econ.
Comm., 76th Cong., Monograph No. 28, at 5 n.1 (1940).
504. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 361, at 735-736.
505. Id. at 739.
506. INS.
INFO.
INST.,
INSURANCE
INDUSTRY
AT
A
GLANCE,
http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/industry.
507. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 361, at 741.
508. Id. at 737.
509. Id. at 740.
In 1988, Congress began hearings to determine whether federal regulation was needed, but
no legislation resulted. After forty multi-state insurance companies failed in 1992, the
Federal Insurance Solvency Act (FISA) was introduced. It sought to create a Federal
Insurance Solvency Commission (FISC) that would establish national standards for financial
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requirements had a dramatic effect on the corporate structure of many large
insurance companies. It placed pressure on insurance companies to
increase their capital, a task that was difficult for many insurance
companies because they operated as mutual companies that were owned by
their policy holders. In order to alleviate that problem, New York adopted
legislation permitting mutual life insurance companies to convert to stock
companies in order to allow mutual companies to raise capital by
converting to a stock based entity. This idea quickly spread and many
large mutual companies became conventional shareholder-owned
corporations.
For example, the Equitable Life Assurance Society
demutualized in 1992. It was joined five years later by the Mutual Life
Insurance Company of New York, company that had operated in a mutual
form for 150 years. Prudential, the largest insurance company in the
country that was founded a mutual company some 130 years earlier,
demutalized, as did the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and many
others' °
B.

REGULATION OF RESERVES

The states provide pervasive regulation over insurance companies.
They have sought to provide some uniformity in regulation through the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), which was
created in 1871. Among other things, NAIC created a joint reporting and
" ' As an
surveillance system for large interstate insurance companies.51
example of state regulation, insurance companies operating in New York
are subject to audit by the Superintendent of Insurance" 2 and must file
annual audited financial reports with the Superintendent." 3 New York
statutes set governance and voting procedures for mutual companies514 and
regulate the conduct of board members on insurance companies that have a
corporate form.5" 5 New York law sets reserve requirements; in the case of
life insurance, those reserves are based on approved mortality tables and
interest rates. 6 New York also has a legal list of investments permitted by
insurance companies that places limits on the percentage of investments in

soundness and solvency of insurance companies. The legislation was beaten back by the
industry and state insurance administrators that would have created a Federal Insurance
Solvency Commission charged with setting standards for financial soundness and solvency
of insurance companies. That legislation was not passed.
Id. at 739.
510. Id. at 745-746.
511. Id. at 739.
512. N.Y. Ins. Law § 310 (McKinney 2000).
513. N.Y Ins. Law § 307 (McKinney 2000).
514. N.Y. Ins. Law § 1211 (McKinney 2000).
515. Among other things, New York requires a director to vacate his office if he fails to attend board
meetings for an eighteen month period. N.Y. Ins. Law § 1215 (McKinney 2000).
516. N.Y. Ins. Law § 1304 (McKinney 2000).
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such things as real estate and equities. New York has raised limits on
investments
in equities to a maximum of twenty percent of reserve
5 17
assets.
This regulation reflects a view that insurance reserves are a form of
trust fund for the insured and should be protected from undue risk. The
viewpoint is based on an early nineteenth century concept that the capital
of a corporation is a trust fund for creditors. 8 Such an approach is
inconsistent with investors seeking to maximize their returns and reflects
an earlier era of prudence standards that has largely been replaced by
modem portfolio theory for other collective investments.5t 9 This restrictive
regulation also did not prevent scandal in New York. Indeed, Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer set off another wave of controversy when he began
attacking large insurance companies for bid rigging and manipulating their
accounts to enhance their financial picture and artificially increase their
reserves. One large firm so targeted, Marsh & McLennan Corp., agreed to
pay $850 million to settle Spitzer's charges. 20
Spitzer also attacked the American International Group Inc. and its
head, Hank Greenberg, which led to another brawl in the courtroom and
newspapers over its accounting practices for reserves. 21
The Wall Street Journal weighed in with an editorial claiming that
business practices attacked by Spitzer were normal and customary business
practices. 21 2 Once again, the SEC was caught flat-footed by Spitzer's
charges that publicly traded companies were manipulating their financial

517. N.Y. Ins. Law § 1405 (McKinney 2000). New York requires non-U.S. insurers to post
collateral with the Superintendent of Insurance equal to their gross liabilities. Peter Levene, Handcuffs
on "Aliens, " WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2006, at A18.
518. Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17, 944) (The capital of a
corporation "is deemed a pledge or trust fund for the payment of debts.").
519. Risk based capital requirements for insurance companies resulted in a disruption in the hybrid
securites markets after the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ruled that such
instruments were to be treated as common stock. A hybrid security has both elements of debt and
equity. Aparajita Saha-Bubna, Ruling Shakes Up Hybrid Securities, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2006, at C8.
520. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 507. Zurich American Insurance Co. later agreed to pay $171.7
million to settle claims by nine states that it engaged in improper bid rigging practices in its commercial
insurance contracts. Liam Pleven, Zurich Financial Unit to Settle Bid-Rigging Case with 9 States,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2006, at C3.
521. John C. Whitehead, former chairman of Goldman Sachs, criticized Eliot Spitzer in an Op-ed
piece in the Wall Street Journal for publicly accusing Hank Greenberg of having committed fraud
before any charges were proven or even filed. Spitzer then called Whitehead and threatened him.
According to Whitehead, Spitzer said:
Mr. Whitehead, it's now a war between us and you have fired the first shot. I will be coming
after you. You will pay the price. This is only the beginning and you will pay dearly for
what you have done. You will wish you had never written that letter.
John C. Whitehead, Scary, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2005, at A14. Whitehead remarked that this
conversation was "a little scary." Id.
522. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 507-513.
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statements. It was then forced to join in Spitzer's actions.52 3 In the event,
after firing Greenberg, AIG agreed to pay $1.64 billion to settle charges
brought by Spitzer and the SEC. 24 Three executives of General Re (an
insurance unit of Berkshire Hathaway) and one AIG executive were also
indicted for their operation of an accounting scheme between the two
companies that was alleged to have been used to inflate the reserves of the
American International Group, Inc. by $500 million. 25
VIII. ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE INVESTMENTS
A. UNITARY INVESTMENT FUNDS
There are some other alternative mediums available for collective
investments. One is the unitary investment fund ("UIF") that is widely
employed outside the United States. This "is a contract type entity which is
not independent of its sponsor or manager," as is the case for the open end
mutual fund.526 The UIF may allow redemption of investments, but "[i]ts
design and operation and its success or failure is entirely the responsibility
of its sponsor-manager. 5 2 7 The UIFs have an "all in" annual management
fee plus transaction costs. "They existed in 1940 and in fact were the
preferred form in Boston" and were grandfathered by the Investment
Company Act "with limited corporate democracy imposed by permitting
the unit holders to remove the trustee by a two-thirds vote." '
"The
benefits of a unitary form are realism and the elimination of large amounts
of administrative work at the state and federal level involved with the
corporate governance structure, to say nothing of the internal
administration and legal work involved." 5 9
In 1978, the SEC staff examined whether the UIF concept was
appropriate for wider use. As a part of that study, the use of such entities in
England was examined. The SEC staff and the Investment Company
Institute then sought to draft model legislation for UIFs 3 ° The SEC also
sought public comment on the concept in 1982, but "[m]ost commentators
opposed the UIF, based largely on concerns about the adequacy of investor
protections for UIF investors and unresolved questions about how the

523. Id.
524. Ian McDonald & Liam Pleven, AIG Reaches Accord With Regulators, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2006, at CI.
525. Karen Richardson, Ian McDonald & Liam Pleven, AIG Legal Thicket Grows Thornier, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006, at A3.
526. West, supra note 293, at 64.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 65.
530. Id. at 66.
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concept worked in practice. ,,531
That response cooled interest in the UIF for a time but a study
conducted for the Investment Company Institute by Stephen K. West in
1990 advocated the adoption of a UIF structure.532 The SEC staff rejected
that recommendation in 1992, concluding that, while the UIF approach to
fees "generally is sound," cost savings appeared to be "minimal." The SEC
staff further contended, without any empirical support, that "there is no
practical substitute for the oversight of boards of directors regarding
investment company operations." 53 3 The issue was revisited in 2005 by the
American Enterprise Institute as a part of a series of conferences that
considered the issue of whether there is a better way to regulate mutual
funds. Stephen West appeared at one of those conferences with a revised
proposal that would create a UIF with a board of directors.5 34
B.

UNIT INVESTMENT TRUSTS

The UIF proposal apparently will not go away. The effort to push it
by including a board of directors may help gain SEC support, but is a board
of directors really necessary? Such a management form is permitted by the
Investment Company Act for unit investment trusts ("UITs"). Those
entities hold a fixed group of securities in its portfolio for investors,
providing expertise in the selection of those securities and a degree of
diversification that reduces default risks. The UIT ownership interests are
redeemable but usually trade in a secondary market."3 UITs do not have a
board of directors or an investment advisor, thereby allowing them to
escape most of the onerous corporate governance provisions of the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Rather, UITs are sold under a trust
indenture agreement that spells out the rights of the unit holders. 536 That
indenture also defines the obligations of the sponsor and trustee holding the
UIT's portfolio securities. 37 The Investment Company Act imposes some
minimal obligations on trustees and sponsors, and it allows the trustee to

531. SEC Drv. OF INV. MGMT., PROTECTING INVESTORS 282 n.107 (1992).
532. Stephen K. West, The Investment Company Industry in the 1990s: A Rethinking of the
Regulatory Structure Appropriate for Investment Companies in the 1990's, The Background and
Premisesfor Regulation, REPORT FOR THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 16-17 (1990).
533. SEC Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 531, at 283.
534. Stephen K. West, Sulivan & Cromwell, Remarks at Presentation Before the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy and Research: Is There a Better Way to Regulate Mutual Funds?
(Sept. 26, 2005), transcript available at http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventlD. I 149/transcript.asp.
Mr. West also noted that Cl Investments Inc., a Canadian mutual fund complex, was already planning
to offer funds with a single forward looking fee. Id.
535. United States Trust Co. v. Alpert, 10 F. Supp. 2d 290, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd sub nom.
United States Trust Co. v. Jenner, 168 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999). A third party evaluator is used to price
the UIT interests for the sponsor. Id.
536. Id. at 309.
537. Harmon, supra note 78, at 1048.
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charge such fees as may be provided in the trust indenture agreement. 38
Unlike open end mutual funds, UITs do not trade or manage their
portfolios, but that distinction should not preclude their use for managed
accounts. The fact that managed funds have boards of directors did not
prevent abuses in the 1920s and did not stop the late trading and market
timing practices that were the center of the Spitzer-generated scandals.
Indeed, some unit investment trusts were originally formed in the 1920s
because of concerns with abuses by managed-investment companies that
had boards of directors. "'
C.

TRUST INDENTURE AGREEMENTS

Vast amounts of funds are also invested under a contractual
arrangement used for corporate bonds that is only lightly regulated, at least
as compared to mutual funds. There are $5 trillion in corporate bonds
outstanding. 4 Large amounts of that debt are sold as "debentures" under
"trust indenture agreements" that specify the rights and obligations of the
debenture holders, the issuer and the trustee that acts as a custodian for
principal and interest payments. The corporate issuer of those debentures
has a board of directors, but that board is not there for the protection of
corporate debtors. Absent unusual circumstances, the fiduciary duties of
corporate board members run to equity owners and not lenders. 41
A corporate bond "represents a contractual entitlement to the
repayment of a debt and does not represent an equitable interest in the
issuing corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with
'
concomitant fiduciary duties."542
A bondholder "acquires no equitable
interest, and remains a creditor of the corporation whose interests are
'
protected by the contractual terms of the indenture."543
Moreover, "[a]n
indenture is, of course, a contract. Unless the indenture trustee has
deprived the debentureholders of a right or benefit specifically provided to
them in the indenture, there is no violation of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing." 5" This also means that, "unlike those of an ordinary

538. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26 (2000). The role of the UIT trustee is limited.
The trustee, usually a major bank, is unlike a trustee in most other contexts in that it typically
performs only "ministerial duties," collecting and distributing the interest and dividends due
on the portfolio securities and providing the unit holders with periodic reports concerning the
interest received, amounts distributed and securities in the portfolio.
United States Trust Co. v. Alpert, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
539. Harmon, supra note 78, at 1088.
540. Business and Finance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2006, at Al.
541. See, e.g., Metro. Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
542. Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988).
543. Id. at 304.
544. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., I F.3d 1406, 1415 (3d. Cir. 1993); accord Metro. Life Ins. Co., 716 F.
Supp. at 1524.
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trustee, the duties of an indenture trustee are generally defined by and
limited to the terms of the indenture. 545
Unless
There is some federal regulation of corporate bonds.
the
with
exempted, corporate debt offerings to the public must be registered
SEC under the Securities Act of 1933, bringing those securities into the
SEC's full disclosure regime. Such offerings are also regulated under the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939.546 The latter statute was the result of an SEC
study in 1936 that found that the indenture trustee was often aligned with
the issuer and the trustees were often protected from liability through broad
exculpatory clauses. 547 They included "ostrich" clauses that allowed
indenture trustees to assume that there was no default on the debentures
unless it received notice from at least ten percent of the debenture holders
who were often widely dispersed and unorganized so that any such notice
was unlikely.5 48 "Rather than allow the SEC direct supervision of trustee
behavior and thereby provide for a more overt intrusion into capital
so that.., the indenture ... must be
markets, the Act... is 5structured
'qualified' by the SEC." 49 To be qualified, the indenture may not relieve
the trustee from liability for negligence in carrying out its duties under the
indenture, and the trustee's duties, which are normally only ministerial, are
broadened in the event of a default. 55" The SEC has no enforcement
authority under the Trust Indenture Act once the registration statement
becomes effective for a trust indenture.551
D.

STRUCTURED FINANCE

Another collective investment vehicle is found in structured finance
where special purpose entities ("SPEs") are used to "securitize" cash flows
from assets placed in the SPEs. Ownership interests in the SPEs are sold to
investors and the proceeds from that sale are paid to the owner that
transferred the assets to the SPE. Such entities are formed as limited
partnerships, limited liability companies, partnerships and business trusts.
SPEs have no operational role, nor do they utilize boards of directors. The
SPE's only function is to hold the assets and to 55collect and make any
required payments from the assets' income streams.

545. Harriet & Henderson Yams, Inc. v. Castle, 75 F. Supp. 2d 818, 830 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
546. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77jjj-rrr (2000).
547. Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1005 (1982).
548. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 422, at 181.
549. See Zeffiro, 623 F.2d at 293.
550. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77jjj-rrr (2000).
551. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 422, at 190.
552. The SPE arrangement will often employ various custodians and a "servicer" that acts like an
indenture trustee in collecting and distributing the cash flow. Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate
Reorganization of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured Financing
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SPEs were often used to enhance the credit rating on the SPE
obligations because the assets are isolated from the creditors of the entity
transferring the assets to the SPE. Such isolation could be achieved,
however, only if certain accounting requirements were met. Specifically,
Financial Accounting Standard 140 (FAS 140) allowed the assets and
liabilities of an SPE to be removed from a company's balance sheet only if
an outside investor controlled, and had a substantial investment in, the SPE.
The SEC's Office of Chief Accountant opined that, in order to achieve the
required independence, the outside investor would have to have at least a
three percent substantive equity ownership interest in the SPE. Another
characteristic common to the securitization of assets was that the assets
sold to the SPE would produce an income stream that could be used to pay
back the investors buying interests in the SPE 53
The SPE was initially used to package and resell mortgages and such
investments are now a common part of finance. 54 The concept then spread
to other instruments or obligations that created a stream of payments, such
as credit card receivables55 5 and even song royalties. 55 6 The use of the SPE
was extended beyond limits by the Enron Corp. after it began using markto-market accounting for certain of its assets. That accounting method
resulted in an increase in reported income when those assets were
appreciating but hurt revenue when they began to decline at the end of the
last century. To deal with that decline, Enron sought to "monetize" those
assets by selling them to a SPE. Enron created some 3,000 such entities to
carry out those sales. However, Enron's bankruptcy examiner found that
several Enron SPEs did not have the requisite true sale status because
Enron retained control of the assets and continued to have liability for
decreases in their value, as well as control over the ultimate disposition of
the assets. 57 That scandal resulted in an increase by the Financial

Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 528 (1995).
553. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 70-7 1.
554. These instruments were popularized by the GNMA pass-through certificates in which
mortgages were pooled and interests in those pools sold to investors. See First Nat'l Bank of Chicago
v. Jefferson Mortgage Co., 576 F.2d 479, 482 n.1 (3d Cir. 1978) (describing GNMA pass-through
certificates). Such arrangements were also used to sell privately originated mortgages. See Sec. Indus.
Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1052 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990) (describing
such programs). See generally Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting
Mortgage Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497 (1989) (describing mortgage-backed pools).
A more exotic instrument, the collateralized mortgage obligation, divided the payment streams from
pooled mortgages into various tranches which, among other things, has interest only and principal only
payment streams. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 422, at 611-12. These complicated instruments
were often difficult to value and could cause substantial losses. See Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alexander
Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1038 (4th Cir. 1997) (describing some such losses).
555. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 422, at 621-22.
556. Nicole Chu, Bowie Bonds: A Key to Unlocking the Wealth of Intellectual Property, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 469, 471 (1999) (describing such arrangements).
557. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 70-71.
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Accounting Standards Board
("FASB") in the independent investor
558
requirement to ten percent.
E.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

Another entity that may operate without a board of directors is the
limited liability company ("LLC"). They were created as the result of the
realization that traditional corporate governance structures were often too
unwieldy for small businesses. Wyoming was the first state to enact
559
legislation allowing such entities in 1977, and other states soon followed.
The LLC authorized by those statutes allowed complete flexibility in
capital structure and management. They are also tax advantaged because
the Internal Revenue Service has allowed pass through tax treatment for the
owners of LLCs.56 ° Ownership interests in an LLC that are marketed to
passive investors may be required to register under the federal securities
laws unless exempted. 6 1
The interests of the members of the LLC were not represented by
traditional stock that was governed by the corporate laws of the state of
incorporation.
Rather, their ownership rights are spelled out in an
"operating agreement" that governs the operations and management of the
LLC. The operating agreement may be quite detailed on how the affairs of
the company were to be managed and may permit management structures
outside the traditional board of directors.562 The courts are currently
wrestling with the issue of when fiduciary duties will apply to the managers
563
of an LLC and whether the operating agreement may define those duties.
IX. CONCLUSION

An alternative is needed to the intrusive and expensive regulatory
scheme under the Investment Company Act of 1940 that has failed to
protect investors. The SEC's fixation on the use of outside directors to
guard against conflicts of interest on the part of investment advisers to
mutual funds has proved to be ineffective. That obsession is being pursued
without empirical support for the agency's claim that increasing outside
directors has any effect on the efficacy of a mutual fund or any other
corporate governance structure. Outside directors did not prevent or detect
the scandals uncovered by Spitzer. Outside directors have no way in the
future to prevent misconduct because the investment adviser and sponsor

558. Id. at 471.
559. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999) (describing development of
LLCs).
560. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supranote 296, at 82.
561. JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS L. HAZEN, CORPORATIONS §1.11 (2d ed. 2003).
562. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supranote 296, at 82.
563. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supranote 296, at 86.
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control all information flows. Outside directors, no matter how numerous,
have no way to gain independent access to that flow. Indeed, it seems
strange that the SEC and corporate governance advocates would want to
place management of mutual funds and other corporations into the hands of
outside directors who have no day-to-day knowledge of the business.
Hedge funds have become one of the most successful investment
mediums in the country without SEC regulation.564 The hedge funds have
conflicts of interest but have dealt with them adequately without a
mandated number of outside directors. The hedge fund's cousin, the
commodity pool, has operated successfully as limited partnerships that
have no board of directors. Trust indentures, unit investment trusts,
structured finance and limited liability companies also operate quite well
without boards of outside directors. Conflicts of interest are handled by
disclosures and contractual restrictions. The trust indenture is a good
example of how those conflicts can be managed by negative covenants and
other restrictions. Insurance companies are regulated intensively but have
no seventy-five percent outside director requirement such as that imposed
by the SEC on mutual funds.
Without intruding too far into the debate over market efficiency
between the Chicago and behavioral schools of thought, there are market
disciplines available. 6 5 The trust indenture is negotiated under that
discipline. As one court noted, "those indentures are often not the product
of face-to-face negotiations between the ultimate holders and the issuing
company. What remains equally true, however, is that underwriters
ordinarily negotiate the terms of the indentures with the issuers. Since the
underwriters must then sell or place the bonds, they necessarily negotiate in
part with the interests of the buyers in mind."56' 6 The UIF operates abroad
without the SEC corporate governance restrictions. Its forward looking fee
removes many of the conflicts of interest generated by mutual funds using
a fluctuating backward looking NAV fee. Contractual restrictions can be
added to reduce other conflicts.
Of course, there is no such thing as a foolproof regulatory or
contractual structure. UIF operators will still have incentives to inflate
their returns in order to attract investors, which could lead to destructive
564. Some mutual funds are even seeking to copy the high risk activities of hedge funds in order to
increase returns. Eleanor Laise, Mutual Funds Adopt Hedge-Fund Tactics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2006,
at Dl.
565. The efficient market theory of that school has taken something of a battering, but market
discipline remains a determining basis for disciplining management. See generally Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 630 (1999) (discussing flaws in efficient market theory).
566. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). A district
court has also held that there may exist an efficient market even in high yield (junk) bonds. AAL High
Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 686 (D. Ala. 2005).
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effects when high risk investments are acquired to boost those returns.
Nevertheless, consumers should be given a choice of a managed investment
company that does not have a traditional board of directors or one that is
staffed by a mandatory number of outside directors with little or no
knowledge of the day-to-day business. At the end of the day, consumers
will choose the medium that will provide the greatest after-fee return.
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